Remarks by NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby at the INMM/ESARDA Joint Annual Meeting

Good morning, everyone. It’s a pleasure to be here at the 2^nd annual joint meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, and an honor to be with my colleagues Rafael Grossi, Rob Floyd, and Stephen Lachner on this opening panel. Thank you to Mariana and Mari for moderating our session.

We are witnessing an unprecedented convergence of increased interest in nuclear energy, innovation in nuclear energy technology, and a deteriorating international nuclear security environment. Therefore, this conference comes at a pivotal moment. It represents an important opportunity to share activities and best practices, and to generate new ideas to improve effective solutions. Nuclear proliferation, safety, safeguards, and security are issues that can only be addressed through a common vision and strong international cooperation.

The organization I lead, the National Nuclear Security Administration or NNSA, within the U.S. Department of Energy has three primary missions: design and production of the U.S. nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism, and nuclear reactor design for the U.S. Navy. These missions are all accomplished in a U.S. nuclear enterprise with dedicated science, engineering, and technology talent at national labs, naval reactor labs, and dedicated production facilities distributed across the United States.

At first blush, the nonproliferation mission may seem misplaced. However, it’s placement among nuclear weapons and naval reactors programs is quite an advantage in developing science-based, informed, and practical solutions for nuclear non-proliferation. The nonproliferation program has access to amazing talent and facilities. The way we see it, the nuclear non-proliferation mission coupled with the other missions represent holistic nuclear deterrence and advancement of peaceful nuclear uses.

The promotion of peaceful uses of atomic energy is a longstanding U.S. goal promoted 70 years ago this year in President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech at the U.N General Assembly. In his forward-looking address, Eisenhower expressed hope that the energy of the atom would “serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.”  In the decades since, the international community has worked together to develop an overlapping framework of institutions, treaties, and norms to develop and realize the benefits of nuclear technology and discourage nuclear weapons proliferation

While our global progress is commendable, today’s environment is a harsh reminder of the work still needed. We have both unfinished business in monitoring, safeguards, and security from the relatively stable environment of the past several decades and we also have new and emerging challenges arising. Doing this work together internationally may serve as an important mechanism to rebuild trust between nations at this time when we are increasingly at odds and having a hard time finding common goals.

To be frank, Russia’s full-scale, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has completely rewritten the nuclear security script. Russia’s violation and looting of the Chernobyl nuclear exclusion zone and an unprecedented armed seizure of an operating civil nuclear power plant, Zaporizhzhia, have been major wake up calls. These actions have put civilian lives in danger and threatened radiological contamination across Ukraine and the region. It has forced us to redefine how we think about nuclear power plant safeguards and security, nuclear terrorism, and international cooperation. And it has reminded us of the responsibilities that must come with supplying nuclear power technology to other countries.

This redefinition of nuclear security is occurring alongside the largest adoption of nuclear power in decades. The nuclear power renaissance is recognized as essential to combating climate change and securing sustainable development. Today, there are just under 440 nuclear reactors in operations worldwide with roughly another 60 under construction, representing close to a 15% expansion. Dozens of additional reactors are in the planning stage, and it seems clear that more growth in the global reactor fleet is coming and, indeed, is needed to support clean energy and climate goals.

For safe and secure civilian nuclear power expansion, new ideas must be developed for security, safeguards, and counter-smuggling and counterproliferation. The risks are not theoretical. Plots for terrorist use of a nuclear or radiological device have been disrupted, and interceptions of smuggled nuclear material have occurred. In 2021, the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database recorded over 120 incidents of attempted nuclear or radiological theft or smuggling. And we know nuclear weapons programs can emerge from peaceful nuclear energy programs. The further proliferation of nuclear weapons or a nuclear incident anywhere in the world will have severe implications to peace and security and to humankind’s ability to address climate change.

The promise of civilian nuclear power can only be realized if it is safe and secure, and perceived by the public to be nearly harmless. Effective nuclear safety, security, and safeguards measures build public confidence that nuclear energy is a viable clean source of electricity and shifts the narrative from one driven by fear to one driven by the promise.

The good news is that, as an international nuclear community, we developed a solid framework for nuclear safeguards and security over the past few decades. The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources has been in place for 20 years, and the International Convention of Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment are well developed. Our collective challenge will be to make sure these regimes adapt to emerging technologies – from new reactor designs, to new fuels, to fusion energy.

NNSA is committed to devising and implementing strong domestic and international export control regimes. For proposed transfers of nuclear technology, NNSA works closely with our U.S. interagency partners, experts from our national laboratories, and international allies and partners to assess proliferation risks. This process includes nuclear and nuclear related dual-use goods, nuclear equipment, components, materials, and technology under relevant regulations. NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation maintains more than 100 bilateral partnerships and works with multilateral organizations like the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime to counter theft and smuggling networks and improve the security of vulnerable assets. This work was highlighted as a U.S. national security priority with the March 2023 release of the National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security. Policies like these demonstrate America’s sustained commitment to nuclear safety and security and NNSA is working to bring this new strategy into practice.

The expansion of nuclear power creates additional proliferation challenges by increasing the overall quantity of facilities, material, and expertise that needs to be protected and accounted. The international community must develop more efficient and effective technologies if we are to maintain the same level of confidence without a huge increase in resources. Given technological advances in satellite sensing, data analysis, and other technologies this may fortuitously be achievable. A roadmap of the most promising technologies and an international commitment to their developments is essential and I encourage this to be discussed during this conference.

New reactor types, especially small modular reactors, or SMRs, and advanced reactors, or ARs, will also require new safeguards and security approaches. With advanced reactors in the early stages of development, there is an opportunity for governments, regulators, and the nuclear industry to work together not only to strengthen safety features, but also security and safeguards features of nuclear reactors and their associated fuel cycle facilities. For the nuclear industry, this can provide a significant competitive advantage for their reactors’ commercial viability in international markets.

NNSA is actively partnering with the U.S. nuclear industry and U.S. national laboratories through two programs, International Nuclear Security for Advanced Reactors, or INSTAR, and Advanced Reactor International Safeguards Engagement, or ARISE. Both programs tackle key features of small modular and advanced reactors, with INSTAR promoting security-by-design and ARISE promoting safeguards-by-design. Integrating safeguards and security by design at the vendor level means that exported technology can be easier for the importing country to use and makes nuclear energy technology more likely to succeed.

NNSA is also supporting the Proliferation Resistance Optimization Program, or PRO-X, where we work with research reactor designers to minimize special nuclear materials production and diversion pathways while maximizing reactor performance for stated peaceful uses. Our hope is to apply the expertise and lessons learned from this program to advanced nuclear reactors.

Finally, NNSA routinely engages with industry to ensure they remain compliant with Department of Energy nuclear export control regulations under 10 CFR Part 810, or Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities. You’ll find some of our amazing nuclear security, safeguards, and export control specialists here at this event if you have any questions on any of these lines of effort.

We remain committed to working with international partners. NNSA has deep experience engaging with nuclear newcomers to develop the capacity to adopt nuclear power in a secure manner, consistent with international best practices and the IAEA’s Milestones approach. We advise on developing and strengthening domestic legal and regulatory frameworks on nuclear safeguards and security, including implementing the country’s international nuclear safeguards obligations under their respective agreements with the IAEA.

To wrap up, I want to reiterate that we all benefit from clean energy, energy security, and sustainable development. Together, we can advance nuclear power as a peaceful, safe, and secure energy source. As responsible nations, organizations, and stakeholders, we have the moral responsibilities to both combat climate change and halt the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. NNSA will continue to utilize its nonproliferation, nuclear and radiological security, emergency response, and counterterrorism expertise to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful expansion of nuclear energy and other nuclear technology in this changing world.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.