Remarks by Administrator Jill Hruby, Council on Strategic Risks, Commission on Nuclear Energy and Climate Security, Dinner and Reception, October 12, 2023

Good evening, everyone, it’s a pleasure to be here and particularly to celebrate with Susan Eisenhower the staying power of the vision in President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech delivered 70 years ago this December.  Thank you to the Council on Strategic Risks, especially Sherri Goodman and Dan Poneman, for the invitation to speak with you tonight.

As the NNSA Administrator, my team and I have the responsibility for three core missions: the nuclear deterrent, nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism, and naval reactors.  We accomplish all our missions through an incredibly capable network of national laboratories, and dedicated production plants and sites distributed throughout the United States with decades of experience in these primary missions.   All our missions are challenging and important, however it is important to note the nuclear deterrent mission, including associated infrastructure investments, has about ten times more funding than each of the other two mission areas.

And, as you likely know, there is quite a lot changing in the nuclear deterrence landscape.  Russia and China are advancing their nuclear capabilities, China is increasing the size of its stockpile, and neither are interested in arms control discussions.  Last week, the Russian envoy to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization gave notice of their intent to revoke their ratification.  North Korea continues missile testing and Iran continues enriching uranium.  Furthermore, the countries seem to be increasing their partnerships with each other. And, of course, the actions by Hamas in Israel remind us that we can’t forget there are non-state actors who wish to do us or our allies harm.

In light of this global environment, the Strategic Posture Commission released its report today on the future deterrent and is calling for more and/or different varieties of weapons for the emerging future in 2027 and beyond.  I think we can all agree the nuclear deterrence landscape is increasingly complicated, and increasingly demanding. 

However, against this backdrop, we are acutely aware the world is also confronting the growing impacts of climate change. The need for nuclear power as clean base-load power is growing.  The Department of Energy has released a report that indicates nuclear power in the U.S. will need to grow by an additional 200 GW by 2050 to achieve our clean energy goals.   NNSA supports the need for nuclear power – we certainly can’t turn our back on realistic and necessary options to achieve our climate goals.

So, in my time in this job, I have come to the realization that humankind faces two existential threats for the first time in modern history – one is climate change and the other, a holdover from the last century that isn’t going away, is nuclear weapons.  Both the solution to climate change and our nuclear deterrent involve the splitting of the atom, and in this important way they are tied together.

It is imperative that governments, citizens, and industry around the world work with each other in a way that has not yet been realized to achieve the goal of addressing both existential threats simultaneously.  Everyone in this room has a role to play in that.

The Adoption of Nuclear Power

The rate of adoption of nuclear power is one of the largest we’ve seen in decades.  At the end of last year, there were just over 400 nuclear reactors in operation worldwide with 27 more in suspended operation and another 58 under construction, representing close to a 15% increase in the worldwide reactor fleet. 

Just recently, the IAEA released its annual report on nuclear power projections through 2050 indicating that nuclear generating capacity could grow by 23 to 140%, or 458-890 GW, by mid-century depending on adoption rates. Importantly, many of the countries currently building or planning to build reactors are nuclear newcomers that currently lack the institutional capacity and technical expertise to adopt and implement the strongest possible safeguards and security measures. 

To state the obvious, the adoption of nuclear power has nuclear proliferation and security risks. Increasing the number of facilities and amount of material, and furthering expertise needs to be managed. 

Although safety remains a critical feature of any nuclear power installation, the Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine has caused concerns about the deployment of additional Russian designed facilities, dependent on Russian fuel, and vulnerable to sabotage and control.  We must also keep an eye on the broader security or proliferation dangers associated with export of Chinese designed facilities. 

Clearly, to manage risks the U.S. would like to expand the reach of nuclear power facilities designed by us and our allies and partners.  To successfully export civilian nuclear power plants while maintaining the highest standards for safeguards and security, the U.S. needs to negotiate more 123 agreements.  The U.S. Department of State, together with the DOE and NNSA, knows there is a need to accelerate 123 agreements.  However, at the same time, other countries are wanting more flexibility in fuel cycle agreements.  This will continue to challenge our thoughts on the gold standard 123 agreement and perhaps spur R&D on new reactor and fuel cycle concepts that are more inherently secure and safeguarded.  The promise of a world powered by advanced and small modular reactors and new fuel types is an impetus for a more dynamic approach in our global nuclear cooperation. The United States can be a leader in this emerging civilian reactor market, as it is currently the center of SMR development.

As we work our way through 123 agreements, U.S. industry may still develop the relationships necessary to market their reactors abroad sharing their technology and designs using Part 810.  NNSA is committed to continued improvement to streamline the 810 process and enable US industry outreach.

But there are challenges in our efforts to market U.S. nuclear technology.  First, there are significant differences in how the U.S. and our allies put together financing packages versus state-owned, strategically integrated bids. We also have different approaches to used fuel reprocessing and recycling.  Although we aren’t involved in financing, NNSA is working with DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, or DOE-NE and Advanced Research Projects Agency- Energy, or ARPA-E to help guide their R&D efforts in directions that can be economically viable and proliferation resistant by taking advantage of new technology developments.

As a side note, it was interesting that at the IAEA General Conference a few weeks ago the Russians are clearly putting forward an argument that they have continuously built, operated, and advanced nuclear power more than anyone else around the world.  This is likely to be part of their “sales pitch” and it could be compelling to potential customers.  We should not expect that we will win the day without strong and innovative packages.

Before we leave this topic, I want to express how important it is to support the IAEA’s nuclear safeguards inspection and the role that plays in strengthening the international nonproliferation and nuclear security regime.  Without a strong IAEA we simply cannot manage the risk associated with nuclear power.

Uranium

Now, I would like to an update on some of the steps NNSA and the Department of Energy have taken in the area of uranium supply and uranium enrichment. 

In Fiscal Year 2021, Congress appropriated $75M to NNSA with the intent, at least partially, to reinvigorate uranium mining in the U.S.  When we released a Request for Information, we received over 26,500 responses that represented interests ranging from uranium mining advocates to strong opposition.  Through the RFI, we confirmed that $75M was not enough to restart a uranium mine in the U.S., but that a significant amount of uranium had already been mined but not sold.  With the $75M allocation, and about $7 million of our existing funds, we were able to support the uranium mining industry by purchasing a significant amount of already mined material and placed it in a uranium reserve managed by NNSA.  This was an important first step toward revitalizing this industry.

The next activity we undertook as a department was developing a unified uranium strategy.  This might sound simple, but it was in fact quite complicated.  We started by defining future uranium needs for civil nuclear power, both Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU).  We also confirmed our needs for enriched uranium for defense purposes in NNSA including LEU for tritium production and HEU for weapons and naval reactors. 

As we started working on a unified strategy, two world events influenced the effort: the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the announcement of AUKUS, the Australia – U.S. -U.K. partnership to supply a nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia.  The Russian invasion raised the question of whether they could be a trusted supplier going forward, and the AUKUS announcement raised the potential for an increased need for HEU for naval reactors in the future.

The unified strategy therefore begins with increased LEU and HALEU commercial production in the United States.  NNSA would like a commercial option for LEU and HALEU using all U.S.-made equipment so that enriched uranium can be used for future defense needs in the late 2040s or early 2050s.  NE has been championing HALEU enrichment.  Using about $150M in cost-shared DOE funds, this week, HALEU production has started at the Centrus facility in Piketon, Ohio.  This is the first new U.S.-owned uranium enrichment plant to begin production since 1954.  NNSA has been championing R&D on U.S. centrifuge technology at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and uranium processing at BWXT. 

Due to the realization that there is not unlimited HEU left over from excess Cold War weapons, DOE and NNSA also conducted a deep dive to identify all unallocated HALEU within our labs and plants to help supply some of the material needed for the advanced reactor demonstration projects.  Both NE and NNSA obtained funding to recover the HALEU identified.  

There are still unresolved issues with LEU, HALEU, and HEU production in the United States.  For example, NE has requested but not yet received funding to incentivize the production of HALEU in the U.S.  As you all know, incentivizing HALEU production will also incentivize LEU production.  Additionally, there has not been resolution on whether, when, or under what conditions the U.S. would ban buying enriched uranium from Russia.  Finally, NNSA also needs to decide how to position for future unencumbered LEU and HEU production – including what technology will be used and whether there will be a government-owned enterprise or whether it will be a partnership of some sort with the commercial sector.

It has been proven hard to build and sustain the right government and commercial partnerships in uranium enrichment, but to address the current existential threats we really need to get it right.

Managing Nonproliferation and Security

Let’s go back to managing proliferation and security risks. 

For newcomer countries, DOE/NNSA is willing to engage to build capacity and competency so that nuclear power can be adopted in a safe, secure, and responsible manner.  We champion international best practices, including those developed and promulgated by the IAEA, and the safeguards standards outlined in the NPT.   For example, we worked with the UAE to train their university students on a lifecycle approach to nuclear power. 

We also believe it is important to design and implement strong domestic export control regulations and multilateral export control regimes.  For proposed transfers of nuclear technology, NNSA works closely with our U.S. interagency partners, experts from our national laboratories, and international allies and partners to assess proliferation risks.  This includes nuclear and nuclear related dual-use goods, nuclear equipment, components, materials, and technology under relevant regulations.  NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation maintains more than 100 bilateral partnerships and works with multilateral organizations like the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime to counter theft and smuggling networks and improve nuclear security.  This work was highlighted as a U.S. national security priority with the March 2023 release of the National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security, demonstrating the government’s attention and commitment to the issue.

Going Forward

Going forward, large scale nuclear power plants are no longer going to be the only approach for generating nuclear energy.  They will likely co-exist with smaller scale and advanced reactors that are better solutions in some environments including lower density populations and smaller countries.  Also, smaller scale plants may fit more seamlessly with renewable options, provide resilience to failure, and require less capital investment. 

NNSA actively partners with the U.S. nuclear industry through two programs, International Nuclear Security for Advanced Reactors, or INSTAR, and Advanced Reactor International Safeguards Engagement, or ARISE.  Both programs tackle key features of small modular and advanced reactors, with INSTAR promoting security-by-design and ARISE promoting safeguards-by-design.  Working with industry on safeguards and security by design increases the proliferation resistance of American nuclear technologies. By ensuring that our designs meet the highest standards of nonproliferation, we can decrease the burden on importing countries and increase the worldwide adoption of American technologies.

Finally, I want to brag a bit on NNSA accomplishments in fusion energy.  Just last year, scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory made history by achieving ignition in a controlled fusion experiment for the first time.  Capitalizing on more than six decades of research and innovation, our technical team was able to get more power out from fusion than laser power in.  And twice this year they did it again.  Although there is still much work to do, these results are important first steps towards more efficient fusion that could someday provide clean energy with fewer proliferation and security concerns.

To wrap up, I want to reiterate that we all benefit from clean energy and energy security.  I believe that President Eisenhower’s vision of the atom serving the needs rather than the fears of humanity is possible.  NNSA will continue to utilize its nonproliferation, nuclear and radiological security, emergency response, and counterterrorism expertise to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful expansion of nuclear energy and other nuclear technology in this changing world.

Thank you.