NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator Frank Rose Remarks to the DOE/NNSA Combatant Command/Interagency Liaison On-Site Meeting, Sep. 22, 2023

Thank you, Jenny, for that kind introduction.

It is great to be here with you all this morning, although if I’m being honest, I kind of wish we were meeting at your offices instead of mine.  I love to travel, and this year I was fortunate enough to be able to visit some of our Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Liaisons at their host commands and organizations.  I’ll share some takeaways from these visits later, but for now, it suffices to say that I gained an even greater appreciation for the importance of your work enabling coordination and collaboration with our interagency partners and host organizations.

So no matter whether we are meeting in Hawaii, Florida, or . . . well, Forrestal, I’m still honored to be able to talk to you today.

This morning I’d like to focus my remarks on three specific topics:

1) NNSA’s missions in an increasingly complex and interconnected global security environment; 2) NNSA’s Strategic Vision and how our Strategic Plan seeks to meet these complicated challenges over the next five years; and 3) How our DOE/NNSA LNOs support the Department’s goals and engagements with the DoD combatant commands.

NNSA and the Emerging Threat Environment

But first, let’s begin by quickly surveying the emerging threat conditions that are shaping our decisions about NNSA’s missions.  As the U.S. Director for National Intelligence’s recent Annual Threat Assessment concluded:

The United States and its allies will confront a complex and pivotal international security environment dominated by . . . strategic challenges [that] will intersect and interact in unpredictable ways, leading to mutually reinforcing effects that could challenge our ability to respond.

In addition to shared global challenges such as climate change, health security, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism, the D-N-I warns of an era of renewed nation-state conflict and strategic competition with great powers and rising regional powers. Indeed, prior to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia was already accelerating its nuclear modernization programs, especially in non-strategic weapons and delivery systems and novel, “exotic” weapons like an autonomous nuclear torpedo.  Although the United States and Russia were able to extend New START in early 2021 for another five years, Russia has since announced its suspension of implementation of the treaty.  And Putin’s ominous statements, and those of other Russian officials, hinting at the potential use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine are dangerous and irresponsible.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has also featured an unprecedented event in the history of warfare: ongoing hostilities around—and armed seizure of—operating civil nuclear power plants.  The risks associated with military activities around Ukraine’s nuclear facilities cannot be overstated, as they undercut safety, hinder the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to fulfill its safeguards mandate, and increase the risk of a nuclear accident or incident that could affect large numbers of people in Ukraine and neighboring states, with impacts felt around the world.  Russia’s military attacks and seizures of nuclear facilities in Ukraine severely undermine Moscow’s claim to be a responsible nuclear power, and have been strongly condemned by the international community.

At the same time, China is expanding its political and economic influence and is in the midst of the largest ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history.  It is building hundreds of new I-C-B-M silos and is increasing the number and types of nuclear weapons without transparency in either its doctrine or forces.  Moreover, despite repeated attempts by the last several U.S. presidential administrations, Beijing has not shown any interest in engaging in either the strategic stability or arms control discussions expected of a responsible nuclear power.  This opacity makes determining an effective strategy more difficult, both in terms of maintaining deterrence and in finding a way to integrate China into a future arms control and strategic stability framework.

Looking beyond these peer competitors, North Korea has expanded its nuclear weapons stockpile and range of delivery capabilities and has resumed I-C-B-M testing.  Additionally, in stark contrast to the tenets of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, last year Kim Jong Un announced a new “Nuclear Forces Policy Law” that would permit Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons first against non-nuclear states.

And while Iran may or may not agree to the conditions necessary to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in the past five years it has expanded its nuclear program to operate more advanced centrifuges and enrich more uranium, including at levels closer to weapons grade.

In addition to the challenges these nations pose for our decisions about nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation, Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang have also demonstrated the capability and intent to advance their interests at the expense of the United States and its allies through malicious cyber operations.  Taken together, these developments make for a very complex international environment, one that informs NNSA’s decisions about how to approach our missions and are why NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby told Congress in April, “Not since the Manhattan project has there been a more challenging moment for the NNSA.”

NNSA’s Strategic Plan

To meet these challenges, last year Administrator Hruby and I issued the NNSA’s 2022 Strategic Vision, which established four mission priorities:

1) To design and deliver the Nation’s nuclear stockpile;

2) Forging solutions that enable global security and stability;

3) Harnessing the atom to power our global naval fleet; and

4) Leveraging transformative technologies to address emerging challenges.

NNSA prioritizes the protection of the American people, our allies, and our partners against an array of nuclear risks and challenges while working to improve global security and stability. In pursuing this mission, we must remain adaptive and responsible in our efforts to provide a resilient and responsive Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

To accomplish these missions, NNSA developed a Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2022-2026 that outlines our mid-term goals and objectives. The strategic plan identifies three goals that support NNSA’s mission and vision. First, we seek to modernize the Nuclear Security Enterprise, including the infrastructure, technologies, and capabilities needed to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.  To support this modernization effort, we are increasing investment in the science, technology, and engineering – ST&E – that serve as the foundation for science-based stockpile activities and develop new and innovative solutions for nuclear security. 

Second, we are looking to build a diverse and inclusive workforce through recruitment, retention, and leadership development. Just as the Manhattan Project included scientists and engineers working side-by-side with colleagues from different backgrounds exposes us to experiences and perspectives that challenge our own outlooks, not only on scientific and professional matters, but on the larger world.  

Third, the simple reality is that when it comes to leveraging innovation to meet future challenges, NNSA can’t do it alone.  Our success depends on our ability to collaborate, and thus we are working to strengthen partnerships with other government agencies, international partners, industry, academia, and the public to enhance collaboration, information sharing, and transparency.  This begins with the laboratories, plants, and sites and M-and-O’s that form the broader Nuclear Security Enterprise, continues with constructive relationships within the Department of Energy, and carries over to collaborations with external partners in the Department of Defense – to include STRATCOM and the Navy – the State Department, Congress, and international allies and partners. 

These partnerships are especially critical to our second mission priority, which entails working towards a world with fewer nuclear risks.  As the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review noted: “Preventing an act of nuclear terrorism is an enduring national security requirement.”  The large and growing stockpiles of nuclear and radioactive material, technology, and expertise worldwide makes the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism a significant concern, and the fear that terrorists could acquire and use a nuclear or radiological weapon has motivated a range of efforts to place these materials beyond the reach of non-state actors.

Consequently, in March President Biden signed a National Security Memorandum on Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advancing Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security to direct our efforts in reducing global nuclear and radiological threats domestically and globally. This Memorandum emphasizes the need for collaboration between the U.S. Government and partner governments to counter WMD terrorism.  Indeed, over the past two decades NNSA has partnered with more than 100 countries across the globe to enhance nuclear and radiological security and improve counter nuclear smuggling capabilities. We also engage with international organizations such as the IAEA to develop and implement guidance and training, and to provide technical assistance to countries to improve nuclear security.

The Value of DOE/NNSA Liaison Officers

NNSA’s Liaison Officers to the DOD combatant commands and the interagency strengthen these ground-level efforts in nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear incident response, and nuclear counterproliferation. You ensure our partner organization and command’s policies and operations are informed by NNSA’s unsurpassed knowledge of nuclear threats by facilitating cooperation and coordination, and supporting DOD planning, training, exercises, and partner-capacity building efforts. 

As I mentioned earlier, I have been privileged to see this vital work up close. Earlier this year I visited U.S. European Command Headquarters and saw the important roles NNSA and EUCOM are playing in reducing nuclear and radiological dangers resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine.  The DOE-NNSA Liaison to EUCOM facilitates two-way communication flow between our organizations, enabling operational and technical reach back capabilities between EUCOM and DOE-NNSA headquarters and to the national laboratories.  While in Germany, I also visited AFRICOM headquarters to discuss our current initiatives in Africa and the synchronization to NNSA’s activities and capabilities with AFRICOM’s campaign objectives in support of African energy security, stability, and prosperity.  While visiting our allies in East Asia this summer I visited U.S. Forces Korea, and heard from the Chief of Staff – Brigadier General Weidner – and the USFK staff about how much they value NNSA’s support for the command, and how the DOE-NNSA LNO offsets the USFK’s limited counter-WMD experience by supporting the planning, assessing, and exploiting of Radiological and Nuclear sites, counterproliferation operational support, crisis response, and consequence management.

I recognize that this is only a limited snapshot of the important role our LNOs play in supporting DOE/NNSA’s strategic vision and supporting U.S. national security.  Yet it is clear that recent international crises have demonstrated your value in supporting a whole of government response across the competition continuum, and the fact that an increasing number of DOD and interagency partners have requested DOE-NNSA Liaisons to support and better align our efforts is a testament to your importance.

Conclusion

In the end, although infrastructure and technology are important, what is really critical to mission success is our people.  And the DOE-NNSA Liaisons program’s success is really a reflection of your commitment to national security and professional excellence. 

On behalf of Administrator Hruby and the entire NNSA leadership, thank you for your hard work and dedication.

It is an honor to be with you here this morning, and I look forward to any questions you may have.