NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator Frank Rose Remarks at The Brookings Institution

Thank you, Mike, for that kind introduction and for the invitation to speak with you all this afternoon. 

It is a real pleasure to be back at Brookings, to be amongst so many old colleagues and friends, and to be able to speak with you this morning. 

I’d like to broadly focus my remarks on three topics: 1) What the National Nuclear Security Administration is and what we do; 2) How we are adapting to a rapidly changing security environment and delivering an effective nuclear deterrent; and 3) I will conclude with some thoughts about what we can do in the near term to prepare for the future of arms control. 

NNSA and the Emerging Threat Environment

I’d like to begin, however, by quickly surveying the emerging threat conditions that are shaping our decisions about nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation. 

On Monday the Office of the Director for National Intelligence released its Annual Threat Assessment, and concluded upfront that:

The United States faces an increasingly fragile global order strained by accelerating strategic competition among major powers, more intense and unpredictable transnational challenges, and multiple regional conflicts with far-reaching implications. 

Specifically, the DNI warns that “the expansion of nuclear weapons stockpiles and their delivery systems, coupled with increasing regional conflicts involving nuclear weapons states, pose a significant challenge.”

Of these competitors, Russia maintains the largest and most capable nuclear weapons stockpile, and even prior to its invasion of Ukraine was working to expand and modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities. Moscow continues to develop long-range nuclear-capable missiles and underwater delivery systems meant to penetrate or bypass U.S. missile defenses. Russia is also expanding its large, diverse, and modern set of nonstrategic systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads. These capabilities are particularly ominous given President Putin’s dangerous and irresponsible statements – and those of other Russian officials – hinting at the potential use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has also featured an unprecedented event in the history of warfare: ongoing hostilities around—and the armed seizure of—an operating civil nuclear power plant.  The risks associated with military activities around and against Ukraine’s nuclear facilities cannot be overstated. These activities undercut nuclear safety, hinder the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to fulfill its safeguards and security mandate, and increase the risk of a nuclear emergency that could affect large numbers of people in Ukraine and neighboring states, with impacts felt around the world.  Russia’s military attacks against and seizures of nuclear facilities in Ukraine severely undermine Moscow’s claim to be – and long-standing effort to promote itself as – a responsible nuclear power and have been strongly condemned by the international community.

At the same time, China is in the midst of the largest ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history. According to the Department of Defense’s annual report on Chinese Military Power, “The PRC is investing in, and expanding, the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this major expansion of its nuclear forces.”  This includes developing and building fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities that would enable the swift expansion of its warhead manufacturing capability.  Consequently, if it continues the current pace of its nuclear expansion, by 2035 China will likely field a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads.  Together with the hundreds of new ICBM silos constructed in the past three years, China appears to be abandoning its historic minimum deterrence posture. 

Moreover, despite repeated attempts by the last several U.S. presidential administrations, Beijing has shown no interest in engaging in either the strategic stability or arms control discussions expected of a responsible nuclear power. This opacity makes determining an effective strategy more difficult, both in terms of maintaining deterrence and in finding a way to integrate China into a future arms control and strategic stability framework. 

Looking beyond these near-peer competitors, North Korea continues to enhance its ability to threaten both our Asian allies and the U.S. homeland, expanding its nuclear weapons stockpile and range of delivery capabilities, and resuming ICBM testing.  Additionally, in stark contrast to the tenets of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, last year Kim Jong Un announced a new “Nuclear Forces Policy Law” that would permit Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons first against non-nuclear states.

And in the past five years Iran has expanded its nuclear program to operate more advanced centrifuges and enrich more uranium, including at levels closer to weapons grade. Consequently, the IAEA warned in December that Iran has enough material to make three nuclear bombs if it decides to cross the 60 percent enrichment threshold.  And of course, Iranian proxies remain an active threat to our national security and to international stability, having attacked U.S. forces in Iraq, Jordan, and attacking international shipping in the Red Sea. 

Taken together, these developments make for a very complex international environment, one that is dramatically different from that which we faced 25 years ago.  The U.S. nuclear deterrent is critical to deterring and, if necessary, responding to these threats, which is why NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby has frequently observed: “Not since the Manhattan project has there been a more challenging moment for the NNSA.”

NNSA’s Missions

Although many of you are familiar with NNSA and its predecessor agencies, for those of you who are not, the Congress established NNSA in 2000 with three enduring missions: 

1. Ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; 

2. Reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and

3. Providing military effective nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines.

Everything that we do at NNSA, from stockpile stewardship to detecting signatures of clandestine weapons programs, is underpinned by the Nuclear Security Enterprise’s unique expertise in science and technology.  NNSA manages eight government-owned, contractor-operated national laboratories, plants, and sites throughout the country.  These partners – and the roughly 60,000 scientists, engineers, technicians, managers, and support staff who comprise the Nuclear Security Enterprise’s workforce – apply world-class scientific, engineering, and technological capabilities to support nuclear security and global stability.

These partnerships are critical, and no partner is more vital to NNSA’s success than the Department of Defense.  After all, it is the Pentagon who designs, develops, and deploys the delivery systems that enable STRATCOM to execute its nuclear deterrence mission.  In other words, DOD is effectively the “customer” for whom NNSA maintains the stockpile of nuclear warheads, making sure it meets military requirements such as quantity of weapons and yield.  NNSA has the responsibility to design and build the nation’s nuclear stockpile and to maintain the stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive testing.  These complementary efforts are closely coordinated through the Nuclear Weapons Council, which keeps warhead and delivery platform programs aligned and provides management, oversight, and integration of all U.S. nuclear weapons programs.

And NNSA is delivering capabilities to our partners, providing nuclear warheads that meet safety, security, and performance requirements.  NNSA is currently executing five warhead modernization programs:

• We are in close coordination with DOD on the W87-1 program, which will be fielded on the U.S. Air Force’s Sentinel missile system and will replace the W78 warhead.
• The W80-4 Life Extension Program will enhance the warhead’s safety, security, and reliability, and together with the Air Force’s Long-Range Stand-Off missile will support the long-term effectiveness of the bomber leg of the Nation’s nuclear triad.
• The B61-12 life extension program is well into its production phase.
• The W88 Alt 370 program has also been executing and is deployed on the U.S. Navy’s Trident II D5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system.
• The W93 program is synchronized with our allies in the United Kingdom, which is also modernizing its nuclear forces.  The W93 is being designed for the new Mk7 reentry body being developed for the Navy and is on track for production starting in the mid-2030s. 

Crucially, we are adapting to the rapidly evolving global threat environment.  Both STRATCOM and the U.S. Strategic Posture Commission agree that we must be ready to deter two near-peer nuclear powers within a decade, with the latter warning that the current program of record is adequate, but that we need to do more. Consequently, in October the U.S. government announced the addition of the B61-13 to the program of record. This weapon will replace some of the B61-7 weapons in the stockpile and have the safety, security, and accuracy of the B61-12, providing the President with additional options against certain harder and large-area military targets.  

These warhead modernizations enhance the margin against failure, increase safety, improve security, replace limited life components, address component obsolescence, and support DOD’s delivery platform modernization.  We are pursuing a qualitative and comprehensive approach towards maintaining a viable deterrent for the future at a time of rising threats. This modernization strategy is not solely aimed towards meeting near-term threats the United States may encounter over the next three to five years but rather attempts to look forward decades to hedge against risk and prudently plan for future contingencies. 

Moreover, NNSA is modernizing our stockpile both on-schedule and at pace.  This past year alone NNSA has delivered more than 200 modernized weapons to DOD, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory expects to produce the first diamond-stamped (or War Reserve) pit for the W87-1warhead program by the second half of this year.  

This is not to say that we don’t face serious challenges as we execute these missions and deliver the program of record. More than 60 percent of NNSA’s infrastructure is beyond its life expectancy, with some of the most important facilities dating back to the Manhattan Project.  Although we appreciate the funding that Congress has provided for the purpose of rebuilding our national nuclear infrastructure, the COVID pandemic, acute supply chain disruptions, labor shortages, and inflation have exacerbated long-standing issues that make large-scale construction projects difficult. Respected economists Austan Goolsbee and Chad Syverson have published findings concluding that aggregate data shows a decades long decline in U.S. construction productivity.  And in the book “How Big Things Get Done,” Bent Flyvbjerg and Dan Gardner present evidence that large nuclear projects are historically the most over-schedule and budget of all complex construction activities. These are baked-in challenges we are working to overcome in modernizing NNSA’s infrastructure.

However, we are making significant progress on the large-scale construction projects that will serve as the backbone of the Nuclear Security Enterprise’s modernization. For example, the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 is now over 70 percent complete. Glove boxes are installed in the main process building, overall equipment deliveries are 96 percent complete, and in the last half of 2023 over 58 miles of electrical conduit and cables were installed. 

We are also making steady progress at with the Los Alamos Pit Production Project, also known as LAP-4, removing old, contaminated materials and installing new and modern equipment, including its first new glovebox this year.  And at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility – SRPPF – we continue with design and simultaneous construction start, baseline cost and schedule updates, and long-lead procurement.  We have reconciled safety basis issues and put in place an NNSA first-of-its kind construction management contract.  Our goal for SRPPF is aggressive – to complete construction by 2032 so that rate production can support the W93 schedule.  

Moreover, to sustain this progress and address construction challenges, we have begun working with the Army Corps of Engineers on best practices, especially in cost estimating, and in introducing more disciplined metrics.

Arms Control and the ACAI

While the U.S. nuclear deterrent is critical to responding and deterring to the threats, it alone is not sufficient to effectively respond to all nuclear security threats.  For the United States and our allies and partners not only require a strong deterrent capability but also an equally strong commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and arms control and to counter global nuclear threats.  Ultimately, deterrence and NNSA’s nonproliferation missions are “two halves of the same walnut.”

NNSA has a special responsibility not only for sustaining and strengthening our nation’s nuclear deterrent and its extension to partners and allies but also for working to address global risks to international peace and security and contributing to international stability. 

Although any major arms control agreements with China and Russia are likely unattainable in the near-term, I believe that arms control does have a future – one that will involve new actors, emerging technologies, and new experts. Consequently, we need to start preparing now to be ready to seize opportunities for progress when they eventually present themselves. 

This is why NNSA has established a new Arms Control Advancement Initiative to invest in next generation arms control capabilities. This initiative increases NNSA’s investment across the innovation and technology development process now, and for years to come, by focusing on four key areas:

1. Expanded monitoring and verification research and development;

2. The establishment of a dedicated user facility at NNSA’s Pantex Plant for testing and demonstration of monitoring and verification technologies on nuclear warheads and high-fidelity surrogates;

3. Increased international collaboration; and

4. A Next Generation Arms Control Experts program to develop a cadre of technical and policy experts to support future treaty development and implementation.

In other words, while we recognize that although we may not be talking to Russia and China anytime soon, through the Arms Control Advancement Initiative we are thinking through the strategies and the science that can underpin future arms control efforts. 

Conclusion

In the end, we must be mindful of setting the conditions today for a balanced approach to our nuclear deterrent for decades to come.  This means maintaining a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear stockpile and preparing the concepts and the technologies for the next generation of arms control. 

To do this, we need new blood in the strategic deterrence and arms control community who can pursue these solutions with fresh thinking and renewed vigor.  This will be difficult work, and it will likely require a generational effort.  But it is necessary in order to be ready to seize future arms control opportunities when they eventually do arise. 

I’ll stop here. One of my fondest memories from my time at Brookings was the impassioned – but always collegial – intellectual debates over coffee or lunch in the cafeteria. Granted, that might be a pre-COVID memory – unfortunately, the cafeteria at DOE hasn’t recovered its pre-pandemic glory.  But I want to leave as much time for Q-and-A as possible . . . although I also remember how tough Brookings’ scholars could be on guest speakers, so I might regret this a half hour from now. 

Either way, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak with you today, and for your passion and interest in nuclear security issues.

I look forward to your questions.