NNSA Deputy Administrator Frank Rose's Remarks to CSIS-Project on Nuclear Issues Summer Conference

Delivered at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

Thank you, Heather, for that kind introduction and for the invitation to speak with you this afternoon, and thanks also to Kelsey Hartigan, Jess Link, Lachlan MacKenzie, and everyone else at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and U.S. Strategic Command for their work to make this conference possible.

It is a real pleasure to be here with you this afternoon.  I have been participating in Project on Nuclear Issues conferences for almost two decades now, and I have tremendous respect for PONI’s work, in particular its efforts to support and encourage the next generation of nuclear security experts.

This afternoon I’d like to broadly focus my remarks on three topics: 1) The National Nuclear Security Administration’s mission in an increasingly complex and interconnected global security environment; 2) How our partnerships – including those with the Department of Defense – enable us to accomplish this mission; and 3) What we need to be doing now to develop the next generation of strategic deterrence experts. 

NNSA and the Emerging Threat Environment

I’d like to begin, however, by quickly surveying the emerging threat conditions that are shaping our decisions about nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation. 

As the U.S. Director for National Intelligence’s recent Annual Threat Assessment concluded:

[QUOTE] The United States and its allies will confront a complex and pivotal international security environment dominated by . . . strategic challenges [that] will intersect and interact in unpredictable ways, leading to mutually reinforcing effects that could challenge our ability to respond. [UNQUOTE]

Specifically, the DNI warns that among these challenges is an era of renewed nation-state conflict and strategic competition with great powers and rising regional powers, to include increased competition in the realm of nuclear capabilities.

Of these competitors, Russia maintains the largest and most capable nuclear weapons stockpile, and even prior to its invasion of Ukraine was working to expand and modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities. Moscow continues to develop long-range nuclear-capable missiles and underwater delivery systems meant to penetrate or bypass U.S. missile defenses. Russia is also expanding its large, diverse, and modern set of nonstrategic systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads. These capabilities are particularly ominous given President Putin’s dangerous and irresponsible statements, and those of other Russian officials, hinting at the potential use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has also featured an unprecedented event in the history of warfare: ongoing hostilities around—and armed seizure of—operating civil nuclear power plants.  The risks associated with military activities around Ukraine’s nuclear facilities cannot be overstated. These activities undercut safety, hinder the IAEA’s ability to fulfill its safeguards mandate alongside safety and security risks, and increase the risk of a nuclear accident or incident that could affect large numbers of people in Ukraine and neighboring states, with impacts felt around the world.  Russia’s military attacks and seizures of nuclear facilities in Ukraine severely undermine Moscow’s claim to be, and long-standing effort to promote itself as, a responsible nuclear power, and have been strongly condemned by the international community.

At the same time, China is in the midst of the largest ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history. According to the Department of Defense’s annual report on Chinese Military Power, “The PRC is investing in, and expanding, the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this major expansion of its nuclear forces.”  This includes developing and building fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities that would enable the swift expansion of its warhead manufacturing capability.  Consequently, if it continues the current pace of its nuclear expansion, by 2035 China will likely field a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads.  Together with the hundreds of new ICBM silos constructed in the past three years, China appears to be abandoning its historic minimum deterrence posture.

Moreover, despite repeated attempts by the last several U.S. presidential administrations, Beijing has shown no interest in engaging in either the strategic stability or arms control discussions expected of a responsible nuclear power.  This opacity makes determining an effective strategy more difficult, both in terms of maintaining deterrence and in finding a way to integrate China into a future arms control and strategic stability framework.

Looking beyond these peer competitors, North Korea continues to enhance its ability to threaten both our Asian allies and the U.S. homeland, expanding its nuclear weapons stockpile and range of delivery capabilities, and resuming ICBM testing.  Additionally, in stark contrast to the tenets of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, last year Kim Jong Un announced a new “Nuclear Forces Policy Law” that would permit Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons first against non-nuclear states.

And while Iran may or may not agree to the conditions necessary to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in the past five years it has expanded its nuclear program to operate more advanced centrifuges and enrich more uranium, including at levels closer to weapons grade.    

Taken together, these developments make for a very complex international environment, one that is dramatically different from that which we faced 25 years ago.  These emerging global threat conditions inform NNSA’s decisions about how to approach our missions and are why NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby told Congress in April, “Not since the Manhattan project has there been a more challenging moment for the NNSA.”

NNSA’s Missions

Although many of you are familiar with NNSA and its predecessor agencies, for those of you who are not, NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 with three enduring missions:

1. Ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile;

2. Reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and

3. Providing military effective nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines.

To execute these missions, NNSA manages eight government-owned, contractor operated national laboratories, plants, and sites throughout the country.  These partners – and the nearly 60,000 scientists, engineers, technicians, managers, and support staff who comprise the Nuclear Security Enterprise’s workforce – apply world-class scientific, engineering, and technological capabilities to support nuclear security and global stability.

NNSA has the responsibility to design and build the nation’s nuclear stockpile, and to continue to maintain the stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive testing.  In order to provide nuclear warheads that meet safety, security, and performance requirements, NNSA is currently executing five warhead modernization programs. These warhead modernizations enhance the margin against failure, increase safety, improve security, replace limited life components, address component obsolescence, and support the U.S. Department of Defense’s delivery platform modernization.

What these modernization programs do not do is equally important.  Last year’s Nuclear Posture Review made clear that the Biden administration will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.  We are not trying to match Russia’s large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons on a weapon-for-weapon basis.  Instead, we are pursuing a qualitative and comprehensive approach towards maintaining a viable deterrent for the future at a time of rising threats.  Indeed, this modernization strategy is not solely aimed towards meeting near-term threats the United States may encounter over the next three to five years, but rather attempts to look forward in terms of decades to hedge against risk and prudently plan for future contingencies. 

In addition to addressing the resumption of “great power competition,” the Biden administration’s NPR noted that “Preventing an act of nuclear terrorism is an enduring national security requirement.”  The large and growing stockpiles of nuclear and radioactive material, technology, and expertise worldwide makes the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism a significant concern, and the fear that terrorists could acquire and use a nuclear or radiological weapon has motivated a range of efforts to place these materials beyond the reach of non-state actors.

Consequently, in March President Biden signed a National Security Memorandum on Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advancing Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security to direct our efforts in reducing global nuclear and radiological threats domestically and globally. This Memorandum emphasizes the need for collaboration between the U.S. Government and partner governments to counter WMD terrorism.  Indeed, over the past two decades NNSA has partnered with more than 100 countries across the globe to enhance nuclear and radiological security and improve counter nuclear smuggling capabilities. We also engage with international organizations such as the IAEA to develop and implement guidance and training, and to provide technical assistance to countries to improve nuclear security.

The Power of Partnerships

These nonproliferation and nuclear security partnerships illustrate a simple reality: in order to address the array of emerging global challenges we face, NNSA can’t do it alone . . . our success depends on our ability to collaborate.  This starts with the laboratories, plants, and sites that form the broader Nuclear Security Enterprise, continues with constructive relationships within the Department of Energy, and carries over to collaborations with external partners in the Executive Branch, Congress, and international allies and partners. 

It is actually quite fitting that we are meeting here today at Offutt Air Force Base, since no partner is more vital to NNSA’s success than the Department of Defense. After all, it is the Pentagon who designs, develops, and deploys the delivery systems that enable STRATCOM to execute its nuclear deterrence mission. In other words, DOD is effectively the “customer” for whom NNSA maintains the stockpile of nuclear warheads, making sure it meets military requirements such as quantity of weapons or yield. These complementary efforts are coordinated through the Nuclear Weapons Council, which keeps nuclear warhead and delivery platform programs aligned, and provides management, oversight, and integration of all U.S. nuclear weapons programs.  Together, we conduct joint budget planning and program prioritization, and we are in constant communication to ensure alignment on our respective nuclear missions.

As I noted previously, one of NNSA’s three enduring missions is providing nuclear propulsion for the U.S Navy, more than 40 percent of whose major combatants rely on nuclear technology. The superior mobility, flexibility, responsiveness, and endurance this technology provides our submarines and aircraft carriers is essential for the security of global trade and our allies. And the oversight of all related facilities, radiological controls, environmental safety, and health matters for America’s nuclear Navy, as well as the selection, training, and assignment of personnel is the responsibility of NNSA’s Office of Naval Reactors – led by Admiral James Frank Caldwell Jr.

Our partnerships with DOD are also critical to ground-level efforts in nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear incident response, and nuclear counterproliferation.  For example, NNSA assigns a Liaison Officer to many DOD geographic and functional command to ensure their policies and operations are informed by NNSA’s unsurpassed knowledge of nuclear threats.  These liaisons facilitate cooperation and coordination; support DOD planning, training, exercises, and partner-capacity building efforts.  NNSA enjoys close working relationships with DOD and National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams on nuclear and radiological incident response, helping to maintain their readiness and interoperability to respond to domestic nuclear incidents and accidents. And NNSA has closely coordinated with U.S. EUCOM and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency – or “DTRA” – as a critical part of U.S. efforts to reduce nuclear risks in Ukraine.

DTRA also works with NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation on a variety of nuclear threat reduction missions. DNN and DTRA have recently collaborated on important capacity building missions in Romania and radioactive source removal projects in Guatemala. Together they jointly fund and operate a nonproliferation/counterproliferation testbed that allows our national labs and interagency partners to develop and test technologies to detect and characterize foreign nuclear weapons development activities.  And together with the State Department and Air Force Technical Applications Center, they provide strong support to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization and maintain and operate the worldwide CTBT International Monitoring System.

To reinforce this successful collaboration, in May Administrator Hruby and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment signed a Memorandum of Agreement on Cooperation, Integration, and Synchronization between NNSA and DTRA.  This M-O-A will support expanded collaboration between NNSA and DTRA monitoring and verification experts, thereby allowing NNSA and DTRA to take further advantage of each other’s resources and expertise.

While these examples only scratch the surface of NNSA-DOD collaborations, I think it is important to highlight this important work that is being done every day on the ground in nuclear threat reduction.  For the United States and our allies and partners not only require a strong deterrent capability, but also an equally strong commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, and to counter global nuclear threats. As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently told the Arms Control Association, nuclear deterrence and arms control are each “sides of the nuclear coin.” Or as I like to say, deterrence and NNSA’s nonproliferation missions are “two halves of the same walnut.”

Although any major arms control agreements with China and Russia are likely unattainable in the near-term, I strongly believe that arms control does have a future – one that will involve new actors, emerging technologies, and new experts; and that we need to start preparing now in order to be ready to seize opportunities for progress when they eventually present themselves. 

This is why NNSA has established a new Arms Control Advancement Initiative to invest in next generation arms control capabilities. A-C-A-I is focused on four key areas: enhanced cooperation with partners and allies; research and development aimed at future technologies and tools to solve complex arms control monitoring and verification problems; NNSA’s Next Generation Arms Control Experts human capital development program; and developing a dedicated user facility at NNSA’s Pantex Plant where monitoring and verification concepts can be tested and proofed on nuclear warheads and high-fidelity surrogates.

Arms control and deterrence tools can and must be linked, and while the immediate prospects for arms control and establishing a tripolar strategic stability framework appear dim, one can also view the present moment as an interregnum enabling us to develop the strategies and the science that can underpin future arms control efforts.  I am confident that when this interregnum passes, we will be able to rely on these strong collaborations with DOD and other interagency partners, our allies and international organizations to work to achieve these missions.

The Next Generation of Nuclear Security Experts

Finally, I’d like to note how partnerships are critical to another initiative that is vital to NNSA’s mission and our national security: developing the next generation of strategic deterrence and arms control experts.

While NNSA is increasing investment in infrastructure and the science, technology, and engineering that underpins our national security missions, in addition to investments in facilities and technology, we also must make a commitment to investing in people.  Even as the demanding global security environment noted above means that the Enterprise is facing our heaviest workload in decades, roughly one-third of our workforce will be eligible for retirement over the next five years.  This is why NNSA is pursuing an aggressive hiring strategy of adding an estimated four-to-six-thousand employees annually across the Nuclear Security Enterprise.  As part of our efforts to develop America’s intellectual capital and support the future of strategic deterrence and arms control, we engage hundreds of undergraduate and graduate students through the University Nuclear Leadership Program.  These consortia link universities and DOE national laboratories to address basic research shortfalls in nuclear nonproliferation and treaty compliance monitoring.  We also sponsor the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program, which hires over 60 fellows annually to work alongside leading experts at NNSA program and site offices to participate in professional development, networking, and training opportunities, and to engage with national security stakeholders and support leading events and activities around the world.

NNSA partners with the DOE Office of Science to sponsor academic programs that fund scientific and technical research in 40 states across the nation, providing more than $100 million for centers, grants, consortia, and fellowships to support research – and researchers – addressing areas of interest within the Nuclear Security Enterprise. We have also asked Congress for a 36 percent increase in funding for our Academic Programs and Community Support program in our Fiscal Year 2024 budget request.

Finally, NNSA has significantly increased our outreach to diversify our nuclear security experts by increasing partnerships with Minority Serving Institutions, such as Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Tribal Colleges and Universities, and Hispanic Serving Institutions.  The Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program (or M-S-I-P-P) is designed to build a sustainable STEM pipeline that prepares a diverse workforce of world class talent through strategic partnerships between M-S-I and the Nuclear Security Enterprise.  M-S-I-P-P supports 33 consortia consisting of 56 M-S-I partners as well as NNSA laboratories, production plants, and sites.  This year NNSA also launched a M-S-I Intern Program, bringing in over 240 interns into the nuclear enterprise.

The challenges of modernizing our nuclear stockpile and adapting new technologies to our nuclear security missions demand a strong base of national expertise in specialized technical areas including nuclear science, radiochemistry, high energy density science, advanced manufacturing, and high-performance computing. And in a complicated world with complex threats to our national security and global stability, we cannot afford to leave any talent on the table. 

Yet as Michael Auslin wrote last year, “Modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal will mean little without a much greater revival of sophisticated strategic thinking about nuclear weapons and a well-developed community of nuclear strategists.”  In other words, not only is it vital that we support the growth of a STEM workforce, we also must work to develop the next generation of strategic deterrence and arms control experts who will be critical to ensuring U.S. and allied security, and global stability, long after I have retired.

This is why I cannot overstate my support for PONI’s mission to identify and cultivate the next generation of nuclear security experts.  I know there are several NNSA employees, as well as staff from our partner labs, plants, and sites among the Nuclear Scholars Initiative’s current class.  And I’ve heard from NNSA alumni from previous classes how invaluable their experiences were.

For those who are not already part of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, I urge you to consider a commitment to public service.  NNSA is a cool place to work.  If nothing else, we have younger S-E-S’s than the State Department, and if you apply now you can get tickets to the premiere of Oppenheimer next month! 

In all seriousness though, as was the case eighty years ago, our country needs your talents and your leadership, and I can honestly say we would be lucky to have you.

Conclusion

I would like to end by borrowing a word from the Project’s mission statement: generation.  In Washington, sometimes the nature of news and budget cycles leads us to obsess over the crisis du jour or lose focus beyond short-term requirements.  Yet just as the Project’s goal is to create a generation of nuclear security experts, we must be mindful of setting the conditions today for a balanced approach to our nuclear deterrent for decades to come.  This means maintaining a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear stockpile and preparing the concepts and the technologies for the next generation of arms control. 

To do this, we need new blood in the strategic deterrence and arms control community who can pursue these solutions with fresh thinking and renewed vigor.  This will be difficult work, and it will likely require a generational effort.  But it is necessary in order to be ready to seize future arms control opportunities when they eventually do arise.

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak with you today, and for your passion and interest in nuclear security issues.

I look forward to your questions.