Contract and Security Concerns at the National Nuclear Security Administration’s W88 Alteration 370 Federal Program Office
September 22, 2023
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September 19, 2023
Contract and Security Concerns at the National Nuclear Security Administration’s W88 Alteration 370 Federal Program Office
The Office of Inspector General received allegations pertaining to management and oversight concerns at the National Nuclear Security Administration’s W88 Alteration (ALT) 370 Federal Program Office. One of the allegations was that a Federal employee (Federal Employee) within the W88 ALT 370 Federal Program Office, whose National Nuclear Security Administration building and computer systems access was restricted, was using a subcontractor employee to send and receive emails on behalf of the Federal Employee. We initiated this inspection to determine the facts and circumstances regarding this allegation. The other allegations will be addressed in a separate report.
We substantiated the allegation that a Federal Employee, whose National Nuclear Security Administration building and computer systems access had been restricted due to a formal inquiry by a Department of Energy program, used a subcontractor employee to send and receive emails on their behalf. The Federal Employee also relocated to office space at the subcontractor’s facility. The use of the subcontractor was at the improper technical direction of a former W88 ALT 370 Program Official (Program Official) and was used as a workaround to the Federal Employee’s restrictions. The Program Official did not have contracting authority and provided the improper technical direction directly to the subcontractor, resulting in approximately $1.5 million incurred by the prime contractor over the nearly 5 years of support services received that are in question.
These issues occurred because the Program Official did not consult with the appropriate National Energy Technology Laboratory contracting authorities or with the prime contractor to determine whether the use of the subcontractor to provide accommodations for the Federal Employee was appropriate and authorized.
The actions taken by the Program Official and the subcontractor created security risks to the Department by accommodating the Federal Employee under formal inquiry with unescorted access to the subcontractor’s site where nuclear weapons work and classified activities were conducted.
To address the issues identified in this report, we have made four recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that unauthorized subcontract activities are discontinued and that contracting authorities are reinforced.