DOE-OIG-25-11

December 30, 2024

Allegations of Management Concerns at the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

The Office of Inspector General received an anonymous complaint alleging that: (1) Department of Energy Headquarters’ Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) in the Forrestal Building have been out of compliance with U.S. Intelligence Community requirements; (2) the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE-IN) authorized a contractor employee to procure a contract for a congressionally directed review of DOE-IN’s Counterintelligence (CI) Program, which may have been a conflict-of-interest violation; and (3) DOE-IN has contractor employees conducting inspections of DOE-IN’s CI Program.

We initiated this inspection to determine the facts and circumstances regarding the alleged management concerns at DOE-IN.

We substantiated the allegation that Department Headquarters’ SCIFs in the Forrestal Building did not meet U.S. Intelligence Community requirements.  Specifically, we found that SCIF reaccreditations, technical security reviews, and self-assessments were not conducted for some SCIFs occupied by DOE-IN. These issues occurred, in part, because DOE-IN did not develop and implement a formal corrective action plan with a strategic approach to improve SCIF compliance at Department Headquarters, including the necessary resources to implement the corrective action plan. To its credit, we noted that DOE-IN began making progress in calendar year 2023.  In addition, we did not substantiate the allegation that DOE-IN authorized a contractor employee to procure a contract for a congressionally directed review of DOE-IN’s CI Program; therefore, we did not substantiate the allegation that there was a conflict-of-interest violation.  Further, while we substantiated the allegation that DOE-IN has contractor employees conducting inspections of DOE-IN’s CI Program, we determined that the use of contractor personnel to conduct these inspections is not against DOE-IN policy.  DOE-IN leadership approves the selection of the lead inspector and provides Federal oversight for CI Program inspections. 

Noncompliance with U.S. Intelligence Community security requirements, which ensure that critical safeguards are fully implemented, may result in degradation of the security posture for SCIFs, potentially exposing highly classified national security information.

To address the issues identified in this report, we have made two recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that the Department maintains its Headquarters’ SCIFs in compliance with U.S. Intelligence Community requirements.