Followup Audit on Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Program at the Portsmouth Project
May 1, 2019May 1, 2019
Followup Audit on Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Program at the Portsmouth Project
The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (Portsmouth) operated as a uranium enrichment facility from 1954 to 2001. Subsequently, the Department of Energy began an extensive cleanup of the site once the gaseous diffusion process was no longer operational. The decontamination and decommissioning contractor was required to develop, implement, and maintain a Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) Program consistent with Department Order 474.2, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, which required that accurate records of nuclear materials be maintained and physical inventories be conducted to provide assurance that nuclear material was not missing.
In our prior report, Alleged Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Weaknesses at the Department of Energy’s Portsmouth Project (INS-O-15-04, May 2015), we found that improvements could be made to increase confidence that nuclear material was accounted for and that any compromises to tamper-indicating devices protecting nuclear material were replaced in a timely manner. We initiated this followup audit to determine whether the Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Program had (1) adequate controls for accountability and accessibility of nuclear material, and (2) implemented corrective actions related to recommendations in our prior report.
Nothing came to our attention during our review to indicate that the Portsmouth MC&A Program had not implemented adequate controls for the accountability and accessibility of nuclear materials. Further, we concluded that the corrective actions taken to address the recommendations made in our prior inspection report ensured that the Portsmouth MC&A Program was meeting Departmental requirements. Specifically, the physical inventories we observed and our review of the tamper-indicating device program revealed proper implementation of site procedures. Similarly, our audit work revealed that the materials accounting system was capable of tracing material and included documentation supportive of transactions tested.
Topic: National Security and Safety