Acting Principal Deputy Administrator Corey Hinderstein Remarks at the IDGA Counter-UAS Summit

Remarks, as prepared, for the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement Counter-UAS Summit, Arlington, VA, August 28, 2024

Thank you, David, for that kind introduction, and for the invitation to join you this morning.  I would also like to thank Sara Weissman and everybody at the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement for all their work in putting this conference together.  It is an honor to be able to represent the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration here, especially given how important – and how timely – this topic is, not only to the Nuclear Security Enterprise, but in the context of our broader national security and that of our allies. 

It is great to see so many policymakers, practitioners, and industry representatives here today to exchange information, ideas, and discuss possible solutions to this challenge, which will likely only grow in the years to come.

I’d like to focus on three things today: 

• How uncrewed aircraft systems pose a challenge to securing not just the Nuclear Security Enterprise’s critical infrastructure, but our nation’s secrets as well; 
• How NNSA and the broader Enterprise are addressing the threat posed by UAS; and 
• How NNSA is working to support our industry and international partners in this important endeavor.

More than anything else, however, I hope that you take away one thought from my remarks this morning: NNSA views innovation and collaboration as the key to this issue. As always, diversity of participation, approach and thought will be valuable to our successful management of risks.  It’s a challenge we need to get right not only for ourselves, but for the broader international nuclear security community as well.

Security and the Nuclear Security Enterprise

I want to start by reminding folks about what NNSA is and what we do. NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 but traces its roots back to the Manhattan Project. After World War II, the Atomic Energy Commission and National Laboratory system were created to oversee future research into atomic science and technology. NNSA has three primary mission areas:

1. Design, build and maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile;

2. Prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism around the world; and

3. Provide nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines.

To execute these missions, NNSA manages eight government-owned, contractor operated national laboratories, plants, and sites throughout the country. 

These partners – and the nearly 60,000 scientists, engineers, technicians, managers, and support staff who comprise what we call the “Nuclear Security Enterprise”– apply world-class scientific, engineering, and technological capabilities to support nuclear security and global stability.

I’m guessing many of you saw last year’s Oppenheimer movie. One of the things that it accurately portrays is that security was a primary factor in the selection of Los Alamos as the secret laboratory where they designed and built the world’s first atomic weapons.  Atop the Pajarito plateau and far away from significant population centers, Los Alamos was easy to isolate and secure, enabling the Manhattan Project’s world class scientists to develop the laboratories and facilities necessary for their experiments and the construction of the first atomic bombs. This was also true for many of the other locations key to the Manhattan Project – like Hanford, WA and Oak Ridge, TN. 

In the eight decades since the Manhattan Project, the Nuclear Security Enterprise has been responsible not just for securing the physical infrastructure necessary to build and maintain America’s nuclear weapons stockpile, it has also been responsible for guarding the nation’s most vital secrets. 

This has meant maintaining a dual approach to security – first, an outside-in approach to ensure facilities are secure from external threats, and, later, an inside-out approach to prevent insider threats, including espionage.  These have been the risks we have managed since the days of the Manhattan Project.  The American effort to build the bomb was infiltrated by Soviet agents such as Klaus Fuchs, David Greenglass, and Julius Rosenberg, despite the Army’s best efforts.

Moreover, throughout the atomic age the Nuclear Security Enterprise has had to worry about a third dimension of security. Whether by overflight from airplanes, balloons, or satellites orbiting the earth, surveillance of our top-secret sites from the air has been a persistent concern.  No amount of signage or canine patrols along perimeter fences can prevent this type of surveillance.

And it has become easier through the proliferation of commercially available uncrewed aerial systems. 

Consequently, on one level, we in the Nuclear Security Enterprise perceive the UAS challenge as being more evolutionary than revolutionary in terms of the threat it poses to our research facilities. 

At the same time, however, we recognize that in recent years the purchase, capabilities, and payload capacity of UAS have become more prolific, and that the deployment of many different types of UAS and payloads during current overseas conflicts could a blueprint for domestic activities.  

Moreover, the sheer size of the NSE’s geographical and physical footprint creates unique vulnerabilities.  The Nevada National Security Site outside of Las Vegas alone is roughly 680 square miles – about half the size of Rhode Island. That’s a large area to monitor, and we take the problem posed by UAS very seriously. 

What NNSA Is Doing

So, what is NNSA doing to address this fast-developing challenge? 

Before going into detail about our counter-UAS efforts, I’d like to take a step back and provide an overview of how NNSA is modernizing the ways we conduct strategic risk assessment and risk management, since this is the broader context in which we seek funding, develop technologies, and deploy resources in the counter UAS fight.

For over a decade, the nuclear community within DOE, NNSA, the Department of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have worked together with the Intelligence Community to develop credible and current adversary scenarios and approaches to security planning, and we have jointly developed and tested physical security systems.  

NNSA, DOD, NRC, and other stakeholders also collaborated to update the Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment. Published by the Defense Intelligence Agency, this Assessment serves as the foundation for the Design Basis Threat describing the notional capabilities of potential insider threats and external adversaries to remove nuclear or radiological material, or otherwise sabotage a facility against which we must design our security systems.

We are also taking concrete steps to improve collaboration on emerging threats.  NNSA is involved in multi-agency working groups to tackle threats ranging from countering UAS, to advanced force-on-force modeling and simulation, to the use of AI and machine learning to improve physical security systems.  NNSA sites are also refining protection methodologies to become more efficient and effective by focusing on deployment of risk-based, agile security response in the right place at the right time. 

The Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing – CSTART – is utilizing the national labs’ innovation and partnerships with industry, intergovernmental, and academic partners to design a Security System of the Future that will address new threats, increase performance, and lower cost.  

So what does all this mean with regards to countering UAS?

This is not a hypothetical issue for us. Over three days last October, there were five UAS sightings at the southern border of our Nevada site. Four were detected by a CUAS platform that was actually still in the research and testing phase, the fifth was spotted by an employee. They appeared to have been launched from a nearby highway, though law enforcement was not able to determine the origins. We are awake to the challenge, and have been taking concrete steps.

Currently, NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Security employs a CUAS at four of our eight sites.  We are upgrading the platforms’ hardware, software, and system library, which will extend the system’s life, add camera and radar capability, and enhance CUAS capability and protection across the Enterprise.

Looking forward, NNSA is transitioning to a next-generation CUAS that will employ an open-architecture, systems-based approach to address the evolving threat uncrewed aircraft systems present to NNSA facilities and personnel.  We are seeking integrated tools to provide operators with the information they need to make real-time command and control decisions, plan missions, and deploy assets on a single screen.  Additionally, the next-generation approach to countering UAS must be extensible, flexible, and adaptive, as well as scalable to hundreds of nodes.  Open architecture provides the data integration of open and proprietary sensors to allow NNSA to select the best mitigation capabilities: radio frequency, directed energy, kinetic, and radar. By combining these approaches, NNSA doesn’t rely on a single capability. We can also be more nimble in incorporating advanced technology. This flexibility will allow security planners to customize systems for each lab, plant, and site, based on unique local conditions. 

To implement our enduring test and evaluation process, starting next fiscal year NNSA will also finalize the development of a permanent facility at the Idaho National Laboratory for CUAS testing and evaluation.  The effort will help security planners identify possible next-generation solutions, outline continuous testing requirements, and bolster the current system, which is nearing the end of its service life. 

NNSA is also partnering with DOD, the National Labs, and the private sector.  This collaboration explores new approaches to employ counter-platforms to provide increased situational awareness, amplifying the accuracy, speed, and efficiency of response teams. 

Importantly, we share what we are learning. For example, U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Programs recently accompanied NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Security to a vendor demonstration of a CUAS with kinetic capability. If the system is eventually procured, it will provide both agencies with the ability to not only detect unauthorized UAS, but also the means to interdict the target and mitigate any threat. 

Importantly, the NNSA, DoD, the NRC, and other stakeholders are combining legislative efforts so that we are pursuing common legal authorities to counter the threat from uncrewed systems.

International Partnerships and Engagement

Finally, our efforts to counter UAS are not strictly limited to protecting domestic sites within the Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

For more than a generation, the fear that terrorists could acquire and use a nuclear device has motivated a range of efforts to place nuclear materials beyond the reach of non-state actors. Although constructing a nuclear device requires significant resources and advanced scientific and engineering skill, we cannot assume these obstacles will hinder terrorists indefinitely, and the key is access to the nuclear material. We also recognize that the sabotage of a nuclear facility, causing fear and even radiological release, may be consistent with some terrorist groups’ aims. 

This is why NNSA maintains more than 100 bilateral partnerships and works with multilateral organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime to counter theft and smuggling networks to improve the security of vulnerable assets and remove or eliminated material where possible.  NNSA has eliminated over 7,300 kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material from partner countries—enough for over 320 nuclear weapons. 

Meanwhile, the world is likely on the cusp of a renaissance in civilian nuclear power as a means of combating climate change and securing sustainable development.  Globally, there are roughly 60 nuclear reactors currently under construction, with dozens more in the planning stage, not to mention the nuclear fuel cycle technologies related to this expansion.  This expansion is urgent and necessary as both a key part of meeting climate goals and combatting climate change, but also as a part of seeking more equitable global development. 

Again, because the security from unauthorized access or sabotage of foreign nuclear facilities has been a concern of ours for some time, adapting to the security challenges posed by UAS has arguably been more evolutionary than revolutionary.  The UAS Program in NNSA’s Office of International Nuclear Security works with foreign partners to provide technical exchanges, awareness, training, guidance, collaborative research, testing, and technical outreach. This team leverages the capabilities of DOE’s National Laboratories to assist partner countries and foreign sites in addressing uncrewed threats and incorporating drones into physical security.  This includes outreach, awareness briefings, trainings, and technical exchanges to share ideas and approaches.

The office also leverages the labs’ research, development, test, and evaluation capabilities to solve emerging security needs.  It is actively developing novel detection, assessment, tracking, response, autonomy, and integration solutions to advance current capabilities and provide advanced, threat-informed solutions to real-world nuclear security problems.  Its operational UAS and CUAS radio frequency transmission characterization capability helps decision makers understand radio frequency mitigation, performance, and spectral quality, which informs deconfliction and collateral damage concerns.

The International Nuclear Security team is also using the NNSA standardized counter-UAS test approach to provide guidance on technology down-selection, test planning, and testing to verify performance claims and inform equipment acquisition decisions.  And it uses NNSA-developed modeling and simulation capabilities to design and assess the effectiveness of counter-UAS technology. These capabilities support trainings, demonstrations, table-top exercises, and scenario development, and help optimize deployment.  Finally, the team uses NNSA’s substantial CUAS experience to assist partners with system deployment and integration, train operators, and inform partners on strengths and weaknesses of various CUAS technologies.

All told, in FY24 alone, NNSA has conducted 13 technical exchanges on CUAS across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa. We have further collaborated with partners in Europe on four CUAS projects this fiscal year.

One specific example of how this collaboration is bearing is our work with Ukraine.  We and experts at Sandia National Laboratories are in the process of testing a kinetic CUAS that may help Ukrainian counterparts provide additional protection at nuclear power plants, while also analyzing domestic experience in hardening nuclear power plants which may have broader application for other critical energy infrastructure in Ukraine.  Having completed an initial phase of testing against high-speed drone targets, it was determined that planned testing against larger platforms was no longer needed.  

Another project under development is a Drone Protection Barrier, which has a potential application in hardening response bunkers and other strategic structures to reduce the impact drone-delivered explosives.  The team conducted testing of this barrier in August at Idaho National Laboratory.  

We have also funded additional support of the High-Altitude Detection of UAS.  The goal of this project is to take the previously developed technology and apply it to detection and tracking of potential threat of UAS near nuclear facilities.  Using video imaging systems from commercial satellites or high-altitude UAS, it can detect, localize, and track objects moving towards facilities or locations.  The commercial satellite contracts have been successfully put into place.  Materials have been purchased and delivered, and building the full systems are in progress.  Algorithm and processing work is continuing to progress for upcoming testing. 

Conclusion

I would like to conclude my remarks this morning with one final thought.

Although this conference is understandably focused on emerging technologies, whether as a security threat or as an answer to that threat, we must never lose sight that, as with all national security endeavors, people are really the key to winning the CUAS fight.

It is the scientists and engineers who are working to innovate and improve our CUAS. It is the technicians and operators of these systems that protect our nuclear sites and other critical infrastructure. 

It is even about the psychology of the adversary on the other side of the hill whom we seek to successfully deter.

In the end, even as we marvel at technological innovation and adaptation, we must never lose sight of the human aspect of this challenge.

That is why, on behalf of Administrator Hruby and NNSA’s leadership, I want to thank all of you for your dedication and your efforts to address this important challenge. Whether in government, the military, or industry, we appreciate that we can only succeed in this vital mission through collaboration.

Thank you to everyone at IDGA for allowing me the opportunity to speak with you today.  Thank you for everything that you do to support the United States, our allies and partners, and to ensure that emerging technologies further, rather than threaten, the peaceful use of nuclear material and technology across the globe.

Thank you very much.