Acting Principal Deputy Administrator Corey Hinderstein Remarks at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, July 22, 2024

Remarks, as prepared, for the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 65th Annual Meeting, Portland, Oregon, July 22, 2024

Thank you, Kirsten, for that kind introduction.

It is a real pleasure to be here today in Portland representing the National Nuclear Security Administration.  It is a particular treat to be back at INMM! I am thrilled be with so many colleagues and friends here this morning. 

Many of you know me, and know that I have a deep respect for INMM, its history and its role as a leading professional society. 

This morning I’d like to emphasize two main points: First, that given the volatility of the current international environment, NNSA’s missions are both more important – and more in flux – than ever before.  Second, that while specific program activities may evolve, NNSA’s efforts will continue to as align with INMM’s six technical divisions. 

A Dangerous World . . .

Before looking ahead, however, I’d like to make a quick observation regarding INMM’s past, apropos of the Institute’s 65^th annual meeting.  The Institute was founded in 1958, emerging from a series of joint meetings the NNSA’s precursor – the Atomic Energy Commission – hosted with representatives of the Management and Operating contractor community from 1955-1957.  

Those years had witnessed some of the most significant events in atomic history: 

• In August 1955, the United Nations held the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva; 
• The world’s first commercial nuclear power plants became operational at Windscale, England in 1956, and Shippingport, Pennsylvania in 1957. 
• Also in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency was founded. 

It was clear that the United States – the world, really – needed an independent organization to provide expertise in the area of nuclear materials management.  So, it is not an overstatement to say the Institute’s history is almost synchronous with the history of the atomic age itself.

With the end of the Cold War came opportunities, and the world made significant progress in reducing nuclear dangers.  Collectively, we strengthened the international nonproliferation regime and the global commitment to nuclear security, and we limited the strategic arsenals of the largest nuclear powers.

The last decade, however, has revealed cracks in the arms control and nonproliferation regime.  Today, the expansion of nations’ nuclear weapons stockpiles and their delivery systems – coupled with increasing regional conflicts involving nuclear weapons states – pose significant challenges.  Russia has repeatedly rejected talks on a successor pact to New START, which expires in 2026, and China - just last week – formally announced it would halt nascent arms control discussions with the United States. 

North Korea is also expanding and diversifying its nuclear weapons arsenal..  Iran is still expanding and diversifying its nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. These adversaries are increasingly cooperating and coordinating with each other in ways that undermine peace and stability, and threaten global security. 

The pretext given by Russia and China for rejecting US approaches to arms control and strategic stability are Ukraine and Taiwan. Russia and China are trying to leverage our interest in arms control to influence our international posture and weaken our commitments to our partners and allies. This is not the behavior of responsible nuclear actors.

NSC Senior Director Pranay Vaddi said last month that, “without a change in the trajectory that Russia, the PRC, and North Korea are on—the United States will need to continue to adjust our posture and capabilities to ensure our ability to deter and meet other objectives going forward.” 

Our world is dramatically different from 30 years ago, which is why NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby has observed that: “Not since the Manhattan project has there been a more challenging moment for the NNSA.”

A Time for Innovation

On nuclear security, just as with strategic stability, we can’t think about the world as it was ten years ago, much less in the aftermath of the Cold War. 

For more than a generation, the fear that terrorists could acquire and use a nuclear device has motivated a range of efforts to place nuclear materials beyond the reach of non-state actors. Although constructing a nuclear device requires significant resources and advanced scientific and engineering skill, we cannot assume these obstacles will hinder terrorists indefinitely.  And in this area as well, the gains we have made globally are at risk of backsliding, and the sense of common purpose on nuclear security is at risk of fracturing.

NNSA has made tremendous progress to that end by eliminating over 7,300 kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material from partner countries—enough for over 320 nuclear weapons. Yet addressing and mitigating this threat has new urgency, as the world is likely on the cusp of a renaissance in civilian nuclear power as a means of combating climate change and securing sustainable development. There are roughly 60 nuclear reactors currently under construction, with dozens more in the planning stage, including new and novel designs that will challenge the international safeguards mission as well as nuclear security. 

This adoption of nuclear energy is urgent and necessary as both a key part of meeting climate goals and combatting climate change, but as a part of seeking more equitable global development through access to vital medical, agricultural and environmental tools.  

Without mindful approaches, however, this expansion of peaceful nuclear activities could increase risks. This is why NNSA maintains more than 100 bilateral partnerships and works with multilateral organizations like the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime to counter theft and smuggling networks to improve the security of vulnerable assets. 

I would like to stress that the IAEA is the backbone of the civil nuclear and peaceful nuclear energy enterprise globally. We could not even imagine a nuclear renaissance if we didn’t have a strong, empowered, and independent IAEA.

Yet as new nuclear energy programs emerge, a heightened burden is placed on the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the IAEA to prevent nuclear energy programs from becoming latent nuclear weapon capabilities or targets for terrorists. 

NNSA supports the national labs to partner with U.S. reactor vendors and designers to tackle the technology challenges of incorporating nuclear security and safeguards into small modular reactors, and advanced reactor designs early, so that facilities proposed for export or in development overseas will enhance nuclear security and nonproliferation principles and can meet international regulatory requirements.  Additionally, our Proliferation Resistance Optimization Program, known as “PRO-X,” works with research reactor designers to minimize special nuclear materials production and diversion pathways and maximize reactor performance for stated peaceful uses. Our PRO-X team is here this week to present their lessons learned. 

By collaborating with governments, regulators, and the nuclear industry to not only to strengthen safety features, but also security and safeguards features of nuclear reactors and their associated fuel cycle facilities, we can avoid making the same mistake with the next generation of nuclear reactors. Incorporating nuclear security and nuclear safeguards into designs early will be less costly than waiting until later. 

Over decades of work, the international community has built a solid framework.  The challenge will be to ensure these regimes adapt to emerging technologies – from new reactor designs and new fuels, to new threats such as cyberattacks and uncrewed aerial systems. 

We need to continue to innovate international safeguards approaches to maximize effectiveness and credibility, while seeking efficiencies. We need to think creatively about future arms control and verification – using this pause to push forward the solutions we seek for the future but which we know will take time to develop.

Simply put, we can’t rely on the solutions of the past to address the challenges of the present – and future.

NNSA and INMM

The NNSA programs I’ve mentioned both support – and are reinforced by – collaboration with through Institute’s six divisions.  I have already mentioned directly international safeguards, nuclear security and physical protection, and nonproliferation and arm control. Material control and accountability underpins all three of these key missions; packaging transportation and disposition are key enablers of responsibly executing all elements of the NNSA nuclear security enterprise and realizing the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy; and the facilities operated by our M&O partners are at the forefront of the pressures to deliver NNSA’s national security responsibilities.

At INMM, opportunities to share technical accomplishments, advance nuclear materials management, and improve the qualifications of those employed in this field are vital to the future sustainability of nuclear materials management. 

Conclusion

I would like to conclude my remarks this morning with a message for the nuclear workforce, since there are many of you in the room.  

NNSA’s most important asset is our people.  The effectiveness of our defense programs and nonproliferation missions is due to the over 65,000 scientists, engineers, technicians, program managers, safety and security experts, and support staff that comprise NNSA’s workforce.

On behalf of Administrator Hruby and NNSA’s leadership, I want you to know how much we appreciate your dedication, your sacrifices, and your ability to adapt to new challenges. 

And to our international partners – none of us can succeed in these missions alone. We depend on each other, we learn from each other, and we are here for each other. 

Thank you to everyone at INMM for allowing me the opportunity to speak with you today.  Thank you for your time, for your support, and for everything that you do in your professional lives to ensure nuclear and radioactive materials are used safely and securely, to support the United States, our allies and partners, and to further the peaceful use of nuclear material and technology across the globe.

Thank you very much.