PSH-24-0051 - In the Matter of Personnel Security Hearing

On June 4, 2024, an Administrative Judge (AJ) determined that an Individual's access authorization under 10 C.F.R. Part 710 should not be restored.

The Individual, a DOE employee, was a member of a high-level delegation of American leaders who met with leaders of a Sensitive Country (the SC) that is a potential military and diplomatic adversary of the United States. The meetings took place in the SC. SC deploys a large and effective espionage service both domestically and internationally. While the Individual was in the SC as part of the delegation, he visited a bar in the hotel at which the delegation was staying. While in the hotel bar, he met a woman (SCN-2) and exchanged email addresses with her. Four to six months after the Individual returned to the United States, he began corresponding with SCN-2 by email and telephone.  During these conversations and email exchanges, the Individual and SCN -2 discussed becoming boyfriend and girlfriend and even the possibility of marriage, despite the fact the Individual was, and still is, married. Since the Individual's visit to the SC, the Individual has been the subject of several counterintelligence interviews (CI) and polygraph examinations conducted by the DOE's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence's Directorate of Counterintelligence.

Three years after returning from the SC, the Individual signed, dated, and submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (QNSP) in which he was asked: "Do you have, or have you had, close and/or continuing contact with a foreign national within the last seven (7) years with whom you . . . are bound by affection, influence, common interests, and/or obligation?" The Individual responded "no " to this question. Approximately ten years after he returned from the SC, and after a number of CI's, polygraph examinations, and an investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Individual disclosed his relationship with SCN-2 to DOE.

The Individual also admitted that he had entered a Vault Type Room with his cell phone on several occasions and had failed to inform his supervisor of these breaches, as required by security procedures, because he didn't think these security breaches were important. He further admitted that, on three to five occasions, he had not followed transportation procedures for Secret Restricted Data, Secret Formerly Restricted Data, and Sigma documents.

Finally, during a CI, the Individual, while discussing a potential counterintelligence matter involving a DOE coworker who had traveled to a SC, refused to identify the coworker or provide further details.

After reviewing the record of the proceeding, including the hearing testimony of witnesses presented by the Individual and the DOE, the AJ concluded that the Individual had not resolved the Guideline E security concerns raised by his omission from the QNSP, failure to report his contacts and relationship with SCN-2, failure to cooperate with a counterintelligence investigation, and violations of security rules.

The AJ therefore concluded that the Individual's access authorization should not be restored. ( OHA Case No. PSH-24-0051, Fine)