

**Written Testimony of Assistant Secretary Bruce J. Walker**  
**Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability**  
**U.S. Department of Energy**  
**Before the**  
**U.S. Senate**  
**Committee on Energy and Natural Resources**

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**Introduction**

Chairman Murkowski, Ranking Member Cantwell, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the continuing cybersecurity threats facing our national energy infrastructure and the Department of Energy's (DOE's) role in protecting it. Establishing a resilient energy infrastructure is a top priority of the Secretary and a major focus of the Department; hence, our focus on cybersecurity is paramount.

Our national security and economy depend on the availability of a reliable and resilient energy infrastructure. The mission of the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) is to strengthen, transform, and improve the resiliency of energy infrastructure to ensure access to reliable and secure sources of energy. The Secretary and DOE are committed to working with our public and private sector partners to protect the Nation's critical energy infrastructure from physical security events, natural and man-made disasters, and cybersecurity threats.

**Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response**

To demonstrate our focus on the aforementioned mission, the Secretary announced last month that he is establishing an Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). This organizational change will strengthen the Department's role as the sector-specific agency (SSA) for cybersecurity in the energy sector, supporting our national security responsibilities.

The CESER office will play an essential role in coordinating government and industry efforts to address these energy sector threats. Initially, the office will be comprised of work we currently do in DOE-OE's Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) division and Cybersecurity and Emerging Threats Research and Development (CET R&D) division.

The President has requested slightly more than \$95 million in FY 2019 for CESER with a focus on early-stage activities that improve cybersecurity and resilience to harden and evolve critical grid infrastructure. These activities include early-stage R&D at National Laboratories to develop the next generation of cybersecurity control systems, components, and devices including a greater ability to share time-critical data with industry to detect, prevent, and recover from cyber events.

The creation of the CESER office will build on all that we do today and elevate the Department's focus on energy infrastructure protection and will enable more coordinated preparedness and response to cyber and physical threats and natural disasters. This must include electricity delivery, oil and natural gas infrastructure, and all forms of generation. The Secretary's desire to create dedicated and focused attention on these responsibilities will provide greater visibility, accountability, and flexibility to better protect our Nation's energy infrastructure and support asset owners.

### *The Unique Nature of Energy Sector Cybersecurity*

During a hearing last month before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Worldwide Threats, the Director of National Intelligence testified that the growing cyber threat is "one of my greatest concerns." At that same hearing, the Director of the National Security Agency and head of U.S. Cyber Command stated that "if you look at the internet of things, if you look at the security levels within those components . . . if we think the problem is a challenge now; just wait. It's going to get much, much worse." As the Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment indicates, cyber threats will only continue to increase and the criticality of DOE's role as the sector-specific agency necessitates a more focused approach to cybersecurity.

Our National Intelligence Agencies have noted the increasing number and sophistication of cyber threats. Cyber attacks targeting "information technology," or IT, including computing and business applications, to cause disruptions, obtain access to email accounts and personal information, exfiltrate data to release to the world at large, and exploit information for private gain are growing increasingly common. The energy sector is not immune to such attacks.

Moreover, our adversaries understand that the energy sector is a valuable target because of the assets that the sector controls; including, our defense critical energy infrastructure. Accordingly, we have seen an increased interest in vulnerabilities of the "operating technology," or OT, of energy delivery systems and other critical infrastructure as well. OT systems consist of industrial control systems (or ICS), programmable logic controls, and their associated supervisory control and data acquisition software (known as SCADA). The heavy use of OT systems has made electric utilities, oil and natural gas providers, hydro and nuclear facilities, and water utilities prime targets for OT-related cyber attacks. The disruption of any one of these is not only inherently problematic, it also hampers the ability to respond to other types of emergency events.

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) coordinates control systems-related security incidents and information sharing with Federal, state, and local agencies and organizations, the intelligence

community, and private sector constituents. The focus on control systems cybersecurity provides a direct path for coordination of activities among all members of the critical infrastructure stakeholder community. ICS-CERT responded to 295 incidents in FY 2015, 46 of which were in the energy critical infrastructure (CI) sector. And while only 290 incidents were responded to in FY 2016, the energy CI sector accounted for 59 of the events.<sup>1</sup>

### *DOE's Roles and Responsibilities for Energy Sector Cybersecurity*

In preparation for, and response to, cybersecurity threats, the Federal government's operational framework is provided by Presidential Policy Directive-41 (PPD-41). A primary purpose of PPD-41 is to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Federal government during a "significant cyber incident," which is described as a cyber incident that is "likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the American people."

Under the PPD-41 framework, DOE works in collaboration with other agencies and private sector organizations, including the Federal government's designated lead agencies for coordinating the response to significant cyber incidents: DHS, acting through the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ), acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, respectively. In the event of a cybersecurity emergency in the energy sector, closely aligning DOE's activities with those of our partners at DHS and DOJ ensures DOE's deep expertise with the sector is appropriately leveraged.

DOE's role in energy sector cybersecurity was codified by Congress through the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act. That legislation designated DOE as the Sector Specific Agency for Energy Sector Cybersecurity. In extreme cases, the Department can use its legal authorities such as those in the Federal Power Act, as amended by the FAST Act, to assist in response and recovery operations. Congress enacted several important new energy security measures in the FAST Act as it relates to cybersecurity. The Secretary of Energy was provided a new authority, upon declaration of a "Grid Security Emergency" by the President, to issue emergency orders to protect or restore critical electric infrastructure or defense critical electric infrastructure. This authority allows DOE to respond as needed to the threat of cyber and physical attacks on the grid. The Grid Security Emergency authority is unique to DOE and an important element in partnering with DHS and DOJ to fully address the cybersecurity risks to the energy sector.

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<sup>1</sup> DOE also collects information on electric incidents and emergencies through the Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report (Form OE-417). Electric utilities that operate as Control Area Operators and/or Reliability Authorities, as well as other electric utilities as appropriate, are required to file the form whenever an electrical incident or disturbance is sufficiently large enough to cross reporting thresholds. In the case of cybersecurity, reporting is required for a cyber event that causes interruptions of electrical system operations or an event that could potentially impact electric power system adequacy or reliability. In 2016, five of the 141 events reported were cyber-related, compared with three of 150 events in 2017. For the month of January this year, two of the 18 reported events were cyber-related. [https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417\\_annual\\_summary.aspx](https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417_annual_summary.aspx)

In the energy sector, the core of critical infrastructure partners consists of the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC), the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council (ONG SCC), and the Energy Government Coordinating Council (EGCC). The ESCC and ONG SCC represent the interests of their respective industries. The EGCC, led by DOE and co-chaired with DHS, is where the interagency partners, states, and international partners come together to discuss the important security and resilience issues for the energy sector. This forum ensures that we are working together in a whole-of-government response.

As defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the industry coordinating councils or “SCCs” are created by owners and operators and are self-organized, self-run, and self-governed, with leadership designated by the SCC membership. The SCCs serve as the principal collaboration points between the government and private sector owners and operators for critical infrastructure security and resilience coordination and planning, as well as a range of sector-specific activities and issues.

The SCCs, EGCC, and associated working groups operate under DHS’s Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) framework, which provides a mechanism for industry and government coordination. The public-private critical infrastructure community engages in open dialogue to mitigate critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and to help reduce impacts from threats.

### **DOE’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Energy Sector**

DOE plays a critical role in supporting energy sector cybersecurity to enhance the security and resilience of the Nation's critical energy infrastructure. To address these challenges, it is critical for us to be proactive and cultivate an ecosystem of resilience: a network of producers, distributors, regulators, vendors, and public partners, acting together to strengthen our ability to prepare, respond, and recover.

As part of a comprehensive energy cybersecurity resilience strategy, the Department is focusing cyber support efforts to enhance visibility and situational awareness of operational networks; increase alignment of cyber preparedness and planning across local, state, and Federal levels; and leverage the expertise of DOE’s National Labs to drive cybersecurity innovation.

#### *Enhance Visibility and Situational Awareness of Operational Networks*

It is necessary for partners in the energy sector and the government to share emerging threat data and vulnerability information to help prevent, detect, identify, and thwart cyber attacks more rapidly. An example of this type of collaboration is the Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP), a voluntary public-private partnership that is primarily funded by industry, administered by the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), and enhanced by DOE through intelligence analysis by DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

The purpose of CRISP is to share information among electricity subsector partners, DOE, and the Intelligence Community to facilitate the timely bi-directional sharing of unclassified and classified threat information to enhance the sector's ability to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. CRISP leverages advanced sensors and threat analysis techniques developed by DOE along with DOE's expertise as part of the Intelligence Community to better inform the energy sector of the high-level cyber risks.

Current CRISP participants provide power to over 75 percent of continental United States electricity customers. If CRISP has demonstrated one finding to DOE, it is that continuous monitoring of critical networks and shared situational awareness is of utmost importance in protecting against malicious cyber activities. Programs such as CRISP are critical for facilitating the identification of and response to advanced persistent threats targeting the energy sector.

DOE's CRISP program is an example of how DOE, as the Sector Specific Agency for Energy, integrates additional efforts, including information from other public-private cybersecurity programs, such as DHS's Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS). The AIS program also allows for the bidirectional sharing of observed cyber threat indicators amongst DHS and participating companies.

Advancing the ability to improve situational awareness of OT networks is a key focus of DOE's current activities. The Department is currently in the early stages of taking the lessons learned from CRISP and developing an analogous capability to monitor traffic on OT networks via the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CYOTE) pilot project. Observing anomalous traffic on networks – and having the ability to store and retrieve network traffic from the recent past – can be the first step in stopping an attack in its early stages.

#### *Increase Alignment of Cyber Preparedness and Planning Across Local, State, and Federal Levels*

As the Energy SSA, DOE works at many levels of the electricity, petroleum, and natural gas industries. We interact with numerous stakeholders and industry partners to share both classified and unclassified information, discuss coordination mechanisms, and promote scientific and technological innovation to support energy security and reliability. By partnering through working groups between government and industry at the national, regional, state, and local levels, DOE facilitates enhanced cybersecurity preparedness.

Last year, DOE-OE and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) released the third edition of a cybersecurity primer for regulatory utility commissioners. The updated primer provides best practices, access to industry and national standards, and clearly written reference materials for state commissions in their engagements with utilities to ensure their systems are resilient to cyber threats. This document is publicly available on the NARUC Research Lab website, benefitting not only regulators, but state officials as well.

We are continuing to work with the NARUC Research Lab to support regional trainings on cybersecurity throughout the year, with the goal of building commissioner and commission staff

expertise on cybersecurity so they ensure cyber investments are both resilient and economically sound.

DOE also continues to work closely with our public and private partners so our response and recovery capabilities fully support and bolster the actions needed to help ensure the reliable delivery of energy. We continue to coordinate with industry through the SCCs to synchronize government and industry cyber incident response playbooks.

DOE-OE engages directly with our public and private sector stakeholders to help ensure we all are prepared and coordinated in the event of a cyber incident to the industry. Innovation and preparedness are vital to grid resilience. DOE and the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) co-hosted the Liberty Eclipse Exercise in Newport, Rhode Island, which focused on a hypothetical cyber incident that cascaded into the physical world, resulting in power outages and damage to oil and natural gas infrastructure. The event featured 96 participants from 13 states, and included representatives from state energy offices, emergency management departments, utility commissions, as well as Federal partners, such as FEMA, and private sector utilities and petroleum companies.

And late last year, DOE participated in GridEx IV, a biennial exercise led by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) that was designed to simulate a cyber and physical attack on electric and other critical infrastructures across North America. This and other similar large scale exercises continue to highlight the interdependencies between our Nation's energy infrastructure and other sectors.

While the after-action report has yet to be released, during GridEx IV, it was clear that collaboration between industry and the Federal government has strengthened greatly since Superstorm Sandy and GridEx III. The executed coordination in response to this year's hurricane season also is evidence of this strengthening.

Communication capabilities that are survivable, reliable, and accessible, by both industry and government, will be key to coordinate various efforts showcased in the exercise, including unity of messaging required to recover from a real-life version of the exercise scenario.

In preparation for any future grid security emergency, it is critical that we continue working with our industry, Federal, and state partners now to further shape the types of orders that may be executed under the Secretary's authority, while also clarifying how we communicate and coordinate the operational implementation of these orders.

Continued coordination with Federal and industry partners and participation in preparedness activities like GridEx enables DOE to identify gaps and develop capabilities to support cyber response as the SSA.

#### *Leverage the Expertise of DOE's National Laboratories to Drive Cybersecurity Innovation*

Beyond providing guidance and technical support to the energy sector, DOE-OE also supports a R&D portfolio designed to develop advanced tools and techniques to provide enhanced cyber protection for key energy systems. Intentional, malicious cyber threat challenges to our energy

systems are on the rise in both number and sophistication. This evolution has profound impacts on the energy sector.

Cybersecurity for energy control and OT systems is much different than that of typical IT systems. Power systems must operate continuously with high reliability and availability. Upgrades and patches can be difficult and time consuming, with components dispersed over wide geographic regions. Further, many assets are in publicly accessible areas where they can be subject to physical tampering. Real time operations are imperative and latency is unacceptable for many applications. Immediate emergency response capability is mandatory and active scanning of the network can be difficult.

DOE-OE's Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) R&D program is designed to assist energy sector asset owners by developing cybersecurity solutions for energy delivery systems through a focused research and development effort. DOE-OE co-funds industry-led, National Laboratory-led, and university-led projects with industry partners to make advances in cybersecurity capabilities for energy delivery systems. These research partnerships are helping to detect, prevent, and mitigate the consequences of a cyber incident for our present and future energy delivery systems. In a demonstration of our coordination with other Federal agencies, two of the university-led collaborations are funded in partnership with DHS Science and Technology (S&T).

To select cybersecurity R&D projects, DOE constantly examines today's threat landscape and coordinates with partners, like DHS, to provide the most value to the energy sector while minimizing overlap with existing projects. For example, the Artificial Diversity and Defense Security (ADDSec) project will develop solutions to protect control system networks by constantly changing a network's virtual configuration, much like military communications systems that rapidly change frequencies to avoid interception and jamming. As a result, ADDSec can harden networks against the mapping and reconnaissance activities that are the typical precursors to a cyber attack.

Another project, the Collaborative Defense of Transmission and Distribution Protection and Control Devices against Cyber Attacks (CODEF), is designed to anticipate the impact a command will have on a control system environment. If the commands would result in damage to the system or other negative consequences, CODEF will have the ability to prevent their execution. This type of solution is especially intriguing as it can detect malicious activity regardless of the source, be it an insider threat or an external actor.

The Energy Sector Security Appliances in a System for Intelligent Learning Network Configuration Management and Monitoring project, otherwise known as Essence, is a CEDS-funded endeavor involving the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA). Essence started as a concept to build a system which passively monitors all network traffic with and within an electric utility, and to use machine learning to develop a model of what "normal" is, so that deviations indicative of cyber compromise could be detected instantly and acted on quickly. The envisioned system was built and successfully demonstrated in the first project. Work since then has focused on extending a solid technical prototype into commercially deployable products with solid, committed technical partners with an established presence in the

utility market. To date, NRECA has engaged with four partners to offer commercial products based on Essence.

DOE is also working in conjunction with NRECA and the American Public Power Association (APPA) to help further enhance the culture of security within their utility members' organizations. With more than a quarter of the Nation's electricity customers served by municipal public power providers and rural electric cooperatives, it is critical they have the tools and resources needed to address security challenges. APPA and NRECA are developing security tools, educational resources, updated guidelines, and training on common strategies that can be used by their members to improve their cyber and physical security postures. Exercises, utility site assessments, and a comprehensive range of information sharing with their members will all be used to bolster their security capabilities.

## **Conclusion**

Cyber threats continue to evolve and DOE is working diligently to eliminate and mitigate the potential consequences of these threats. Establishing the CESER office is a result of our laser focused attention to cyber and physical security. Our long-term vision is significant and will positively impact our national security. The establishment of this office will be the first step in the transformational change necessary to meet the ever changing cyber landscape highlighted by our National Intelligence Agencies.

Finally, I would like to highlight that the risk of physical and cyber threats is continuously being exacerbated by a set of circumstances that are increasing the interdependence of the various energy systems throughout the Nation. This significantly increases our overall risk due to the increased number of penetration points that can significantly impact national security and the economy.

As always, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss cybersecurity in the energy sector, and I applaud your leadership. I look forward to working with you and your respective staffs to continue to address cyber and physical security challenges.