Independent Assessment of Safety Culture Survey Methods and Interpretation at the Y-12 National Security Complex

December 2024

U.S. Department of ENERGY | Office of Enterprise Assessments

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Acronyms

BNI	Bechtel National, Inc.
CNS	Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC
CRAD	Criteria and Review Approach Document
DO	Disciplined Operations
DOC	Disciplined Operations Council
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EA	Office of Enterprise Assessments
EFCOG	Energy Facility Contractors Group
HPI	Human Performance Improvement
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
MSM	Mission Success Model
OFI	Opportunity for Improvement
ORAU	Oak Ridge Associated Universities
SCIP	DOE Safety Culture Improvement Panel
TAPP	Trend Analysis and Problem Prevention
TOPIC	Tools for Opportunities – Performance Improvement through Communication
Y-12	Y-12 National Security Complex
YFO	Y-12 Field Office

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY METHODS AND INTERPRETATION AT THE Y-12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

Executive Summary

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) conducted an independent assessment of safety culture survey methods and interpretation at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in July and August 2024. Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) is the management and operating contractor at Y-12. This assessment also evaluated the effectiveness of safety culture monitoring activities conducted by the Y-12 Field Office (YFO).

DOE allows each organization to determine how it will promote and maintain a strong safety culture and assess or monitor its culture. CNS established an organizational model in 2016, the Mission Success Model, to holistically integrate safety with other imperatives, such as security and mission delivery. In 2019, CNS commissioned Oak Ridge Associated Universities to evaluate progress in safety culture improvement and the maturity of the implementation of the Mission Success Model. Since then, CNS has relied on "visible leadership floor time," a key component of the CNS Disciplined Operations initiative, as its primary source of culture-related data. Additionally, in 2021, 2022, and 2023, CNS conducted limited-scope safety culture surveys of the Construction organization, which is made up of CNS employees and is responsible for smaller construction projects at the site.

EA identified the following positive attributes, including one best practice:

- In 2023, CNS's Construction organization used corporate resources to access an established, validated safety culture model, subject matter expertise in surveying construction organizations, and human performance improvement error precursor codes to support credible data reporting and analysis beyond what was available at the site. (Best Practice)
- CNS's visible leadership floor time program emphasizes employee engagement to gain insight into safety culture.
- The CNS Site Manager and the Deputy Site Manager leverage their knowledge of the site and interpersonal relationships to regularly conduct field visits to engage with the workforce and monitor the CNS Y-12 safety culture.
- YFO's *The Manual for Operating Management* refers to the 2012 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations safety culture traits (an established culture model). Through leadership team and staff meetings, senior leadership has set clear expectations that field office management and staff embrace these traits in their routine job functions in providing oversight of CNS.

EA also identified several areas needing attention, as summarized below:

- CNS has not performed a sitewide safety culture assessment for five years, although other surveys were performed to gather data on specific aspects of safety culture.
- CNS is not consistently trending the information from the visible leadership floor time observations, which are an important source of safety-culture-related data.
- CNS's recently established Trend Analysis and Problem Prevention group, which looks for trends or patterns that may indicate programmatic deficiencies or latent organizational weaknesses, does not look for trends indicative of culture issues.
- There is no designated YFO safety culture subject matter expert to provide guidance on culture-related activities.
- Although certain YFO assessments are designated in the annual assessment planning process as including safety culture, assessment criteria specific to culture have not been identified.

CNS has initiated several new or expanded activities intended to enhance attention to key factors that support positive organizational culture, which includes safety culture. Most of the monitoring and interpretation activities related to organizational culture are acknowledged to be relatively new and maturing. In addition, an effectiveness review of the Disciplined Operations initiative was recently completed, identifying several improvement actions. At the time of this assessment, CNS had issued a subcontract with an outside firm for conducting organizational-culture-related support in 2025 that would include a survey/assessment.

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY METHODS AND INTERPRETATION AT THE Y-12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments, within the independent Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA), conducted an assessment of safety culture survey methods and interpretation used since 2020 by Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), the management and operating contractor at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). This assessment also evaluated the effectiveness of safety culture monitoring activities conducted by the Y-12 Field Office (YFO). Assessment activities were conducted in July and August 2024.

The EA report, *Assessment of Safety Culture Sustainment Processes at U.S. Department of Energy Sites – June 2020*, is a rollup report of eight safety culture assessments performed at a cross-section of DOE sites. The rollup report identified that one of the most significant areas of variance within the DOE complex is the quality of safety culture survey instruments and the proper interpretation of gathered survey data.[1] In consultation with the Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security, program offices, and local DOE field offices, EA established a goal to conduct follow-up reviews of the quality of safety culture surveys that inform safety culture decision-making, including contractors that were assessed in the rollup report and others that were not. This series of follow-up reviews is being performed in accordance with the *Plan for the Enterprise-wide Assessment of Safety Culture Survey Methods and Interpretation – February 2022*.

DOE Policy 450.4A, *Integrated Safety Management Policy*, sets the expectation that all organizations embrace a strong safety culture where core values are safe work performance and worker involvement in all aspects of work performance. That culture includes, among other key considerations, establishing a safety conscious work environment in which employees feel free to raise safety concerns to management without fear of retaliation. While DOE does not set specific requirements for how organizations should promote and maintain a strong safety culture or how they should assess or monitor their culture, DOE and industry guidance documents present acceptable methods for safety culture evaluation as described in section 2.0 below.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The DOE independent oversight program is described in and governed by DOE Order 227.1A, *Independent Oversight Program*, which EA implements through a comprehensive set of internal protocols, operating practices, assessment guides, and process guides. This report uses the terms "best practices" and "opportunities for improvement (OFIs)" as defined in the order. As identified in the assessment plan, EA used selected criteria from objectives SC.1 and SC.3 of EA CRAD 30-08, Revision 0, *Safety Culture Assessment*, to guide the assessment.

Because DOE provides guidance related to safety culture but expresses no specific requirements, EA referenced generally accepted standards and practices for safety culture surveys and monitoring. Core

[1] Safety culture surveys, as discussed in the 2020 EA report, are quantitative instruments and associated administrative processes used to gather employee perceptions about factors important for the safe performance of work. To be helpful in decision-making, survey questions should be designed to measure the right factors, and the people participating in the survey should be representative of the full organization.

references used in this assessment included the DOE Safety Culture Improvement Panel's (SCIP's) *Tailoring the Analysis of Safety Culture Health Monitoring Means and Methods Working Group*, January 2022; the Energy Facility Contractors Group's (EFCOG's) *A Guide to Safety Culture Evaluation*, Revision 0, September 2015; EFCOG's *Safety Culture Practitioner's Resources Guide*, Revision 1, September 2022; EFCOG's *Best Practice #249: Strategy and Design for Internal Surveys*, November 18, 2021; and the International Atomic Energy Agency's *Performing Safety Culture Self-Assessments*, Revision 0, June 2016.

EA examined approximately 120 CNS documents and exhibits related to safety culture management and surveys, including survey questions and results, organizational effectiveness assessments, strategic and management plans, survey communications, Voluntary Protection Program reports, meeting minutes, and operational experience lessons learned. EA also reviewed documents related to YFO safety culture oversight. EA interviewed CNS and YFO personnel responsible for monitoring topics related to safety culture and leadership responsible for acting on the results. EA also observed several organizational meetings both remotely and while on site. The combination of document reviews, observations, and interviews with involved individuals provided the data for this assessment.

The members of the assessment team, the Quality Review Board, and the management responsible for this assessment are listed in appendix A.

3.0 RESULTS

3.1 Valid and Reliable Methods to Maintain Cognizance of Safety Culture

Positive Attributes

Culture Survey Development and Survey Methods

CNS has established an organizational model, the Mission Success Model (MSM), to holistically integrate safety with other imperatives, such as security and mission delivery, to support their vision of Performance Excellence. The MSM was originally described in 2016 as the CNS Operating Model in PLN CNS-F-0001, *Strategic Framework for Achieving Performance Excellence*, and was updated and refined in subsequent years. The MSM includes influences from established culture models, such as the 2012 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) safety culture traits, the Five Disciplines Model of a learning organization, and others.

In 2019, CNS conducted an organization-wide culture assessment using Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) to evaluate progress in safety culture improvement and to evaluate the maturity of the implementation of the MSM. Because the scope of this EA assessment was on CNS activities from 2020 to the present, EA did not look at the conduct of the 2019 culture assessment in detail, and instead focused on the actions CNS took in response to that assessment.

The Disciplined Operations (DO) initiative was described by interviewees as the primary source of current safety culture-related insights. A key component of the DO initiative is "visible leadership floor time," requiring managers to observe work in the field to ensure that behaviors are consistent with DO principles. CNS is defining expectations for these floor time observations. CNS leaders are using the Process Workflow Management database to document floor time observations.

In 2021, 2022, and 2023, CNS conducted limited-scope safety culture surveys of the Construction organization, which is made up of CNS employees and is responsible for smaller construction projects at the site. The Construction organization management team derived the 2023 limited-scope safety culture survey from the Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI) safety culture handbook, the core of which is the 2012 INPO safety culture traits. In developing the survey, CNS drew on BNI's prior experience in conducting similar surveys. For example, one of the survey team members was involved in conducting a BNI safety culture survey for a U.S. Air Force construction project. After each team member had proposed a set of questions, the team selected the 10 most optimal questions for obtaining worker input on aspects of safety culture. In addition to the survey, focus groups and interviews provided qualitative data for triangulation with the quantitative survey data to enhance the credibility of results and areas for improvement. A total of 254 responses were completed, for a response rate of 65%, which is statistically representative of the collective Construction organization. This corporate reach-back used as a basis for developing and conducting similar surveys is considered a **Best Practice** because it provided: access to an established, validated safety culture model; experience and lessons learned in conducting safety culture assessments in construction projects; and human performance improvement (HPI) error precursor codes to support credible data reporting and analysis. (See **BP-CNS-1**.)

Culture Survey Results Analysis and Communication

Interviews and document reviews during this EA assessment showed that CNS has taken actions to address recommendations from the 2019 organization-wide culture assessment. Communication and management/employee engagement were major themes in the recommendations and corrective actions. CNS now uses the safety sustainment plans for each major organization, the routine "principle shares" (brief discussions on one of the MSM principles held before meetings), as well as a tiered communication approach to share common messages throughout the organization. Monthly safety pauses are another example of new and enhanced activities to support consistent and sustained communication. Also, the DO initiative was created in direct response to these recommendations, along with a Diversity and Inclusion organization to ensure representation and engagement of the continuously changing employee makeup of the organization. In addition, actions to address recommendations associated with accountability, work environment, and problem resolution were appropriately tailored.

CNS's 2023 survey of their Construction organization was preceded by a variety of communications (e.g., pre-job briefings, tailgates) to discuss the upcoming survey and encourage participation and qualitative comments. The survey analysis was performed by senior construction managers with prior experience in similar analyses, supported by statistical data analysts from the CNS Performance Analysis group. Similarly, the Construction organization management team used existing communication opportunities and methods to share results and improvement opportunities. In addition, in August 2024, a luncheon celebration was held to mark the Construction organization's accomplishment of over 1 million work hours without a lost time injury. At the luncheon, the CNS Director of Y-12 Construction specifically highlighted the Knoxville Building Trades Council craft professionals for their commitment to working safely, and the craft safety representatives for their active role in the safety program. CNS's improvements from the survey included expanded safety leadership training opportunities, increased project supervision coverage on weekends, and improved accountability for adherence to safety requirements.

CNS managers and supervisors collect factors related to safety culture from floor time observations, such as: availability of resources to complete work as directed; worker willingness to pause when unsure; and use of safety equipment. These are documented using a standardized form in the Process Workflow Management database to promote consistency and aid in developing manager competencies in observation. Results of floor time observations are recorded on the forms and binned by four pre-set categories: (1) issues, which are added to a rolling action item list, (2) OFIs, (3) field corrections, and (4)

"commendables" (positive observations). To date, the majority of floor time observations have been categorized as OFIs and commendables. Observations, insights, and actions are discussed at monthly Disciplined Operations Council (DOC) meetings. In 2024, CNS conducted an effectiveness review of the DO initiative to provide insights into continued improvement opportunities.

In addition to this formalized floor time data reporting process, data from other sources, such as Tools for Opportunities – Performance Improvement through Communication (TOPIC) (which includes data from issues management, event investigation, and assessment tracking), are reviewed by the Trend Analysis and Problem Prevention (TAPP) group for early signs of potential negative trends. According to interviews, the revived TAPP group was conceived in response to a recent criticality safety event. The DO and the contractor assurance system improvement plans contributed to the formation of the TAPP group. TAPP group subject matter experts use cognitive trending to review recent issues/events, looking for similarities in information that may not be easily evaluated using statistical methods, and bring identified similarities to the DOC. The TAPP group draws upon personal experience and team members' expertise to look for programmatic deficiencies or latent organizational weaknesses that may indicate previously unrecognized deficiencies in management control processes (e.g., strategy, policies, work control, training, and resource allocation). Currently, the TAPP group is examining targeted trend codes to better support field use and promote more consistent analysis. For example, through corporate reach-back, the TAPP group identified that it had not been considering all available HPI cause code data; as a result, any time that a TOPIC issue lists an HPI cause code, the TAPP group will use this data as part of issues management.

Qualification of Responsible Personnel

At the highest levels of operations, the CNS Site Manager and the Deputy Site Manager leverage their knowledge of the site and interpersonal relationships to regularly conduct field visits to engage with the workforce and monitor the CNS Y-12 safety culture.

When asked about training or orientation related to safety culture monitoring, various interviewees cited participation in DOE National Training Center courses, SCIP activities, and peer-type safety culture-related reviews for other DOE operations. Individuals involved in safety-culture-related support roles cited their safety professional qualifications (e.g., formal education and certifications) and professional experience at Y-12, other DOE sites, other Federal government agencies, and military experience.

Areas Needing Attention

Culture Survey Development and Survey Methods

The MSM is a comprehensive model with clear documentation that identifies the impetus for its original development, and the report from the 2019 organization-wide culture assessment established that CNS intended for the MSM to be an overarching, holistic organizational model. However, there is limited information related to subsequent modifications to the MSM and the role it plays to monitor and enhance safety culture. (See **OFI-CNS-1**.)

An organization-wide safety culture assessment has not been performed for five years, although other surveys were performed to gather data on specific aspects of safety culture. (See **OFI-CNS-2**.) Interviewees mentioned that in-depth investigation of recent events revealed previously unnoticed factors. The MSM has been modified, and Y-12's demographics have changed since the 2019 culture assessment. Additionally, in November 2024, a new management and operating contractor will assume responsibility of the Pantex Plant, leaving CNS with responsibility for only Y-12, which could invalidate many of the previous results. Accepted standards and practice for safety culture analysis recommend that a safety

culture assessment be conducted every two to three years for a stable employee population, and more frequently for a rapidly changing employee population. At the time of this assessment, CNS had issued a subcontract with an outside firm for conducting safety-culture-related support in 2025 that would include a survey/assessment.

The 2023 construction survey, with only 10 questions, was not intended to provide a full accounting of the group's safety culture. While the questions were based on the 2012 INPO safety culture traits, the language was modified to use familiar project terminology, and the modified questions were not formally validated.

Culture Survey Results Analysis and Communication

Interviews revealed that data from floor time observations has not been integrated into TOPIC, and the TAPP group is currently working to determine what value CNS gets from the observations and how data from various sources can be used for aggregate trending. Also, the TAPP charter states that the group looks for latent organizational weaknesses, which are deficiencies in management control processes as well as deficiencies in values (shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, and assumptions) that create workplace conditions that can provoke errors (precursors) and degrade the integrity of controls. Currently, the TAPP group is focusing on identifying deficiencies in management control processes; the TAPP group acknowledged that it has not yet added the culture element but intends to do so as the process matures.

CNS acknowledges the need to improve the communications with the workforce about the information gathered from floor time observations. Although issues are tracked through the rolling action item list, OFIs and trends identified from several observations are not consistently communicated.

Qualification of Responsible Personnel

Interviewees noted that most managers who are expected to participate in the visible leadership floor time program lack the breadth of Y-12 work experience and established interpersonal relationships that the Site Manager and Deputy Site Manager possess. Efforts are underway to incorporate these attributes into leadership training and development for new leaders.

Interviewees commented that key CNS personnel responsible for the 2019 organization-wide culture assessment have retired or left the organization. Consequently, there is little historical knowledge of the details of transitioning from a safety culture focus to a more holistic organizational culture focus as discussed in the 2019 organization-wide culture assessment report. (See **OFI-CNS-3**.)

CNS has not designated a safety culture coordinator. Rather, members of the management team with various roles and responsibilities related to safety culture identify and assign support based on experience and professional insights. Likewise, CNS has not formally defined processes or competencies for developing, administering, analyzing, and interpreting safety culture monitoring activities as part of the holistic organizational culture surveys or assessments. Developing safety culture surveys and assessments, conducting them, and analyzing the data require specialized expertise that is different from knowledge about safety practices and improvement. While key personnel have obtained relevant skills and knowledge related to developing and sustaining a healthy safety culture, CNS has not codified these as position-specific knowledge, skills, and abilities for qualifying or recruiting similar personnel for the future. (See **OFI-CNS-4**.)

3.2 DOE Oversight of Contractor Safety Culture Efforts

Positive Attributes

Culture Monitoring Framework

Each interviewed YFO staff member considered aspects of safety culture to inform many of their routine oversight activities. The YFO Office of Environment, Health, Safety, and Quality is responsible for providing long-term safety culture sustainment and oversight as stated in YFO-1.0, *The Manual for Operating Management*. YFO's commitment to promoting a healthy safety culture is demonstrated by YFO-1.0, where YFO leadership has committed to the 2012 INPO safety culture traits. Through leadership team and staff meetings, senior leadership has set clear expectations that field office management and staff embrace these traits in their routine job functions in providing oversight of CNS. YFO personnel focus on maintaining positive relationships with CNS managers and staff to encourage low-level issues to be shared and addressed through routine meetings and processes. All YFO staff who provide oversight have opportunities to incorporate safety culture principles into their field walkdown operational awareness reports, and these documented observations and concerns are summarized in a monthly letter to CNS management. As an example, YFO identified a management concern in DO several years ago and has been continuously monitoring and supporting CNS as they respond to the concern.

Interviewed YFO Facility Representatives discussed how they maintain good rapport with CNS staff to facilitate informal oversight and consider safety culture in their daily oversight activities. The Facility Representatives mentioned that they consider safety culture by assessing how the contractor integrates safety into daily work activities, through observing pre-job briefings, conducting facility walkdowns, writing operational awareness reports, shadowing assessments, and completing contractor assurance system oversight.

YFO leadership stated that safety culture is engrained into all Y-12 activities and cited executive leadership team meetings, operational awareness reports, integrated bimonthly operation calls, the DOC meeting (and other meetings with CNS), the triennial issues management meeting, the employee concerns program, management open door policy, and the integrated safety management system as examples of strong programs that promote a healthy safety culture.

Development of Safety Culture Competencies

In general, YFO leadership is supportive of improving the safety culture at Y-12 as demonstrated by: (1) all YFO leadership received safety culture orientation through the required Nuclear Executive Leadership Training, (2) YFO staff participate in SCIP meetings, and (3) YFO staff currently serve on SCIP subcommittees. Additionally, some YFO staff have developed their safety culture competency through a temporary position on the SCIP after receiving the "Facility Representative of the Year" award.

Areas Needing Attention

Culture Monitoring Framework

YFO does not have a designated safety culture lead. (See **OFI-YFO-1**.) Additionally, although the annual assessment plan identifies some assessments as "including safety culture," assessment criteria specific to culture have not been identified. (See **OFI-YFO-2**.) Instead, safety culture is incorporated into the designated assessments at the assessor's discretion.

Development of Safety Culture Competencies

YFO has not initiated a formal effort to ensure that staff members have safety culture training commensurate with their safety culture responsibilities. (See **OFI-YFO-3**.) YFO has been actively onboarding over a dozen new employees since May 2024 and recognizes that formalized training would assist YFO leadership in developing new staff to achieve the desired culture.

3.3 Summary

CNS leadership believes that focusing on DO is important for advancing their organization's culture in a positive direction, in particular during the current work environment at Y-12 of changing missions and a growing workforce. CNS has recently initiated and is maturing several initiatives to support this DO focus. Using ORAU support, CNS has conducted high-quality culture assessments in the past that provided insights used to move the culture in a positive direction. Planning for a culture assessment in 2025 is underway, with the goal of conducting a high-quality assessment that will provide the CNS leadership team with insights into the broader aspects of culture and support continued improvements. CNS leadership is aware of the complexities associated with the contract transition and the challenges of the new missions. CNS is actively monitoring key enhancement actions, mentoring managers, and displaying leadership behaviors to nurture and sustain a positive safety culture.

YFO senior leadership recognizes the importance of implementing and maintaining strong safety culture traits within its own organization and in its oversight of CNS. YFO has committed to the 2012 INPO safety culture traits, and these traits are embodied in the various oversight activities routinely conducted by management and staff. Designating a formal safety culture lead within the YFO organization could enhance current culture oversight of CNS by incorporating knowledge, skills, and abilities of safety culture aspects within current processes (e.g., meetings, operational awareness reports) and in developing specific criteria for future assessments. Additionally, the implementation of formal safety culture training would assist to instill an aligned culture mindset for new hires.

4.0 BEST PRACTICES

Best practices are safety-related practices, techniques, processes, or program attributes observed during an assessment that may merit consideration by other DOE and contractor organizations for implementation. The following best practice was identified as part of this assessment:

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC

BP-CNS-1: The corporate reach-back to BNI for guidance provided: access to an established, validated safety culture model; experience and lessons learned in conducting safety culture assessments in construction projects; and HPI error precursor codes to support credible data reporting and analysis.

5.0 OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

EA identified the OFIs shown below to assist cognizant managers in improving programs and operations. While OFIs may identify potential solutions to findings and deficiencies identified in assessment reports, they may also address other conditions observed during the assessment process. These OFIs are offered only as recommendations for line management consideration; they do not require formal resolution by management through a corrective action process and are not intended to be prescriptive or mandatory.

Rather, they are suggestions that may assist site management in implementing best practices or provide potential solutions to issues identified during the assessment.

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC

OFI-CNS-1: Consider clarifying how CNS aspires to use the MSM as a management construct to monitor and enhance key social and organizational factors that influence mission performance, particularly in conditions of rapid employee change, contract transition, or changes in mission taskings or production tempo that might be necessary to support expedited vital mission priorities.

OFI-CNS-2: Consider enhancing organizational/safety culture monitoring methodology through periodic use of assessments involving a combination of surveys, interviews, focus groups, and team observations of site evolutions and work processes to provide a baseline against which to develop a more holistic understanding of organizational/safety culture than may be obtained solely by floor time observations. A variety of reliable, validated assessment methods are published in available DOE and nuclear industry documents, specifically in EFCOG guides. If the MSM is to be used as an overarching construct for assessment, the factors that are considered as predominately related to safety should be identified, such as in a matrix format.

OFI-CNS-3: Consider documenting the design basis for future organization-wide culture surveys/assessments (e.g., identifying the MSM, INPO, or similar constructs that serve as a reference; explaining the basis for selecting or tailoring new questions or question revisions, including how those questions were validated and tested). Likewise, consider describing the process of analysis, both quantitative and qualitative.

OFI-CNS-4: Consider conducting an analysis of the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for the organizational/safety culture survey/assessment development, conduct, analysis, interpretation, and enhancement actions. This could serve as a prerequisite to selecting or qualifying new personnel to further develop CNS's approaches to culture monitoring and evolution as current personnel are replaced due to retirements or other assignments. Creating a formally designated safety culture coordinator position with specialized training/education has been found to support organizational clarity and harmonization of safety culture-related communication, monitoring, staff development, and internal integration. The EFCOG Safety Culture Practitioner's Resource Guide: *A Resource Guide for the DOE Community*, Issue Date: 09-30-2022 and EFCOG's *A Guide to Safety Culture Evaluation* could be helpful resources.

Y-12 Field Office

OFI-YFO-1: Consider conducting an analysis of the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for a safety culture subject matter expert or lead. A safety culture lead does not need to be an independent position within the organization, but a formal lead with an appropriate background of knowledge could provide benefit in further enhancing organizational culture traits within all of the oversight programs YFO currently implements in its oversight of CNS.

OFI-YFO-2: Consider developing additional guidance related to assessment criteria directly related to safety culture oversight.

OFI-YFO-3: Consider making formal safety culture training available to YFO staff periodically.

Appendix A
Supplemental Information

Dates of Assessment

July 31 to August 29, 2024

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