What Is The EMERGENCY PETROLEUM and GAS ADMINISTRATION?



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What is the

EMERGENCY PETROLEUM and GAS ADMINISTRATION . . . . .?



Partners in Defense

Revised by the
Office of Oil and Gas
U.S. Department of the Interior
1972

United States Department of the Interior

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

The Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration was established in 1963 to provide a planned, organized approach to Federal emergency responsibilities for oil and gas. The Department of the Interior's responsibilities in this area were defined by the Defense Production Act of 1950 and Executive Orders 10480 and 10997 (now 11490) as amended. The latter directs the Secretary of the Interior to prepare emergency plans and to develop emergency preparedness programs regarding petroleum and gas.

In carrying out its job of supplying three-fourths of the Nation's energy needs, the U.S. oil and gas industry has grown to a tremendous size. It employs over one million people. It drills about 30,000 wells a year. It produces over 11,000,000 barrels of crude oil and natural gas liquids and 60 billion cubic feet of natural gas a day. It transports crude oil, natural gas, and products through 1.1 million miles of pipelines. It manufactures fuels, lubricants, and many other useful products in about 250 refineries located in 38 states. Its products are distributed by 30,000 individual distributors, and marketed by about 220,000 service station operators. Every day it provides the United States with more than half a billion gallons of petroleum products and 62 billion cubic feet of natural gas to power the industrial and transportation segments of our society. For the foreseeable future, our economy and even our existence is dependent upon continued availability of the energy supplied by the oil and gas industry. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that this vital industry be prepared to supply these needs under all emergency conditions, from natural disasters to nuclear war.

Much of the oil and gas industry has attained, or is well on its way to attaining, adequate readiness. All of the industry should be prepared. To this end, this booklet will be found useful because it describes the direction and support which the Federal Government, through the Department of the Interior and the Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration, will give to the oil and gas industry in a national emergency.

Rogers C.B. Morton

Secretary of the Interior

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Despite our Nation's commitment to world peace, we *could be attacked.*

Would we be attacked with "The Bomb"? No one can answer that question; but if we were, casualties and damage to facilities could be staggering.

In the event of a nuclear war, weapons many million times more powerful than conventional bombs would be loosed on the United States. Blast effects would be felt several miles from the point of each nuclear explosion. Fallout could be significant *hundreds of miles away.* Even with full-scale civil defense measures, well over 50 million fatalities could occur in the United States if a major nuclear attack were to take place.

In spite of the prospect of such awesome damage, a majority of U.S. citizens *could survive* a nuclear attack. An important part of the petroleum industry—which now supplies three-fourths of the Nation's energy—could resume effective operations following an attack if adequate precautions are taken now.

National defense is the responsibility of our government. However, it is the *cooperative job of both government and industry* to plan in advance for any degree of emergency, from a relatively limited conflict, such as in Korea or Vietnam to an all-out nuclear war. In the latter event, the first job would be to pick up the pieces and get the industry's machinery back into running order, a task which has never had to be contemplated before in the United States.

Considerable analysis has been made of the actions individual companies should take in preparation for an emergency, and several major studies have been completed on this subject. The elements of company emergency planning are set forth in the concluding section of this booklet, beginning on page 19.

The principal focus of this booklet, however, is on the cooperative, pre-emergency planning steps under way by government and industry to back up the efforts that individual companies make on their own.

The booklet is designed to answer such questions as: "What kind of emergency do we face?" . . . "What is likely to happen?" . . . "What plans are being made to assure supplies of oil and gas in time of an emergency?" . . . "Who will run the show and how will it be run?" . . . "What part can I and my company play in emergency preparations?"



WHAT KIND OF EMERGENCY DO WE FACE?

The United States has to be prepared for emergencies ranging all the way from natural disasters through international tension and limited war to all-out nuclear attack on this country.

In peacetime and in periods of international tension, the Office of Oil and Gas of the Department of the Interior constantly monitors develop-

ments relating to oil and gas operations. Worldwide petroleum supply and demand studies under various assumed contingency situations are made regularly by the Office of Oil and Gas for the Department of Defense and/or the Office of Emergency Preparedness with the advice and assistance of the Petroleum Security Subcommittee of the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee. These studies provide a base for possible actions if international tension were to escalate into a major emergency.

Although the contingencies differ greatly, there is a consistent aim in emergency planning: to assure that the oil and gas industry can meet the Nation's emergency requirements. Here, in brief, is what would probably be done in each of the basic contingencies:

1. In a limited war of no greater magnitude than the Korean Conflict, probably little change from peacetime arrangements would now be needed. Oil and gas industry capability could be assessed and coordinated by the Office of Oil and Gas. Assistance would be provided by advisory committees such as the National Petroleum Council, the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, and the Emergency Advisory Committee for Natural Gas. Upon request, such industry committees would provide information to the government and comment on the soundness of proposed policies.

2. In a conventional war such as World War II, the stand-by Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration (EPGA) would be activated by the Secretary of the Interior. Much more will be said about EPGA in later sections. It is sufficient at this point to say that it would act on a coordinated national basis to develop whatever policies and directives are required to provide the petroleum supplies needed for the war effort.

3. In the event of nuclear attack, EPGA would be activated automatically and first operate on a decentralized basis from several regional offices. At a later time, with restoration of communications and rehabilitation of industry facilities, a nationally coordinated effort would be achieved as in a conventional war.

In this booklet considerable emphasis is placed on the actions to be taken during a period of nuclear conflict, because such a situation presents the challenges that are the most serious and the least familiar. However, government planning recognizes the need to be flexible in order to handle a variety of emergencies. The industry has always had to cope with natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes, and there is no intention of interposing a complicated bureaucracy into this picture. However, other government agencies provide vitally needed assistance to the public in a disaster situation and the Office of Oil and Gas, with assistance from the EPGA if it is required, will provide liaison between the industry and those agencies. Similarly, the Office of Oil and Gas would provide all required liaison in the event of geographically limited civil disturbances, bombings, and sabotage. More general disruptions would involve the same considerations as in limited war, with response depending on the extent of the resultant shortages.

The spectrum of likely contingencies embraces three broad situations (see page 4).

Contingency I (*International Tension*) means the continuation of international crises threatening the national security, some of which might also threaten to increase rapidly.

The existing peacetime control and coordination of the individual companies and the industry are adequate to cope with the present atmosphere of international tension. International tension could reach a point where the President or Congress would find it necessary and justifiable to invoke extraordinary measures falling short of declaring a civil defense emergency. These measures normally would be implemented as to oil and gas operations by the Department of the Interior with the assistance of industry advisory committees. It is not considered likely that EPGA activation would be required during a period of international tension.

Priorities and allocation authorities of the Defense Production Act of 1950 as amended, are still available for defense needs. The current Defense Materials System of the Department of Commerce is operated under this basic authority. DMS provides a system of priorities and allocation of basic materials for military and defense production. Similar authority for petroleum and gas has been delegated to the Secretary of the Interior.

Contingency II (*Limited War*) means warfare fought principally with conventional arms and involving U. S. general purpose combat forces on a substantial scale outside the continental United States—"limited" not in a geographical sense or size of involvement, but limited generally to the use of conventional weapons. A limited war may range in size from a localized conflict such as in Vietnam to a war similar in size and scope to World War II. Under limited war conditions the President and Con-



DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
US OOG
MAY 1972

gress might deem it necessary to invoke controls over production and other economic matters.

Depending upon the severity, EPGA may be partially or fully activated. The extent of EPGA activation would be determined by the Secretary of the Interior. When activated in a limited war situation, the objective of the government emergency organizations would be to mobilize the country's resources behind the war effort. This means that the EPGA probably would function in much the same manner as its predecessor agencies, the Petroleum Administration for War in World War II and the Petroleum Administration for Defense in the Korean Conflict. It is presumed that coordination at the national level could be maintained, and that an appropriate degree of central directional control of the industry would emanate from EPGA National Headquarters. If the degree of the emergency should lead to activation of EPGA regional, Gas Group and state offices, directional control of the industry would be channeled through such offices to the extent practicable.

Limited War Plans and Assumptions

Priority to Limited War Planning

In September 1965 the Office of Emergency Preparedness issued emergency planning guidance to Federal agencies directing that priority in emergency preparedness planning be given to limited war preparedness. This guidance was supplemented by an OEP request in December 1965 for cooperation of all Federal agencies with emergency responsibilities in achieving full mobilization readiness for limited war by June 30, 1966.

Statements of policy applicable to a limited war situation were provided by OEP in January 1966. In accordance with this guidance, OOG has developed a limited war readiness status program based on a checklist of emergency actions to assure adequate petroleum and gas supplies. A detailed petroleum and gas section to be included in a resource annex to the Government-wide Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited War has been developed by the Office of Oil and Gas.

Limited War Assumptions

1. Although plans call for full activation of the EPGA by the Secretary of the Interior upon declaration of a civil defense emergency by the President or Congress, it is also assumed that the Secretary will activate the EPGA in any limited war situation which requires the capability provided by the EPGA.

2. EPGA actions are all based on the assumption that the limited war situation has been deemed serious enough to warrant activation of the EPGA. Actions in a limited war situation of less severity would be taken by regular Department of the Interior officials under authority of the Secretary of the Interior.

3. The extent to which the EPGA will be activated in a limited emergency will be determined by the Secretary of the Interior.

4. Under limited emergency conditions, the Federal Government will carry on such programs and invoke such emergency control measures as necessary to assure adequate supplies and the best use of petroleum and gas for military and civil defense purposes.

5. State and local governments may be called upon to adapt their normal petroleum and gas regulations to fit emergency conditions, to assist the Federal Government in administering a petroleum consumer rationing program, if such a program is needed, and to control the distribution of natural gas and secondary inventories of petroleum products as requested by Interior or the EPGA.

6. In a large-scale limited war emergency, the Federal Government may request the state and local governments to perform some of the same functions they would have in a nuclear attack emergency.

7. The following conditions are indicative of those which might prevail in a severe limited war situation requiring activation of the EPGA:

Petroleum and gas requirements may increase substantially.

Sources of supply of petroleum from foreign sources may be seriously interrupted.

Normal shipping facilities may be disrupted.

Shortages in product supplies in the U. S. may occur in some localities.

Shortages in manpower and materials may occur.

Sabotage of domestic petroleum facilities may be a distinct possibility.

Communications will be intact but may be under heavy priority use.

All Government offices may be functioning in normal locations.

There may be ever present the possibility of general war (nuclear war).

Contingency III (General War) means armed conflict that includes direct nuclear attack on the United States. In this situation the response of the government agencies would be immediate and automatic, probably with little or no warning. The fullest capability of the surviving EPGA organization would be required.

General War Assumptions

It is assumed that, in such an attack, thermo-nuclear weapons in the multimegaton range probably would be used against the land area, cities, industry, military bases, and people in this country.

1. The enemy's initial attack will be an attempted knockout blow placing primary reliance on nuclear weapons delivered by missile, manned aircraft, and other means. There will be subsequent attacks possibly employing biological and chemical weapons.

2. The important military and Atomic Energy Commission installations, direct defense producing plants, industrial centers, and concentrations of populations will be primary targets for nuclear weapons.

3. Not all possible targets will be damaged in the initial or subsequent attacks. The number of targets to be attacked or the pattern of attack cannot be reasonably predicted.

4. Surface bursts will generally be employed since radioactive fallout from such bursts would increase casualties and interfere with military and civilian activities for days or weeks over wide areas of the country. However, air bursts would cause more widespread damage.

5. Sabotage may be employed before, during, and after an attack against key oil and gas facilities.

6. The attack will disrupt communications and transportation; cause widespread damage in major urban communities and industrial centers; and deny access to large areas and certain oil and gas facilities, because of radioactive fallout, making difficult the task of operations, repair and reconstruction.

7. Washington, D. C., may no longer exist as the seat of government.

8. The Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration (EPGA) will be activated in the event of a declaration of a civil defense emergency *or an attack on this country.* Direction from the National Headquarters, or even Regional Offices, may be impossible in the immediate post-attack period. The effectiveness and self-sufficiency of the initial operations (survival period) will be dependent upon:

Clear pre-delegation of authority:

To EPGA field offices by Federal officials.

To State Emergency Resource Management Organizations by state officials.

The understanding and acceptance of emergency plans, responsibilities, and policies at company, field and national levels.

Positive action by individual gas companies.

The assumptions on limited or general war involving the U.S. constitute an effort to visualize possible future events in order to give positive direction to planning. Accordingly, these assumptions are not forecasts of events to come or necessarily actions that would be taken, but are included here as necessary guides for planning.

WHY MAKE PLANS NOW?

Any future national emergency could be far different from the conditions of World War II or the Korean Conflict. On those earlier occasions, there was considerable delay after the crisis arose in formulating emergency plans and recruiting personnel for the mobilization effort. The start-up time on earlier occasions illustrates the importance of advance readiness. The *next* time—should there be a next time—we may not have *any* time to plan and organize *after the fact.* Our "lead time" is *now.*

Even in an emergency short of war, advance planning will pay big dividends in reduced disruption of the economy, and less drastic or reduced length of time for curtailments of energy and for diminished standard of living. Clearly, we must be prepared with well thought-out plans to survive, to adapt, to fight back, and to reconstitute the American economy. Without such plans, helplessness and inertia—even defeat—are much more likely to occur and, in any event, rehabilitation would be uncertain and slow.

WHAT BASIC PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE?

The planning process is well under way.

As early as January 1949, a study on emergency planning was carried out at the request of the Secretary of the Interior by a committee of the National Petroleum Council. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Petroleum Administration for Defense was organized in October 1950, along the lines recommended by the NPC committee in 1949. During and after the 1950's, the NPC made studies relating to: an oil and gas emergency defense organization; disaster planning for the oil and gas industries; security principles for the petroleum and gas industries. In 1959 and 1964, in response to further requests from the Secretary of the Interior, the NPC published reports on national emergency oil and gas mobilization.

The Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) published in 1964 a revised and updated "National Plan for Emergency Preparedness," a complete statement on non-military defense planning for the country. It provides broad guidelines for actions by government from national to local community levels, by industry and private organizations, and by individual citizens throughout America. It outlines what must be done in specific areas for survival and restoration of the economy upon a nuclear attack. Some examples of the essential subjects covered are: Civil Defense; Health; Manpower; Food; Water; Economic Stabilization; and Housing.

One of the Plan's 16 chapters—Chapter 10, entitled "Fuel and Energy"—deals with oil and gas, solid fuels, and electric power. General guidance is provided on the assumed effects of attacks, the organization and responsibilities for meeting military and essential civilian requirements for oil and gas, actions to be taken in limited emergencies, and actions to be taken in a general war.

Other plans developed by OEP include those for resource mobilization and management in the event of an emergency short of war (1971), limited war (1967), and general war (1970). Also, plans have been prepared as guides to state and local planning.

In oil and gas, the most important planning effort has gone into the establishment, staffing and training of the stand-by emergency agencies such as the EPGA. The EPGA has detailed operating manuals and reference handbooks to guide its members in handling emergency responsibilities.

HOW WOULD THE NATIONAL PLAN WORK?

The National Plan brings together and summarizes in a single document the basic plans and guidance issued by the government agencies in carrying out their legislative and executive mandates. The broad and far-reaching powers for actions prescribed in the National Plan are derived from the authority vested in or to be provided to the chief executives of Federal, state, and local governments by their respective constitutions, statutes, local charters and ordinances and, specifically, by defense emergency legislation at all levels of government.

The Office of Defense Resources (ODR) is established on the declaration of an emergency which requires national direction of resources. The Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) will become the nucleus of the ODR when the latter is established. ODR is the central programming agency for resource management and the principal staff arm of the President in determining national economic goals. It provides the policy guidance and direction necessary to achieve Presidentially approved objectives. All major programs and unresolved problems involving the use of resources are adjudicated and approved by this agency. In discharging its overall mobilization responsibility, ODR relies heavily on other government departments and resource agencies; it looks to them to settle most of the disputes in regard to the resources for which they are responsible, keeping problems referred for arbitration to a minimum.

Over thirty departments and agencies are involved in carrying out the emergency functions required in the management of resources. Programs for oil and gas, for example, are developed by the Department of the

Interior (EPGA); manpower by the Department of Labor's National Manpower Agency (NMA); and industrial production by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Domestic Commerce (BDC). Many decisions involve several agencies. If there are conflicting demands for the resources required or if resource use decisions are challenged by other agencies, ODR will resolve the conflict.

The pre-emergency relationship between the Interior Department's Office of Oil and Gas, the Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, is diagrammed in Exhibit 1 on page 23.

KEY PHASES IN CENTRAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

While these activities are going forward at the national level, state and local governments are developing their non-military defense plans and capabilities, including enactment of legislation giving emergency authority to their principal officials. In general, these state and local plans follow the broad pattern established by the National Plan. The relationships between Federal and state organizations for oil and natural gas emergency activities are set forth in the illustrations below and in Exhibit 2 on page 24.

In brief, the role of the national and regional offices of the EPGA relating to oil and gas is the coordination and direction of the industrial process that provides petroleum fuels and natural gas. EPGA will also oversee the direct distribution of oil and gas from primary inventory to the military, to other countries, to certain large industrial users, to secondary inventory points—and, in the case of natural gas, to local distribution systems. Distribution from secondary oil inventories or local gas systems to all other consumers is to be directed by state and local authorities under general policy guidelines set down by national authorities. Further details on the state organization duties are contained in Office of Emergency Preparedness Example State Plans (see Bibliography, Item 6).





WOULD THE GOVERNMENT TAKE OVER INDUSTRY?

The government would *not* take over industry.

In peacetime, and to a large extent in war, Americans rightfully rely on the marketplace to work out the intricate matching-up of supply and demand. The business community recognizes, however, that some direction from the government is necessary in time of war. A balance has to be struck between civilian and military needs. There has to be some government coordination in securing scarce material and manpower to accomplish wartime goals.

One of the key principles of the Basic Policies section (Chapter 1) of the National Plan is that we "continue a basically free economy and private operation of industry, subject to government regulations only to the extent necessary to the public interest." The National Plan further states (Chapter 10) that "Although subject to emergency controls and regulations, the provision of fuel and energy and the construction, operation and maintenance of fuel and energy facilities would remain the responsibility of their owners or operators."

Governmental direction would continue only as long as absolutely necessary.

WHO WOULD RUN THE SHOW?

Although government controls and regulations would be imposed on industry only to the extent required by the emergency, a nuclear attack upon the United States would clearly require a major expansion of government activity and personnel.

The President specifically assigned to the Secretary of the Interior responsibility for preparing national emergency plans and developing preparedness programs covering petroleum and gas (Executive Order 10997, February 16, 1962). The principal Federal agency to carry out such plans in the event of a national emergency is the Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration which was established by the Secretary of the Interior on August 28, 1963. The Secretary of the Interior heads EPGA as National Administrator.

KEY PHASES
IN CENTRAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT



EPGA will be staffed largely by personnel recruited from the industry. Many of those who would be needed are already enrolled in the National Defense Executive Reserve. NDER was established so that able and experienced civilian executives could be selected in advance of an emergency for training to occupy full-time executive positions in the Federal Government. In the oil and gas industry, employers are requested by the Office of Oil and Gas or by EPGA Regional Administrators to make executives available for service. Once an individual is selected for appointment, he is asked to join the NDER to accept an assignment to serve in a specific position in the stand-by organization. With the wealth of ability and industry experience that these men bring into the government emergency organization, oil and gas mobilization can be effectively coordinated in order to secure the goals established by the President and other top civilian government officials.

STAFFING OF THE EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION

EPGA will be staffed largely by industry people selected and appointed as members of the National Defense Executive Reserve.

The NDER goes back to 1955 when an amendment to the Defense Production Act authorized the President to establish and train an executive reserve for employment in the government in times of emergency. It had become increasingly evident that effective use of executive civilian talent is a keystone for the successful mobilization of our resources when the Nation faces a crisis. Therefore, in 1956, the President issued Executive Order 10660 (now EO 11179) establishing the National Defense Executive Reserve. The Office of Emergency Preparedness coordinates the Reserve program on behalf of the President.

Here are answers to some questions concerning petroleum Executive Reservists:

1. *What are the qualifications for membership in the Petroleum and Gas Unit of the National Defense Executive Reserve?*
   The generally limiting qualifications for membership in the NDER are U.S. citizenship and the mandatory Federal retirement age of 70. Of course each man must have the background and experience that are relevant to his emergency responsibilities in EPGA. A candidate may be selected on the basis of administrative or professional experience that can be related to mobilization programs for oil, natural gas, and petrochemicals.

2. *How does one become a candidate?*
   Candidates are selected and appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. Generally, candidates are recruited by the Office of Oil and Gas and EPGA Regional Administrators.

3. *Is security clearance necessary?*
   Yes. Candidates must be cleared for security by the Federal Government before designation as Reservists. These clearances usually take from three to four months.

4. *What are the obligations of a Reservist?*
   The Reservist and his employer must sign a statement of understanding to the effect that the Reservist will be permitted to attend peacetime training sessions and that he will be available immediately for full-time Federal employment in the event of a national emergency. His initial membership in the Executive Reserve will be for a three-year term.

5. *What would be the responsibilities of the EPGA Reservist in time of emergency?*
   The Office of Oil and Gas furnishes each of its Executive Reservists a handbook, operating manual, and specific instructions as to where to report, and the nature of his responsibilities as an EPGA official in an emergency.

6. *Will EPGA Reservists be trained for specific mobilization assignments?*
   Reservists will be trained for a specific EPGA emergency assignment in addition to general mobilization responsibilities. A Reservist normally would be assigned to the emergency work for which he had specialized experience and knowledge, but the EPGA would not be precluded from using him where most needed.

7. *How much time is the Executive Reservist expected to devote to training activities?*
   The training program is planned so that undue demands will not

HOW WOULD THE SHOW BE RUN?

Experience has shown that an emergency agency can contribute very importantly to effective mobilization of resources in a wartime emergency. Certainly World War II demonstrated this. Early in the war, not all the parts of the national industrial mobilization plans meshed smoothly. There was, for example, the overall goal of producing 75,000 planes a year. Such a large amount of our strategic materials was committed to the manufacture of aircraft and other hardware that there was not enough steel, as well as other materials, to construct the refineries needed to supply the fuel requirements for the forthcoming planes. The Petroleum Administration for War pushed for a balanced usage of our limited manpower and materials and thus helped the petroleum companies in getting the materials needed to do their wartime job.

be imposed on the Reservist's time. Regional training conferences are held not more than twice a year, and a national training conference normally is held every two or three years. In most positions the Reservist is expected to devote approximately three to five days per year.

8. *What kind of training does the EPGA Executive Reservist receive?*
   a. Participation in test exercises and alerts to the extent practicable;
   b. Attendance at periodic meetings in which mobilization programs are discussed in general;
   c. Personal consultation on specific mobilization problems relative to his area of competence; and
   d. Reading publications and other communications pertaining to EPGA plans and programs—usually specifically related to the Reservist's emergency responsibilities.

9. *Is a Reservist paid for his services?*
   The Executive Reservist receives no reimbursement from government for his pre-emergency training and travel expenses. When called to duty in an emergency, the Reservist becomes a Federal employee and usually serves on a salary basis under government pay schedules then in effect. If his personal or company circumstances require him to serve without government compensation, he is allowed to do so pursuant to appropriate legal authority then existing.

10. *Can a person have dual status as an Executive Reservist and a military reservist?*
    Men who have obligations under the active military reserve cannot assume the second responsibility of an EPGA Executive Reservist.

11. *Is an Executive Reservist subject to the so-called "Conflict of Interest" statutes while he is in training?*
    No, he is not. Sections 203, 205, 207, 208, and 209 of Title 18, United States Code, are applicable only to officers and employees of the United States. A person does not become an officer or employee of the United States by reason of his membership in the Executive Reserve. His activities as an Executive Reservist are confined to training and do not include advising, consulting, or acting on any matter pending before any department or agency.

12. *Is an Executive Reservist subject to the "Conflict of Interest" statutes after he reports for duty?*
    A person serving in a position in EPGA would be a government employee and subject to the statutory provisions mentioned above. There is authority, however, to make appointments to EPGA of persons who would serve as government employees without compensation. Section 209, prohibiting the receipt by a government employee of compensation from any source other than the government, does not apply to persons so appointed.

    Requests to Executive Reservists to accept assignments to positions in EPGA presuppose that, if and when an emergency arises, the individuals will be able to accept appointments to those positions and serve effectively under them without contravening any statutory provision. Conversely, no Executive Reservist would be expected to accept an appointment and enter on duty if at that time it appears that such action would place him in jeopardy.

The approach used by the Petroleum Administration for War in World War II and its successor organization during the Korean War, the Petroleum Administration for Defense, was considered by businessmen to be practical and effective. For example, when it was apparent that only limited amounts of tubular goods were available in World War II, PAW *could have* set up procedures to review every well that was to be drilled, considering the subjective information of geological prospects and the exact amount of materials requested. Instead, PAW adopted simplified formulas for equitable allocation of tubular goods consistent with the war program.

There is good reason to believe the planners in both government and industry retained much of the knowledge they learned "the hard way." Such a practical approach to problem-solving will be basic to the operation of EPGA in the future.



HOW WOULD EPGA? WORK?

In establishing EPGA, the Secretary of the Interior indicated that the agency has two primary purposes:

1. To have an organization, in being and known to Federal and state government agencies and to the industry, which is ready and authorized to discharge promptly the defense responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior for oil and gas in the event of a civil defense emergency or an attack upon the United States. In this type of emergency, EPGA would be activated automatically; in others, the extent of operations would be specified by the Secretary of the Interior.
2. To aid the Department in its emergency preparedness functions relating to oil and gas as assigned to the Secretary of the Interior by the President.

EPGA's primary function in an actual emergency is to assist, coordinate, and direct, where necessary, activities of the oil and gas industry, in order to assure that domestic and foreign supplies of oil and gas meet essential military and civilian requirements of the Nation and its allies. In discharging this broad function, among the activities EPGA would have to perform are the following:

1. Formulate and coordinate oil and gas supply programs.
2. Act as claimant for the oil and gas industry before other government agencies to obtain supporting resources such as manpower, materials, transportation, communications and funds needed for vital programs.
3. Coordinate and direct the allocation and distribution of petroleum products from primary inventories to distributors, wholesalers, etc., and gas to local distribution systems.
4. Establish and maintain communications with the oil and gas industry and with government agencies, as necessary to perform the above functions.

While EPGA utilizes the knowledge and experience of two earlier emergency oil and gas agencies that functioned effectively (PAW and PAD), it differs from its predecessors primarily in that a large degree of decentralization of its operations is provided for in case of a nuclear attack that disrupts nationwide communications.

Even with limited communications, decentralized authority and stand-by organizational plans would allow EPGA to aid the industry early in the recovery efforts. These efforts would focus on damage-repair problems and on obtaining materials needed for repairs. The organization of EPGA



Map Illustrates Boundaries of EPGA and OEP Regions

would necessarily be local or regional under these conditions and might consist of many uncoordinated offices. As communications improved and operational control was restored, administration would shift to a national basis.

The EPGA organization is flexible so that it will fit the needs of any kind of national emergency. EPGA provides a far-reaching organization, all or any part of which could be readily activated. Thus, the organization arrangements would speed mobilization regardless of the nature of a future emergency. EPGA provides a ready-made organization consisting of a national headquarters unit, regional units serving the ten uniform Federal regions (see map at top of page), nine Gas Group Offices as well as state offices. EPGA structure parallels the functional lines of the petroleum industry, with staff and line units comparable to those found in a typical large, vertically integrated organization. This is apparent from looking at the organization charts of the national and regional EPGA offices. (See Exhibits 3 and 4 on pages 25 and 26.)

Under the National Plan, Federal *claimant* agencies have been assigned the responsibility for developing and presenting the needs of their assigned constituents to the proper Federal *resource* agencies which have the responsibility for their assigned resources and seek to supply the indicated needs. In the case of oil and gas, EPGA (as the resource agency) evaluates claims for oil and gas for completeness and validity, assures there are no overlaps, and adds any essential demands upon the resource for which no claims are received, particularly those reflected by consumer needs not represented by a claimant other than the resource agency itself. The EPGA planning process also provides for the development of total estimated oil and gas requirements through industry sources. This provides a means of cross-checking the requirements presented by the claimant agencies to assure completeness. Because of the possible lack of advance warning of a nuclear attack, emergency legislation, executive orders and agency decrees have been drafted and arrangements made for the distribution of these documents at the appropriate time. These stand-by measures or documents, pertaining to delegations of requisite emergency authorities, priorities for allocations of resources and materials, "freeze orders," etc., will, when approved, act to "hold the line" until measures tailored to meet

actual conditions are placed into effect. A delegation of emergency authority by the Secretary of the Interior to EPGA officials for their use in the event of a civil defense emergency declared by the President or Congress, or an attack upon the United States, has already been executed.

EPGA also functions as a *claimant* agency for supporting resources such as materials, manpower, communications, etc., needed by the oil and gas industries to carry out approved EPGA supply programs.

Central resource management starts as soon as the gross outline of a national rehabilitation plan is developed, based on broad national goals set by the President. There is an immediate need to define these goals in more definitive terms to ensure that they are feasible and within the capacity of the Nation to achieve.

Defining the goals as specifically as possible is a function of the agencies charged with the development of resource programs. These goals are reflected in programs for:

—The military strength and protection of the Nation.
—Economic assistance and other non-military relations with our Allies.
—Essential civil needs.
—New construction or rebuilding of productive capacity.

ODR adjudicates any conflicts involving the use of resources in the interest of determining the best possible balance for national security.

By Executive Order 10480, the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to impose priorities and allocations over petroleum and gas. This authority has been pre-delegated to EPGA for use when activated and might be utilized by EPGA officials in taking such actions as:

1. Directing petroleum and gas production and processing facilities to meet essential needs.
2. Allocation of petroleum products from primary inventories to secondary inventories, to military and AEC installations, to ports for export, and to industrial plants usually supplied by primary inventories.
3. Curtailment of gas deliveries to consumers in accordance with a Federal Gas Priority System developed by EPGA under guidelines furnished by ODR, and approved by the EPGA National Administrator, which specifies the order of curtailment of gas supply to consumers in emergency situations.

When activated, EPGA as a *resource agency* is responsible for directional control of all segments of oil and gas operations, from production through distribution to the ultimate consumer. In a general war involving an attack upon the United States, state and local governments will assist EPGA in the administration of the Federal Gas Priority System. It is possible that this arrangement may also be utilized for administering the Federal Gas Priority System in a limited war situation of a severity requiring the activation of EPGA.

The principal objective of EPGA is to assure continuity of adequate supplies to meet essential requirements. EPGA endeavors to attain the goals set by the President and the ODR. To accomplish this, it is necessary to provide for continuous forward planning and direction of the oil and gas industries, identifying problems and recommending means to correct or resolve them. The structure is built around the EPGA General Supply Programs. These programs reflect the matching of worldwide demand with capability to supply essential oil and gas requirements. These comprehensive programs are made up of a number of component programs, including a consolidation of various geographic Area Supply and Support Service Programs, as follows:

A. *Area Supply Programs.* These are divided into Domestic (USA) and Foreign, and further divided into sub-areas such as the U. S. Regions and Foreign Areas.

B. *Division Operating Programs* are each functional Division's plans for executing that Division's part of the General Supply Program.

C. *Support Service Programs* are programs indicating materials, manpower and other support resource requirements complementary to the fulfillment of General Supply Programs. These are a consolidation of support service requirements included in the Division Operating Programs.

D. *Program Time Frames.* Programs will be prepared for the following time frames:

Short Range	— Current through 3rd month (by monthly periods)
Intermediate Range	— 4th month through 18th month (by quarterly periods)
Long Range	— From 18th month forward (by semi-annual periods)

By special agreement the Federal Power Commission assists the Secretary of the Interior in carrying out certain areas of his emergency responsibilities as they pertain to natural gas.

HOW WOULD EPGA AND THE INDUSTRY RESPOND TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK?

As the first step in understanding petroleum and gas operations under nuclear war conditions, it must be recognized that in a nuclear attack the United States would face the probability of severe losses in population, plus damaging losses to communications, transport, agriculture, industry and other facilities. Generally, it is felt that recovery from a nuclear attack would be characterized by three successive phases:

A. Shock (survival) period
B. Recovery and stabilization period
C. All-out war effort.

Emergency measures in the oil and gas industry have already been summarized in broad terms in the preceding section. This section discusses specifically the steps that probably would be taken by EPGA and industry to provide adequate supplies of oil and gas to meet essential military, civilian and industrial requirements after a nuclear attack.

A. *Shock (survival) period*

It seems likely that damage after a nuclear attack would be so great and fallout problems so widespread that the normal channels of supply and distribution of petroleum between various regions of the United States would be badly disrupted. In general, industry would attempt to continue operating as normally as possible. The major petroleum supply actions during this period would seem to be:

1. A technical "on-the-spot" appraisal by industry of surviving petroleum inventories and facilities immediately after the initial attack.
2. An appraisal of essential needs to be supplied from surviving capabilities.
3. The distribution of surviving supply by a properly constituted authority in accordance with a pre-determined order of priority. Since supplies are likely to be short in certain regions, great effort should be made to "stretch-out" existing quantities. Availability of supplies in the utter disruption of a post-nuclear situation will depend upon the local initiative of regional offices, working under the guidelines of Defense Mobilization Order 8500.1A—"Guidance on Priority Use of Resources in Immediate Post-attack Period," issued by the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Executive Office of the President.

In view of the necessary tasks to be done in the initial "shock" period just after nuclear attack, the following steps are planned by industry and government:

1. Establish damage survey teams on stand-by basis from industry personnel in each region; train and equip these units so that they can function promptly in an emergency.
2. Establish working relationships between Regional EPGA Administrators and state, county and municipal emergency organizations as well as oil and gas companies in order to assure that emergency procedures and responsibilities are clearly assigned.

B. *Recovery and stabilization period*

During this period enemy attack might continue, but with less intensity. This assumes the enemy will have expended major missile capability in the early phase of the attack, and that further action will concentrate largely on United States military targets using weapons from surface or undersea vessels, plus harassment of shipping by enemy submarines and aircraft. Alternatively, some sort of cease-fire or truce will have been established, since the enemy would have suffered equivalent damage.

Under either conditions, it would be possible to re-establish control of petroleum supply and facilities on a coordinated nationwide basis under the direction of EPGA.

Communications could be re-established and coordinated action could begin to supply and distribute petroleum from lightly damaged or undamaged facilities to various parts of the country. However, available petroleum would still have to be allocated carefully to essential consumers in accordance with a broadly applicable order of priority. Also during this period oil and gas companies and industry advisory groups would, as called upon, provide Regional and National Headquarters of EPGA with information to assist EPGA in its operations, including:

1. Assessment of damage to facilities; estimates of time, manpower and materials for restoration or new construction.

2. Estimates of essential oil and gas requirements for civilian survival and for industrial support to the war effort.

3. Estimates of supply available, both current and for as far ahead as feasible.

Effective liaison would have to be maintained particularly at the regional level, between EPGA and the state, county and municipal emergency regulatory authorities, and the industry as part of the coordinated activity.

The main efforts of EPGA supported as necessary by the industry at this phase would focus on the following:

1. Aiding surviving petroleum producing, refining, storage, and transportation and distribution facilities to get back to a normal operation as quickly as possible.

2. Establishing an operating balance between raw material supply, processing capacity, and distribution facilities.

3. Determining what allocation of supplies is necessary and setting up procedures to accomplish it.

4. Designing programs to increase the availability of petroleum in the months ahead.

5. Claiming manpower and materials from proper authorities to support programs.

6. Coordinating and guiding the operations of the petroleum industry in accordance with these programs.

To accomplish these ends, it might also be necessary to establish close working relationships with industry—regionally as well as nationally.

C. *All-out war effort*

Operations and organizational effort during this period would, in general, follow the same pattern as previously outlined for the recovery and stabilization period. However, every effort would be made to expand the petroleum capabilities to meet military and industrial objectives for the successful prosecution of the war toward ultimate victory.

Fallout Conditions from a Random Assumed Nuclear Attack

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

While the foregoing has dealt primarily with rehabilitation of the U.S. oil and gas industries, it is conceivable that certain allies of the United States (particularly those of the NATO group) would also have been subject to attack, and would be experiencing similar difficulties in supply. A great deal of what has been said in this booklet with reference to the United States would also apply to many of its Allies.

The NATO European group of countries has a relatively small volume of indigenous production and therefore relies heavily upon outside sources for supplies. In the case of a nuclear attack, it is conceivable that some (perhaps all) of these sources would be denied; in this event the United States and its Allies would have to agree on how to share the remaining resources. The problems of continuing adequate supply are, therefore, expected to become wider in scope and more complex than during the first month after the attack—in which period concentrated effort would have been directed mainly toward survival.

WHAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN

EPGA?

EPGA is far beyond the blueprint stage. It is a stand-by organization, ready to assume full responsibility for oil and gas resource management. Approximately, 650 key positions are staffed, primarily with Executive Reservists with related industry experience. Orientation and training sessions are held regularly. Field workshops, seminars, etc., are held regularly for members of the regional organization, and national exercises are staged at intervals, with regional members sometimes joining the members of the National Headquarters. These include sessions for orientation of new members, updating the long-term Reservists, and problem-solving sessions where management decisions are reached on the handling of a theoretical future emergency.

Operating manuals have been prepared and issued to all Executive Reservists, providing guidance for the handling of post-activation operations of the EPGA. The Reservist's Handbook contains the appropriate chapters of the National Plan, the Executive Orders that provide the authority for emergency management of oil and gas resources, Departmental Manual Releases on the EPGA and Authority Delegations, organizational information, and EPGA Circulars including the alert and activation procedures, and other information of interest to Reservists.



Office space is provided for a small representative cadre of the regional EPGA organizations at the OEP/DCPA Federal Relocation Centers, with pre-positional information that would be needed for emergency resource management. OOG Regional Representatives are located at or near some of the FRCs, and they maintain the staffing and readiness of the EPGA regional organizations for coverage of all ten of the Uniform Federal Regions. In many of the regions, contracts have been made for emergency office space and living quarters to facilitate the activation of the EPGA Regional units.

Nine Gas Group Offices have been established in space provided by gas transmission host companies. Gas Group kits contain a complete set of transparencies of the entire U.S. natural gas transmission system with details of the locations of compressor stations, interties, river crossing, etc. These kits are pre-positioned at each Gas Group Office and each regional and national emergency operating center.

The EPGA National Headquarters has an alternate emergency operating center prepared for immediate activation if an emergency requires its use. Three cadres are assigned to maintain continuity of operations in three locations if an attack should become imminent.

Vital information, maps and data have been compiled and pre-positioned at EPGA offices for immediate use at the outset of an emergency. An important backup data gathering and analysis system is provided EPGA by the National Resource Analysis Center (NRAC) of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. NRAC has input resource data covering such information as natural gas processing plants, natural gas pipeline facilities, petroleum refineries' basic processing capacity and supplementary processing capacity, petrochemical plants, crude oil pipelines, petroleum products pipelines, petroleum product storage capacity, estimated inventories, military bulk petroleum storage facilities, worldwide port facilities, electric generating stations, manufacturing census establishment and product shipment records, special products capacity, population and housing. NRAC also provides a computer capability for making assessments of damage to oil and gas facilities by nuclear attack or other physical damage and for making analyses of surviving resources. The data which have been provided to the NRAC form a basis upon which computers can project an attack pattern and determine the general results of simulated attacks on petroleum and gas facilities and supplies. In addition to providing case study capability for vulnerability studies, this also provides a capability to obtain a similar determination on a swift and summary basis in the event of an actual attack. Remote computer terminals are located at each Federal Regional Center and some other Emergency Operations Centers. These provide access to the NRAC computer.

The National Petroleum Council (NPC), since its inception in 1946, has been the principal voice of the petroleum and gas industries to advise, inform and make recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior on emergency preparedness, including the supply of data on industry operations which would be needed in an emergency. The Council was instrumental in developing the handbooks and manuals which provide information and detailed emergency operating procedures for the use of EPGA. Other studies conducted by the Council, at the Department's request, have produced oil and gas resource data which are needed for all types of emergency planning. These include data on manpower and materials requirements, transportation facilities, storage facilities, etc.

The work of the NPC is complemented by the Emergency Advisory Committee for Natural Gas which was established by the Secretary of the Interior in 1962 to assist in emergency preparedness efforts involving natural gas. It has conducted studies which have resulted in useful recommendations concerning pre-emergency compilation of information and development of emergency plans covering gas operations. It has assisted in the development of guidance for the natural gas industry. A guidebook entitled "Emergency Operations Guide for the Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Industry," was completed with the Committee's help in 1967. In 1970, the EACNG updated a set of comprehensive maps showing all natural gas transmission pipelines and related compressor stations, and other key facilities in the U.S., including the preparation of photographic negatives to be used for slide projections. In 1971, the EACNG and OOG developed kits which include the map slides and other related materials. The kits also contain a set of the resource input listings that can be used by OEP's National Resource Analysis Center in its computer program for estimating damage to key facilities on gas pipelines. Complete kits have been distributed to nine EPGA Gas Group Offices, EPGA regional offices, OOG's Washington office, and OOG's relocation site.

A selected list of NPC studies is shown on the following page.

NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL STUDIES RELATING TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Capacity of Crude Oil Gathering Systems and Deepwater Terminals (1970)

Civil Defense and Emergency Planning for the Petroleum and Gas Industries (1964)

Emergency Fuel Convertibility (1965)

Maintenance and Chemical Requirements for U.S. Petroleum Refineries and Natural Gasoline Plants (1961)

Materials Requirements for Petroleum Exploration and Production (1960)

Petroleum and Gas in a National Emergency (An Analysis of Government Planning) (1964)

Proved Discoveries and Productive Capacity of Crude Oil, Natural Gas and Natural Gas Liquids in the United States (1965)

Skills and Occupations of People in the United States Oil and Gas Industries (1969)

U.S. Petroleum and Gas Transportation Capacities (1967)

U.S. Petroleum Inventories and Storage Capacity (1970)

EPGA has been furnished plans and manuals prepared by other agencies that will be activated immediately upon attack. These cover such vital services as: wage and salary stabilization programs; money, credit and banking; rent board instructions for stabilizing rent and determining ceiling prices of real property; ration board instructions for consumer rationing; and price board instructions for stabilizing prices and services, etc.

WHAT SHOULD OIL AND GAS COMPANIES DO NOW TO PREPARE FOR NATIONAL EMERGENCIES?

So far, this booklet has dealt largely with cooperative efforts of government and the oil and gas industry to prepare for operations in a time of emergency.

But there are important steps that each company can—and should—take on its own to ensure that the company can cope with a civil defense emergency.

The National Petroleum Council has prepared a report, *Civil Defense and Emergency Planning for the Petroleum and Gas Industries,* containing "Principles and Procedures" and "Guide and Sample Company Plans." The report was completed in 1964, and over 75,000 copies were printed and disseminated throughout the Nation to oil and gas companies as well as other industries and government agencies. Copies are obtainable from the National Petroleum Council, 1625 K Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20006.

Among the elements of industrial civil defense planning covered in that booklet are these: (1) establishing a company civil defense program; (2) assuring continuity of management; (3) protecting employees; (4) safeguarding plant and property; and (5) providing an emergency organizational capability for restoring and continuing operations.

1. *Establishing a Company Civil Defense Program*

Top management in each company must inform all executive and supervisory personnel of the importance of civil defense. Top management policy direction is a vital factor in securing effective emergency planning by key management and operating personnel.

One of the first steps in getting the company civil defense and disaster control program under way is the appointment of a responsible official as civil defense coordinator. In large companies, this should be followed by the designation of key personnel as coordinators for each major operating unit, facility or plant to provide coordination and direction to the execu-

tion of the company civil defense plan and disaster plan for each separate company installation.

Company civil defense planning must be consistent with the civil defense program of the national, state and local governments. The company civil defense coordinator will want to become thoroughly familiar with the authority, organization and emergency procedures that are established by law and that will become effective upon declaration of a civil defense emergency by the President or the Congress.

2. *Continuity of Management*

Preservation of managerial leadership—at company headquarters and at the plant level—must be a major part of the company disaster control and civil defense plan. For each key position, replacements should be designated in order of succession. Companies should plan for continued operation of various plants and divisions as independent entities until central corporate headquarters could be re-established in the event the corporate headquarters were destroyed in an attack. Alternate corporate or plant headquarters should be established so that key personnel will have a safe place from which to operate the company business during a civil defense emergency.

3. *Protection of Employees*

A dependable warning system is a vital part of the civil defense planning of both government and industry. The backbone of the civil defense warning system is the National Warning System which links Civil Defense National Warning Center at the Headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and more than 600 state and local warning points in the continental United States. They, in turn, relay the warning to local communities.

Complete dissemination of the warning to all office buildings, shops, plants, warehouses, laboratories and other areas where employees are located is essential. In some cases, existing public address and plant radio systems can be used. Employees must be informed about what the warning signals are, what they mean, and what action is to be taken upon receipt of a warning signal.

Identifying effective fallout shelter for employees and making arrangements for moving employees rapidly to such shelters in the event of nu-

An Important Element of Industrial Civil Defense Planning Is

PLANT SECURITY



clear attack are key elements of the civil defense plan for every industrial facility. The first step in planning such protection at an industrial facility is a survey of the existing structures to determine how much shelter is available, its quality, and the number of people that can be accommodated in it.

If a building meets Civil Defense requirements and the owner is willing to make this protected space available for public occupancy in case of a nuclear attack, the government will provide food, water, sanitary facilities, medical supplies sufficient for a two-week occupancy, and a set of radiological monitoring instruments.

The facility civil defense plan should provide for the appointment of a shelter manager for each shelter area in the facility. Similarly, other employees should be designated as necessary to assist each shelter manager in performing specific duties such as maintaining order, radiological monitoring, distributing food and water, and other required duties. Facility managers should arrange through their local Civil Defense Directors to have selected employees trained in shelter management.

Every industrial and commercial facility should have some personnel trained to detect and measure the intensity of radioactive fallout. These employees should also receive instruction in maintaining radiological monitoring equipment so that these instruments will always be ready for use. The local Civil Defense Director can arrange training in radiological monitoring for employees designated by the plant manager.

4. *Safeguarding Plant and Property*

Oil and gas installations are both critical as essential defense facilities and vulnerable to sabotage and other subversive activities. The more critical and vulnerable facilities in relation to continuity of operations should be identified and measures taken to reduce vulnerability, taking into account the possibility of power failures and natural disaster as well as enemy actions. Emergency shutdown procedures for plants should be developed and tested. Vital records should be protected including the duplication and safe storage of records important to the continuation of the company and its operations.

5. *Emergency Organizational Capability*

An early and comprehensive assessment of the damage caused by an attack is vital to quick recovery. A good disaster plan provides for organizing and training selected employees to assess damage and restore electric power, communications, gas and water services, as well as repair of damage to production facilities. Restoration of facilities subjected to fallout involves special considerations for which appropriate preparations should be made.

* * *

To be sure your company is doing all it can to prepare for survival, review the checklist prepared by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (see page 34).

Of particular importance is integration of company preparedness measures with those being developed by the Office of Oil and Gas. To facilitate this, industry officials should get to know the Executive Reservists who are assigned as their functional counterparts in the stand-by EPGA. It would be advantageous for company managers to review their defense planning efforts with men who have become well acquainted with the emergency planning efforts of national, state and local governments.

Another helpful source of information for company emergency planning is the *Industrial Civil Defense Workbook,* obtainable from the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Washington, D. C. 20025, or from your local Civil Defense Director.

CONCLUSION

Remote as it may seem, we must face the possibility of a serious national emergency. We must prepare now for the things we would have to do so that our Nation could survive and recover. How well we prepare now spells the difference between survival and defeat.

No matter what segment of the oil and gas industry a man is in, no matter how small or large his company, there is an essential part for him to play in the industry's effort to prepare for its task of supplying a major part of the Nation's energy needs in an emergency.

LIST OF EXHIBITS

PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING & CIVIL DEFENSE

EXHIBIT 1

RELATIONSHIPS CHART



OEP—OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
OOG—OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS
DCPA—DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY

** In many states there is one director for both emergency planning and civil defense. In other states there are both a Director of Emergency Planning responsible for management of resources and a Director of Civil Defense responsible for civil defense matters.*

EXHIBIT 2

OIL & GAS

FEDERAL-STATE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION RELATIONSHIP



NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION–EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION



EXHIBIT 4

PRO FORMA REGIONAL ORGANIZATION – EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION

(ACTIVATED AS REQUIRED AND STAFFED TO THE DEPTH NECESSARY IN EACH REGION)



EXHIBIT 5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR



EXHIBIT 6

Principal Officials—Emergency Resource Management

EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION

National Headquarters

National Administrator
Name: Rogers C. B. Morton
Secretary of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Address: Washington, D.C. 20240
Telephone: (202) 343-6412

Alternate Administrator
Name: Hollis M. Dole
Assistant Secretary-Mineral Resources
Department of the Interior
Address: Washington, D.C. 20240
Telephone: (202) 343-2186

Deputy Administrator (To be appointed from Alternate Deputies)

Alternate Deputy Administrator
Name: Harold M. McClure, Jr.
President, McClure Oil Company
Address: P.O. Box 147
Alma, Michigan 48801
Telephone: (517) 463-1141

Alternate Deputy Administrator
Name: Gene P. Morrell
Director, Office of Oil and Gas
Department of the Interior
Address: Washington, D.C. 20240
Telephone: (202) 343-8071

OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS

Director—Gene P. Morrell

Associate Director
Name: Ralph W. Snyder, Jr.
Address: Office of Oil and Gas
Department of the Interior
Washington, D.C. 20240
Telephone: (202) 343-5480

Assistant Director, Emergency Preparedness and Oil Import Compliance
Name: John Ricca
Address: Office of Oil and Gas
Department of the Interior
Washington, D.C. 20240
Telephone: (202) 343-3831

Chief, Emergency Preparedness
Name: Robert L. Presley
Address: Office of Oil and Gas
Department of the Interior
Washington, D.C. 20240
Telephone: (202) 343-3353

Chief, Emergency Committees
Name: Ben Tafoya
Address: Office of Oil and Gas
Department of the Interior
Washington, D.C. 20240
Telephone: (202) 343-4164

EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATION

EXHIBIT 7



NOTE:

In the event of "Cut Off" from Regional Headquarters, each State EPGA Organization will endeavor to contact National Headquarters for guidance.

0 **EPGA Regional Office**

STATE **EPGA State Office**

0# **Gas Group Office**

Puerto Rico Virgin Is.	Region 2
District of Columbia	Region 3
Canal Zone	Region 4
American Samoa, Guam	Region 9

*Alternate National Headquarters

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EXHIBIT 8

EPGA GAS GROUP OFFICES

Group No.	*Group Office Locations*	*Host Company*	*Gas Group Office Reports to Region No.*
1	Birmingham, Alabama	Southern Natural Gas Company	4
2	Elkins, West Virginia	Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.	3
3	Kansas City, Missouri	Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.	5
4	Shreveport, Louisiana	United Gas Pipe Line Company	6
5	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	Cities Service Gas Company	6
6	Omaha, Nebraska	Northern Natural Gas Company	7
7	Colorado Springs, Colorado	Colorado Interstate Gas Company	8
8	Kingman, Arizona	El Paso Natural Gas Company	9
9	Butte, Montana	The Montana Power Company	8

NINE EPGA GAS GROUPS

▲ LOCATION OF GAS GROUPS

Group 1 – Birmingham, Alabama
Group 2 – Elkins, West Virginia
Group 3 – Kansas City, Missouri
Group 4 – Shreveport, Louisiana
Group 5 – Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Group 6 – Omaha, Nebraska
Group 7 – Colorado Springs, Colorado
Group 8 – Kingman, Arizona
Group 9 – Butte, Montana



BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. **National Plans**

   a. "The National Plan for Emergency Preparedness," December 1964. Sets forth the basic principles, policies, responsibilities, preparations and responses of civil government to meet a national emergency and describes the roles of Federal, state and local governments, non-governmental organizations and individual citizens. Chapter 1 covers *Basic Principles;* and Chapter 10 covers *Fuel and Energy*. (Available from the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. 20504, or the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price: 75 cents.)

2. **Authority for Priorities and Allocations**

   a. "Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended" (50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2061) (Title I, Sec. 101—Priorities and Allocations).
   Gives authority to the President to establish priorities and to allocate materials and facilities, as necessary, to promote the national defense.

   b. "Executive Order 10480" (August 14, 1953—as amended 1962).
   In which the President delegates functions conferred upon him by Title I of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and directs him to provide by redelegation or otherwise for their performance by certain Executive Branch officials including the Secretary of the Interior.

   c. "Defense Mobilization Order 8400.1," November 6, 1963.
   In which the functions of the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness under Title I of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, are delegated to the offices and agencies named in Section 201 of Executive Order 10480, as amended.

   d. *DM Release 1379* (December 28, 1971)—DELGATION—Authority in Defense Emergencies (EPGA). Delegation of Authority to Headquarters and Field Officials of the Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration. Department of the Interior Manual, Part 290.2.1 through 290.2.1C. (Revision of Department of the Interior Manual, Part 205.4.6 through 205.4.6C, issued under DM Release 730, March 22, 1965.)

3. **Emergency Preparedness Functions**

   a. "Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended."
   In which the President is given all authority formerly vested by law in the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, along with the power to redelegate.

   b. "Executive Order 11490," October 28, 1969 (Revokes E.O. 10997—February 16, 1962).
   In which the President assigned emergency preparedness functions to the Secretary of the Interior, including the preparation of national emergency plans and development of preparedness programs covering petroleum and gas and certain other commodities.

   c. *DM Release 747* (July 7, 1965)—EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS—Organization and Functional Statement; establishes EPGA. (Department of the Interior Manual, Part 190.2.1 through 190.2.8D, plus 2 charts and 1 map, issued under DM Release 730, March 22, 1965.)

4. **Priority Use of Resources**

   a. "Defense Mobilization Order 8500.1A," November 4, 1964.
   Provides policy on post-attack use of resources and guidance for priorities on use of resources. (Also lists essential survival items.)

5. **Designation of Federal Claimant Agencies**

   a. "Office of Emergency Preparedness Circular 8500.4A," May 1, 1965.
   Designation of Federal claimant agencies for emergency preparedness planning.

6. **Example State Plans for Petroleum and Gas**

   a. Example State Plan for Petroleum.
   "Example of a State Plan for Emergency Management of Resources," Part B, Resource Sections, IX. Petroleum. (OEP, May 1964)

   b. Example State Plan for Gas.
   "Example of a State Plan for Emergency Management of Resources," Part B, Resource Sections, V. Gas. (OEP, May 1964)

7. **National Defense Executive Reserve**

   a. "Executive Order 11179," September 22, 1964.
   Provides for the National Defense Executive Reserve authorized by Section 710(e) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended. Supersedes Executive Order 10660, February 15, 1956.

   b. "OEP Circular 9700.2B," National Defense Executive Reserve. Policies and Procedures Manual, May 1972.
   Provides policies, standards, and procedures for carrying out the National Defense Executive Reserve program.

8. **Reports of the Emergency Advisory Committee for Natural Gas**

   a. "Emergency Operations Guide for the Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Industry," October 1967.
   (Available from the Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C. 20240.)

9. **Miscellaneous**

   a. "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," Revised Edition, Samuel Glasstone, Editor. (730 Pages, $3.00, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.)

   b. "Minimizing Damage to Refineries from Nuclear Attack, Natural and Other Disasters," February 1970. ($2.50, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.)

   c. "A Guide to the Defense Electric Power Administration," 1972. (75¢, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.)

   d. "Emergency Transportation Planning Officer's Directory," March 1, 1972. (U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590.)

   e. "Emergency Preparedness Progress in Seaports," March 1972. (Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230.)

   f. "Preparedness Programs for Emergency Operations in Banking," 1970. (Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense.)

   g. "Industrial Defense Against Civil Disturbances, Bombings, Sabotage," 1971. (Department of the Army.)

   h. "Emergency Planning in the Communications and Electronics Equipment Industries," March 1971. (Published by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce in cooperation with the Dept. of Defense, Office of Civil Defense.)

A Checklist of Procedures in Preparing for Civil Defense in Industry

Establishing the Company Civil Defense Program

1. Get in touch with your local civil defense director.
2. Appoint corporate and plant civil defense coordinators.
3. Select corporate and plant civil defense advisory committees.
4. Issue corporate policy directives establishing the civil defense program.
5. Train civil defense coordinators and committee members at DCPA schools.
6. Join with neighboring plants in organizing industrial mutual aid associations.
7. Prepare a manual of company and plant civil defense plans.
8. Tell stockholders about your company civil defense plan.
9. Let the public know that your company has prepared for civil defense.

Continuity of Management

10. Establish a control center and emergency communications system.
11. Establish executive succession list.
12. Amend corporate by-laws and regulations as necessary.
13. Establish emergency corporate headquarters at alternate locations.

Protection of Employees

14. Arrange for receipt and dissemination of warning.
15. Provide fallout shelter for employees and the public.
16. Plan for mass movement of employees to shelter.
17. Enlarge existing protective groups.
18. Organize employees into special groups for self-help.
19. Enroll these groups into departments of local government.
20. Train for—shelter management—radiological monitoring—first aid and medical self-help—decontamination—rescue—fire fighting.
21. Tell employees about the company civil defense plan.
22. Inform and educate employees in methods of personal and home survival.
23. Publish stories about civil defense in company and employee publications.
24. Urge discussion of civil defense at employee meetings.

Safeguarding of Plant and Property

25. Assess vulnerability of plant and headquarters location.
26. Develop emergency shutdown procedures.
27. Establish a security system for protection against espionage and sabotage.
28. Prepare to detect and report unexploded ordnance and unconventional weapons.
29. Protect vital company records and documents.
30. Deconcentrate production of critical items.
31. Disperse new industrial plants.

Emergency Organizational Capability

32. Plan for continuity of each important company function.
33. Assign emergency duties to department heads and appropriate employees.
34. Develop emergency financial procedures.
35. Designate post-attack assembly points for employees.
36. Prepare quickly to assess and report damage following attack.
37. Plan for emergency repair and restoration.
38. Develop plans for quickly training employees following attack.
39. Test the disaster control plan with drills and exercises.
40. Provide leadership, support and assistance to local government in preparing for community survival.

NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL
1625 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006
H. A. True, Jr., *Chairman*
Robert G. Dunlop, *Vice-Chairman*
Vincent M. Brown, *Executive Director*
An Advisory Committee
to the
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Washington, D.C.
Rogers C. B. Morton, *Secretary*
Hollis M. Dole, *Assistant Secretary—Mineral Resources*
and to the
OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS
Gene P. Morrell, *Director*

Originally Prepared in 1966 by the
National Petroleum Council
in response to a request of the
Department of the Interior
and as a
service to the oil and gas industries and
all others who may find
this booklet helpful in their
Emergency Planning Programs

Additional copies of this booklet may be obtained from the Office of Oil and Gas, U.S. Department of the Interior.


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NATIONAL DEFENSE
EXECUTIVE RESERVE
EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION


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