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By Docket Room at 8:55 am, Aug 11, 2022

Lake Charles Exports, LLC; Application) Docket Nos. 11-59-LNG
To Amend Existing Long-Term) 16-110-LNG
Authorizations To Export Liquefied)
Natural Gas to Non-Free Trade)
Agreement Countries)

Lake Charles LNG Export Company,) Docket Nos. 13-04-LNG
LLC; Application To Amend Existing) 16-109-LNG
Long-Term Authorizations To Export)
Liquefied Natural Gas to Non-Free)
Trade Agreement Countries)

NOTICE OF INTERVENTION, PROTEST AND COMMENT BY THE INDUSTRIAL ENERGY CONSUMERS OF AMERICA

The Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM) (formerly the Office of Fossil Energy) of the Department of Energy (DOE) gives notice (Notice) of receipt of an application (Application), filed on June 21, 2022, by Lake Charles Exports, LLC (LCE). LCE requests to amend its existing authorizations to export domestically produced liquefied natural gas (LNG) to non-free trade agreement countries set forth in DOE/FE Order Nos. 3324-A and 4011 (both as amended). Specifically, LCE seeks to amend the commencement of operations deadline in each order. LCE filed the Application under the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Protests, motions to intervene, notices of intervention, and written comments are invited.

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I. Industrial Energy Consumers of America

The Industrial Energy Consumers (IECA) of America is a nonpartisan association of leading manufacturing companies with \$1.1 trillion in annual sales, over 11,700 facilities nationwide, and with more than 1.8 million employees. It is an organization created to promote the interests of manufacturing companies through advocacy and collaboration for which the availability, use and cost of energy, power or feedstock play a significant role in their ability to compete in domestic and world markets. IECA membership represents a diverse set of industries including: chemicals, plastics, steel, iron ore, aluminum, paper, food processing, fertilizer, insulation, glass, industrial gases, pharmaceutical, building products, automotive, independent oil refining, and cement.

II. Comments

The Industrial Energy Consumers (IECA) submits this motion to intervene in opposition to the requested extension of time out to December 16, 2028 for Lake Charles Exports, LLC and Lake Charles LNG Export Company (LCE).

Under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), it is not in the public interest to grant the extension when the future LNG exports from LCE individually and with the cumulative exports of others, that were justified by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Study on "Macroeconomic Outcomes of Market Determined Levels of U.S. LNG Exports" has proven to be significantly incorrect *and has resulted in developments of such significant consequence as to put the public interest at risk. DOE is fully authorized to take action as necessary to protect the public interest. [Federal Register/Vol 83. No. 120, Thursday, June 21, 2018]*

As compared to the study, LNG exports have already resulted in substantially increased inflation via higher natural gas and electric power prices nationwide. But for LNG exports, the U.S. would not have been short 14.9 Bcf/d last winter, which drove up prices. The anticipation of even higher export volume has contributed to higher futures prices. On a regional basis, LNG exports have damaged reliability for both natural gas and power generation and are going to get even more severe due to pipeline limitations going forward.

To extend the requested time and eventual operation of LCE is to lock-in decades of increased natural gas and power prices, inflation, damaging manufacturing competitiveness, reshoring and threaten economic, and national security. The extension does nothing to serve the public interest under the NGA.

LNG exports, including future exports by LCE, serve foreign country customers, not U.S. consumers and the public interest and not even the national security interests of the U.S. We note that a significant volume of LNG long-term (20 year) contracts have been signed for destination to China, not to our NATO allies.

Exports create higher demand and lower national natural gas inventories that are needed for peak winter demand thereby threatening reliability. None of these impacts are in the public interest.

IECA is entering into today's record comments that were filed on July 27, 2018 in response to the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Study on "Macroeconomic Outcomes of Market Determined Levels of U.S. LNG Exports." The study was used to justify approval of large volumes of LNG to NAFTA countries, including LCE, and was fundamentally flawed and purposefully constructed in a manner to justify exports without sufficient consideration to the public interest. Export volumes approved based upon this study and previous studies are not in the public interest. The study violated the Data Quality Act because it used economic models that were by a third party, not transparent and consumers were unable to verify the conclusions and file appropriate comments.

The DOE has put in place an LNG export policy, not a policy that balances the need for reliable and affordable natural gas and electricity for the benefit of our Nation's economic and national

security interests. The public interest standard calls for U.S. consumers and the economy to be the priority, not LNG exports. The opposite is true today with existing policy. The study placed the finger on the scale in favor of LNG exports.

We offer three quotes from the DOE study as further evidence that LCE extension of time are not in the public interest:

Page 65 of the study says, “U.S. consumer well-being increases with rising LNG exports.” If fact, the reality has been just the opposite. We have seen a linear relationship of rising natural gas and electricity costs with increased LNG exports that have added tens of billions of dollars to energy costs that have fueled inflation nationwide and challenged reliability. Only a narrow sector of the economy has benefited (exporters, oil and gas companies) while every citizen and the economy in general has been negatively affected.

Page 67 of the study says, “Under these export scenarios, as U.S. LNG exports increase, U.S. households who hold shares in companies that own liquefaction plants receive additional income from take-or-pay tolling charges for LNG exports. The additional sources of income for U.S. consumers outweigh the income loss associated with higher energy prices.” The facts are quite different than the claim by the study. It is only a handful of large corporations, including foreign companies that own these export terminals and financially benefit, not households.

The study price projections underestimate the impact to domestic prices. On page 17, the reference case states, “These central cases have a combined probability of 47% and prices range from \$5.00 to about \$6.60 per MM Btu in 2040”. In fact, in 2022 prices have risen as high as \$9.28/MM Btu.

With only 13.18 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of nameplate LNG capacity operating (17.6% of net 2021 supply), prices have been negatively impacted. The FERC reports that more are on the way and that there is approved and under construction another 6.58 Bcf/d (8.7% of 2021 net supply) and 20.8 Bcf/d that is approved and not under construction (27.8% of 2021 net supply). The DOE’s website reports that they have approved a total of 63 Bcf/day of exports to NFTA countries, a volume equal to 84% of 2021 net supply. The LCE and cumulative export volumes of this magnitude cannot possibly be in the public interest.

The study assumes that the resources and pipeline capacity will be available. That is an incorrect assumption. The volume of natural gas resources is meaningless unless it can be delivered to consumers. The last few years has illustrated that levels of production are very uncertain and that pipeline availability is as well. Other uncertainties include weather that causes extreme heat or cold, federal and state public policies, and activist groups that can stop or slow the drilling and building of pipelines. These uncertainties were not considered by the study.

The vulnerability of the captive natural gas consumer was not considered. Natural gas is not like gasoline. If the U.S. is short on gasoline, we can import it from every coast and ship it by


pipeline, rail, truck, and barge to serve domestic shortfalls. That capability does not exist for the domestic natural gas consumer. We do not have an alternative.

The study also does not consider that the global LNG export market is not a free market. The buyers and consumers of LNG are state owned enterprises (SOEs), natural gas and electricity utilities fully regulated and backed by their country governments. They have the responsibility to keep the lights on in their country. This means that they can pay any price for U.S. natural gas and simply pass it on. They have the ability, for example, in the dead of winter, during our peak demand, to literally buy-away U.S. natural gas from the domestic consumer. They have ‘market power’ over the U.S. consumer. U.S. manufacturing does not have automatic cost pass-through. If prices get too high and we cannot produce at a profit, we have to shut down operations.

If not for LNG exports, the U.S. Henry Hub natural gas price would have never increased to \$9.28/MMBtu on June 7, breaking a 13-year record. At \$9.00/MMBtu versus the average price of \$3.89/MMBtu in 2021 would cost consumers \$156 billion annually. Price volatility has soared. In figure 1 it shows the direct relationship between higher export volumes and prices.

Wholesale power prices would not have increased over 200% nationwide. While natural gas-fired power is only 38 percent of total power generation, its sets almost 100% of the electricity prices nationwide. For example, PJM’s wholesale power prices in June 2022 rose to \$80/MWh, a 266% increase versus \$30/MWh in 2021. For every one dollar increase in natural gas, electricity prices increase by \$13 per MWh. The fact that natural gas-fired power generation sets the marginal price for wholesale power was not considered by the study.

Figure 1



But for LNG exports, U.S. inventories would not have fallen to levels 17% below the previous year. If the Freeport LNG terminal fire had not occurred, national inventories would have become (and still may) dangerously low for reliability by the winter of 2022-2023.

The Freeport LNG fire illustrates the negative impact that LNG exports have on domestic prices (see figure 3). It is important to note that Freeport has only 2 Bcf/d of export capacity. But, when supply and inventories do not keep up, even relatively small volumes have significant leveraging effects on prices.

On June 7, 2022, the day before the fire, the Henry Hub natural gas price closed at \$9.28/MMBtu. On June 8, the day of the fire, the price closed at \$8.69/MMBtu. On June 14, Freeport LNG announced it would not resume exports until late 2022. Prices immediately fell to around \$7.21/MMBtu, an annual cost reduction of \$63 billion to U.S. consumers.

What happened last winter illustrates that the DOE study used to justify approval of LCE export facilities were flawed by not considering real and common uncertainties. A core issue is that the DOE study solely relied upon an unrealistic assumption that production will always exceed the combination of domestic and export demand.

Last winter total demand exceeded supply by 14.9 Bcf/d and as a result, prices rose to over \$9.00/MMBtu. If there were no LNG exports there would have been plenty of supply for the domestic market and prices would have been in the price range of past years. U.S. production totaled 95.6 Bcf/d and domestic demand was 99.5 Bcf/d, which means that supply for the domestic market was short only 3.9 Bcf/d. A shortfall of this small magnitude would not have caused much of a price increase as has been the case in recent years.

Total demand (domestic demand plus LNG/pipeline exports) equaled 119.2 Bcf/d. Canadian pipeline imports accounted for 8.7 Bcf/d. LNG exports created a shortfall of 14.9 Bcf/d (see figure 2). Because of high LNG exports, inventory levels fell to 17 percent below the previous year.

Figure 2





Figure 3



Past Administrations have defined public interest as “net economic benefit.” That definition does not protect the public from reliability and high price concerns due to real and common natural gas market uncertainties. The recent history on price impacts illustrates that costs and inflation impacts exceed net economic benefits.

For LCE, the Biden Administration’s DOE has the latitude to define public interest as, “the export volume, individually or collectively must not materially impact the price of natural gas in the U.S.” We urge DOE to examine LCE using this new definition.

There is a mistaken understanding about the public interest under the NGA. The NGA does not state that once an application is approved that it is in the public interest forever. As consumers, we interpret the NGA public interest to mean that export volumes must “always” be in the public interest and not a one and done.

Lastly, the DOE policy to extend the terms to December 31, 2050 is an anti-consumer policy because it transfers supply and price risk from exporters to consumers. The 2050 policy gives foreign countries guaranteed access to our market, while consumers have no alternative. Consumers are captive. The uncertainties associated with whether supply will be adequate by 2050 for the domestic market are very significant.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon on the applicant and on DOE/FE for inclusion in the FE docket in the proceeding in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 590.107(b) (2013).

Dated at Washington, D.C., this August 11, 2022.

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