



Department of Energy
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585



November 6, 2020

VIA OVERNIGHT UPS MAIL CARRIER

Dr. Thomas Mason
Laboratory Director
Triad National Security, LLC
Los Alamos National Laboratory
P.O. Box 1663, MS-A100
Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545

WEA-2020-01

Dear Dr. Mason:

This letter refers to the Department of Energy's (DOE) investigation into the facts and circumstances associated with a December 19, 2018, material-handling event in which a subcontractor worker was seriously injured when he was struck by a lifting hook attachment and load, which detached from a skid-steer loader, at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

The DOE Office of Enterprise Assessments' Office of Enforcement provided the results of the investigation to Triad National Security, LLC (Triad) in an investigation report dated November 8, 2019. The scope of the investigation also included Triad's involvement in implementing and sustaining corrective actions associated with a July 18, 2018, material handling event in which a worker from the same subcontractor suffered a concussion. An enforcement conference was convened on January 14, 2020, with you and members of your staff to discuss the report's findings and Triad's response. A summary of the enforcement conference and an attendance roster are enclosed.

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) considers the material-handling deficiencies to be of high safety significance. The December 19, 2018, flange-handling event exposed weaknesses in Triad's implementation of the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 851, *Worker Safety and Health Program*, and in Triad's implementation of corrective actions associated with the July 18, 2018, angle-iron event. The flange-handling event resulted in serious injury to a worker and could have resulted in death. The event revealed deficiencies in: (1) management responsibilities, (2) hazard identification, assessment, prevention, and abatement, and (3) occupational medicine.



The flange-handling event at the LANL Mercury Road laydown yard for the Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment (ECCCE) project revealed deficiencies in Triad's oversight of subcontractors and flow-down of Part 851 post-exposure medical evaluation requirements to subcontractors. Triad did not ensure that the lessons learned and corrective actions from the angle iron event were applied to the ECCCE project activities in the laydown yard, including: (1) additional safety oversight, (2) maintaining a "cone of safety" near material handling activities, and (3) adequately securing loads. Further, Triad did not recognize material handling activities of moving flanges from pallets on the ground to a welding table as lifts. Therefore, Triad did not ensure that classification, planning, and conducting these lifts was performed with adequate rigor, including consideration of the load capacity of material handling equipment. Consequently, no additional hazard analysis and implementation of controls occurred to protect workers from hazards associated with the lifting activity. Additionally, one or more subcontractor workers rendering aid to a seriously injured worker were not evaluated for potential bloodborne pathogen exposure despite being exposed to his blood.

Based on an evaluation of the evidence in this matter, including information presented at the enforcement conference, DOE/NNSA concludes that Triad violated requirements prescribed under 10 C.F.R. Part 851. Accordingly, DOE/NNSA hereby issues the enclosed Preliminary Notice of Violation (PNOV), which cites three Severity Level I violations with a corresponding civil penalty (unmitigated) of \$99,000 per violation. DOE/NNSA considers these deficiencies self-disclosing and grants no mitigation for timely self-identification, consistent with DOE's worker safety and health enforcement policies.

DOE/NNSA and Triad conducted a joint accident investigation of the flange-handling event. Triad developed a comprehensive corrective action plan to address the conclusions and fifteen Judgments of Need identified in the Joint Accident Investigation Report. Triad also performed an extent-of-condition review that was extended into other Cross Connection, Inc. contracts, other subcontractors, and across the laboratory for all capital project work. The corrective actions developed by Triad for the two Severity Level I violations related to management responsibilities, hazard identification, assessment, prevention, and abatement, if adequately implemented and maintained, are likely adequate to prevent recurrence of similar issues at LANL. In general, these actions appropriately address the specific judgments of need and conclusions of the Joint Accident Investigation Board report. Therefore, DOE/NNSA has granted partial mitigation of 50 percent of the civil penalties for the corrective actions addressing these two violations.

The corrective actions taken by Triad for the occupational medicine violation (i.e., lack of post exposure medical evaluation of involved workers) are likely adequate to prevent recurrence of similar issues if adequately implemented and maintained. Therefore, DOE/NNSA has granted partial mitigation of 25 percent of the civil penalty for the corrective actions addressing this violation. Full mitigation was not applied because Triad failed to rectify the lack of medical evaluation for workers exposed to blood during the response to this event.

In consideration of the mitigating factors, DOE/NNSA calculated a mitigated civil penalty (prior to adjustment for fee reduction) of \$173,250 for worker safety and health violations. However, DOE/NNSA withheld \$1,725,000 in contract award fee from Triad for safety and health-related

deficiencies, including those associated with the flange-handling event cited in this PNOV. Therefore, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 851.5(c), DOE/NNSA imposes no civil penalty for the violations cited in this PNOV.

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 851.42, *Preliminary Notice of Violation*, you are obligated to submit a written reply within 30 calendar days of receipt of the enclosed PNOV and to follow the instructions specified in the PNOV when preparing your response. If you fail to submit a reply within 30 calendar days, then in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 851.42(d), you relinquish any right to appeal any matter in the PNOV, and the PNOV will constitute a final order.

After reviewing your reply to the PNOV, including any proposed additional corrective actions entered into DOE's Noncompliance Tracking System, DOE/NNSA will determine whether any further activity is necessary to ensure compliance with DOE worker safety and health requirements. DOE/NNSA will continue to monitor the completion of corrective actions until this matter is fully resolved.

Sincerely,



William A. Bookless
Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
and Administrator, NNSA

Enclosures: Preliminary Notice of Violation (WEA-2020-01)
Enforcement Conference Summary
Enforcement Conference Attendance Roster

cc: Michael Weis, NA-LA
Kevin Dressman, EA-10
Lauren Griffith, Triad National Security, LLC
Venessa Chavez, Triad National Security, LLC

Preliminary Notice of Violation

Triad National Security, LLC
Los Alamos National Laboratory

WEA-2020-01

A U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) investigation into the facts and circumstances associated with a December 19, 2018, material-handling event in which a subcontractor worker was struck and seriously injured by a lifting hook attachment falling from a skid-steer loader at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) revealed multiple violations of DOE worker safety and health requirements by Triad National Security, LLC (Triad). The scope of the investigation also included Triad's involvement in implementing and sustaining corrective actions associated with a July 18, 2018, material handling event in which a worker from the same subcontractor suffered a concussion.

DOE provided Triad with an investigation report dated November 8, 2019, and convened an enforcement conference on January 14, 2020, with Triad representatives, to discuss the report's findings and Triad's response. A summary of the enforcement conference and attendance roster are enclosed. Brief summaries of the two events are as follows:

Flange-Handling Event: On December 19, 2018, at the LANL Mercury Road laydown yard, Cross Connection, Inc. (CCI) workers were using a skid-steer loader with a fork mounted lifting hook attachment (lifting attachment) to lift a rigged 24-inch flange from a pallet on the ground to a welding table. The lifting attachment, which was not designed for use on the skid-steer loader, was placed on the forklift tines but not secured with the required safety pins. Workers rigged the flange by a sling to the bottom of the lifting hook. As the flange was lowered towards the table, a worker was positioned in front of the load, holding two bolts for insertion through the flange bolt-holes. As the forklift tines dropped below horizontal, the 350-pound lifting attachment and the rigged 268-pound flange slid off the forklift tines. The lifting attachment struck the worker in the face, arms, and upper torso, resulting in severe injuries, including multiple fractures of the worker's right arm and ribs, lung damage, and a severe, full-depth facial laceration. The worker was hospitalized for three nights. A co-worker provided aid to the injured worker until paramedics arrived, and the injured worker was transported to the hospital for evaluation and treatment. Later that evening, the injured worker was air transported to a trauma center for further treatment. Two additional workers were exposed to the hazard but were not injured.

Angle Iron Event: On July 18, 2018, subcontractor workers from CCI were performing demolition of ceiling plenums at LANL's Technical Area 3, Building 2327. The plenums, approximately 8 feet wide by 22 feet long by 30 inches high, were constructed of sheet metal panels and bolted angle iron, covered with gypsum board. To remove the plenums, the gypsum board panels of each plenum were removed. Then, workers removed the exposed angle iron by positioning two material lifts (one under the middle of each side of an L-shaped section of angle

iron) and using a piece of Unistrut in front to keep it from sliding off the material lift forks. While working to remove the third plenum, workers encountered an off-centered cement pad, requiring a material lift configuration change. To accommodate the pad, one of the material lifts was repositioned parallel to the plenum, preventing the angle iron from being fully supported by the tines or limited by the Unistrut. Once workers unsecured this section from the ceiling, the angle iron, weighing over 100 pounds, fell approximately five feet, striking a worker on his hard hat and knocking him to the ground. Work was paused and the worker declined medical care. The worker drove himself home and later went to a local hospital where he was diagnosed with a concussion without loss of consciousness.

Pursuant to Section 234C of the *Atomic Energy Act of 1954*, as amended, and DOE regulations as set forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 851 (Part 851), *Worker Safety and Health Program*, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hereby issues this Preliminary Notice of Violation (PNOV) to Triad. The regulatory violations cited in this PNOV include deficiencies in: (1) management responsibilities, (2) hazard identification, assessment, prevention and abatement, and (3) occupational medicine. DOE/NNSA has categorized these deficiencies as three Severity Level I violations.

Severity Levels are explained in Part 851, Appendix B, *General Statement of Enforcement Policy*. Subparagraph VI(b)(1) states that “[a] Severity Level I violation is a serious violation. A serious violation shall be deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a potential that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment.”

In accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 851.5(b) and DOE Acquisition Regulation 48 C.F.R. § 970.5215-3, incorporated by reference into the NNSA-Triad contract (Contract No. 89233218CNA000001) at Section I, Clause I-21, *Conditional Payment of Fee, Profit and Other Incentives – Facility Management Contracts*, DOE/NNSA withheld \$1,725,000 in contract award fee from Triad for safety and health-related deficiencies, including those associated with the flange handling event cited in this PNOV. Therefore, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 851.5(c), DOE/NNSA proposes no civil penalty for the violations cited in this PNOV.

As required by 10 C.F.R. § 851.42(b) and consistent with Part 851, Appendix B, the violation is listed below. If this PNOV becomes a final order, then Triad may be required to post a copy of this PNOV in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 851.42(e).

I. VIOLATIONS

A. Management Responsibilities

Title 10 C.F.R. § 851.10, *General requirements*, subsection (a), states that “[w]ith respect to a covered workplace for which a contractor is responsible, the contractor must: ... (2) [e]nsure that work is performed in accordance with: (i) [a]ll applicable requirements of [10 C.F.R. Part 851]; and (ii) [w]ith the worker safety and health program for that workplace.”

Title 10 C.F.R. § 851.21, *Hazard identification and assessment*, subsection (a), states that “[c]ontractors must establish procedures to identify existing and potential workplace hazards and assess the risk of associated worker injuries and illnesses. Procedures must include methods to: . . . (3) [r]ecord observations, testing and monitoring results . . . (7) [r]eview site safety and health experience information.”

Triad document PD100, *DOE/NNSA Approved Los Alamos National Laboratory 10 CFR 851 Worker Safety and Health Program Description*, March 30, 2018, Revision 3, section 3.1.2, *Anticipation, Prevention, and Abatement*, states that “LANL and subcontractor’s management must establish and implement a hazard prevention and abatement process to ensure that all identified and potential hazards are prevented or abated in a timely manner. These processes apply to the design phase for new facilities and to existing hazards in existing facilities.”

NNSA project document PLAN-103286-00011, *Project Execution Plan for the Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment [ECCCE] Project*, March 5, 2018, Revision 0, section 8.3, *Environment, Safety and Health*, states that “[p]roject ES&H activities will be per PLAN-103286-00001, *ES&H Plan*.” Section 8.3.4 states that “[s]afety and health activities are planned and implemented over the full life cycle of the Project to ensure that the facility . . . can be built and operated in a manner that protects workers, the public, and the environment. The integration of safety requirements into the Project are driven by . . . 10 C.F.R. 851.”

LANL project document PLAN-103286-00001, *Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment Project Environmental, Safety & Health Plan*, August 2017, Revision 0, section 8.1, *Monitoring for Safety and Compliance*, states that “[t]he [M&O] construction safety inspectors perform daily compliance inspections. The project management team performs periodic management walk-arounds and self-assessments. The subcontract technical representative is responsible for enforcing the contractual safety requirements”. This section further states that “[t]he goal is to maintain a high level of on-site presence to observe and influence site activities, worker behaviors and safety and environmental compliance. The focus of these site visits is to improve safety performance by providing on-going assistance and coaching to the subcontractors and the workers. Daily safety compliance inspections by the construction safety inspectors will be completed and are considered to be enforcement activities used to monitor the subcontractor’s safety compliance performance. Deficiencies and good practices will be outlined in these daily reports. These daily reports are to be stored in the Electronic Document Management System.” Contrary to the above requirements and as evidenced by the following facts, Triad failed to provide effective oversight of, or apply lessons learned from, the angle iron event to the ECCCE project flange-handling activity in the laydown yard. Specific examples include the following:

1. Triad management did not ensure that monitoring and inspection of the subcontractor’s flange-handling activities emphasized compliance with material handling safety requirements and the recognized hazards of the work. Instead, monitoring and inspections focused primarily on facility/worksite conditions. Further, Triad oversight

resources were primarily directed toward other ECCCE project work locations since the laydown yard work activities were considered less hazardous.

2. Triad management did not ensure that daily reports monitoring CCI's safety performance for the ECCCE project were stored in the Electronic Document Management System. Between the assumption of site management responsibilities on November 1, 2018, and the day of the flange-handling event, only one inspection, dated December 16, 2018, was documented on the required form. The information reported on this form did not distinguish between the three distinct work locations comprising the ECCCE project. Further, this inspection occurred on a Sunday and CCI's *Daily Work Documentation Form* records do not identify any ECCCE work activities as being performed on this day.
3. Triad did not ensure that lessons learned and corrective actions from the angle iron event were effectively applied to ECCCE project management activities in the laydown yard, including: (1) providing an increased level of safety oversight and conducting frequent inspections, (2) maintaining a "cone of safety" near material handling activities, (3) properly using material handling equipment, and (4) adequately securing loads. Although the angle-iron event occurred during Triad's four-month contract transition period, members of the Triad transition team were aware of the event. In addition, some Triad personnel were involved with ECCCE project management throughout the timeframe of both events, and Triad accepted the corrective action plan established by the outgoing prime contractor during transition. Failure to adequately oversee subcontractor activities contributed to the worksite conditions in which the flange-handling event injury occurred.

Collectively, these deficiencies constitute a Severity Level I violation.

Base Civil Penalty – \$99,000

Mitigated Civil Penalty (50 percent for adequate corrective actions to prevent recurrence) – \$49,500

Proposed Civil Penalty (as adjusted for fee reduction) – \$0

B. Hazard Identification, Assessment, Prevention, and Abatement

Title 10 C.F.R. § 851.21, *Hazard identification and assessment*, subsection (a), states that "[c]ontractors must establish procedures to identify existing and potential workplace hazards and assess the risk of associated worker injuries and illnesses. Procedures must include methods to:... (4) [a]nalyze designs of new facilities and modifications to existing facilities and equipment for potential workplace hazards... (6) [p]erform routine job activity-level hazard analyses."

Title 10 C.F.R. § 851.22, *Hazard prevention and abatement*, subsection (c) states that "[c]ontractors must address hazards when selecting or purchasing equipment, products, and services."

Triad document PD100, *DOE/NNSA Approved Los Alamos National Laboratory 10 C.F.R. 851 Worker Safety and Health Program Description*, March 30, 2018, revision 3, Section

3.8, *Flow Down of 10 CFR 851 Requirements to Subcontractors*, states that “[e]nvironment, safety, and health (ES&H) requirements for subcontractors are flowed-down to subcontractors through Exhibit F, *Environmental, Safety and Health Requirements*, which is incorporated in their subcontracts.”

Triad document Exhibit F, Section F32.1, states that “[a]ll crane and material handling operations shall be performed in accordance with the applicable sections of 29 C.F.R. 1910 and 29 C.F.R. 1926, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B30 series documents, the *DOE Hoisting and Rigging Standard* (DOE STD 1090-2011), and the manufacturer’s instructions.” Section F32.11, states that “[a]ll lifts must be classified as ordinary, moderate risk, or critical by the designated subcontractor qualified person and agreed to by the contractor qualified person. Any lift meeting one or more of the following criteria shall be considered a critical lift: a significant risk of personal injury or property damage... exceeds or may exceed 75 percent of the rated capacity of the crane (or hoist) or rigging equipment used.” Section F32.12 states that “[c]ritical lifts must have a critical lift plan (LANL Form 2210A) approved by contractor qualified person and the subcontractor’s qualified person and person-in-charge before such before lifts are performed.” In addition, section F32.13 requires that “[a]ny moderate risk lift at LANL by subcontractor requires a completed Form 1611A, *Ordinary/Moderate Risk Lift Procedure for Subcontractors*. Moderate risk lift examples include:... where boom cranes or mobile cranes are involved and lifts are between 70% and 75% of chart for the boom angle and swing radius required for the full cycle of the lift.”

ASME Standard B30.9-2014, *Safety Standard for Cableways, Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings*, section 9-5.10.4 establishes acceptable rigging practices for slings. Specifically, section 9-5.10.4(c) states that “[t]he sling shall be hitched in a manner providing control of the load.” Section 9-5.10.4(d) states that “[s]lings in contact with edges, corners, protrusions, or abrasive surfaces shall be protected with a material of sufficient strength, thickness, and construction to prevent damage.” Section 9-5.10.4(h) states that “[t]wisting shall be avoided.” In addition, section 9-5.10.4(n) states that “[s]lings should not be constricted, bunched, or pinched by the load, hook, or any fitting.”

Bobcat manual *Operation & Maintenance Manual - S450 Skid-Steer Loader*, dated 2014, states “[u]se only attachments approved by Bobcat Company for this model loader... the attachments and buckets are designed for a Rated Operating Capacity... They are designed for secure fastening to the Bobcat loader. The user must check with the dealer, or Bobcat literature, to determine safe loads of materials of specified densities for the machine - attachment combination.”

Contrary to the above requirements and as evidenced by the following facts, Triad failed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor work activities to identify and address existing and potential workplace hazards in the laydown yard, which exposed workers to significant safety hazards. Specific examples include the following:

1. Triad did not establish requirements for ensuring appropriate selection and coordination of material handling equipment for the flange-handling activity. Consequently, a skid-

steer was used instead of a JLG Industries telehandler to lift the flange in the laydown yard. The operating characteristics of the skid-steer lacked the operational precision of the telehandler, which contributed to the event. Further, a lifting attachment designed and approved for a (JLG Industries) telehandler was used inappropriately on a skid-steer (contrary to the manufacturer's recommendations). The failure to coordinate material handling equipment assignments contributed to the lack of a required safety pin on the lifting attachment, allowing it to detach and cause serious injuries to a worker.

2. Triad personnel responsible for oversight of subcontractor work activities (in the laydown yard) did not recognize material handling activities, such as moving flanges from pallets on the ground to a welding table, as lifts. Therefore, Triad did not ensure that classification, planning and conducting these lifts was performed with adequate rigor, including consideration of the skid-steer's load capacity and the total load of the list (i.e., the combined weight of the flange, rigging material, lifting hook, and pallet fork attachment). Consequently, no additional hazard analysis or implementation of controls occurred to protect workers from the hazards associated with lifting activities. Further, the flange was not properly rigged to ensure worker safety during lifting activities. The unapproved, alternate method for rigging the flange resulted in twists in the sling and multiple constrictions where the sling passed through boltholes in the flange, and no cut protection was provided for the synthetic sling.

Collectively, these deficiencies constitute a Severity Level I violation.

Base Civil Penalty – \$99,000

Mitigated Civil Penalty (50 percent for adequate corrective actions to prevent recurrence) – \$49,500

Proposed Civil Penalty (as adjusted for fee reduction) – \$0

C. Occupational Medicine

Title 10 C.F.R § 851 Appendix A, Section 8, *Occupational Medicine*, Subsection (g) states that “[t]he occupational medicine services provider must determine the content of the worker health evaluations... (2) [t]he following health evaluations must be conducted when determined necessary by the occupational medicine provider ... (iii) [d]iagnostic examinations will evaluate employee's injuries and illnesses to determine work-relatedness, the applicability of medical restrictions, and referral for definitive care, as appropriate.”

Triad document OSH-ISH-FSD-BM-007, *Los Alamos National Laboratory Bloodborne Pathogen Exposure Control Plan*, (ECP), May 1, 2018, Revision 0.1, Section 1.2 *Scope and Applicability*, states that “...[t]his ECP does not apply to... subcontractors performing Exhibit F work, as these individuals must be included in their employer's ECP. Any worker who experiences an exposure incident in the workplace must contact Occupational Safety and Health – Occupational Health (OSH-OH) ...immediately, so the worker may be offered a follow-up evaluation.” Section 4.6 states that LANL will offer “the hepatitis B vaccine to all unvaccinated first aid providers who render assistance in any situation involving the presence of blood or OPIM [other potentially infectious materials] (regardless of whether the situation was an actual “exposure incident” as defined by the standard), as well as appropriate post-

exposure evaluation, prophylaxis, and follow-up for workers who experience an 'exposure incident.' The full hepatitis B vaccination series is to be made available as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours, to all unvaccinated first aid providers who have rendered assistance in any situation involving the presence of blood or other potentially infectious materials, regardless of whether or not a specific 'exposure incident,' as defined by the standard, has occurred." Section 4.8 further states that "[f]ollowing an exposure incident, an immediate, confidential medical evaluation and follow-up will be made available by an OSH-OH Medical Provider."

Contrary to the above requirements and as evidenced by the following facts, Triad failed to establish an equivalent requirement for subcontractor post-exposure medical evaluation in Exhibit F for the ECCCE project or address the disparity post-event. The LANL ECP establishes post exposure requirements for compliance with both the OSHA bloodborne pathogen standard and DOE occupational medicine requirements. For Triad workers exposed to blood, the ECP requires a medical evaluation to determine whether there was risk of bloodborne pathogen exposure, regardless of whether the situation is an actual "exposure incident" as defined by the OSHA standard or resulting from a "good samaritan" act. Subcontractors are explicitly excluded from coverage under the Triad ECP, with coverage to be addressed through the flow down of requirements in Exhibit F. However, Exhibit F for the ECCCE project provided limited expectations for compliance with only the OSHA bloodborne pathogen standard. Consequently, after the flange-handling event, one or more CCI workers rendering aid to a seriously injured worker were not evaluated for potential bloodborne pathogen exposure despite being exposed to human blood or other potentially infectious materials.

This deficiency constitutes a Severity Level I violation.

Base Civil Penalty – \$99,000

Mitigated Civil Penalty (25 percent for corrective actions¹) - \$74,250

Proposed Civil Penalty (as adjusted for fee reduction) – \$0

II. REPLY

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 851.42(b)(4), Triad is hereby obligated to submit a written reply within 30 calendar days of receipt of this PNOV. The reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to the Preliminary Notice of Violation."

If Triad chooses not to contest the violation set forth in this PNOV then the reply should clearly state that Triad waives the right to contest any aspect of this PNOV. In such case, this PNOV will constitute a final order 30 calendar days after the receipt of this PNOV.

If Triad disagrees with any aspect of this PNOV, then as applicable and in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 851.42(c)(1), the reply must: (1) state any facts, explanations, and arguments that support a denial of an alleged violation; and (2) discuss the relevant authorities that support the position asserted, including rulings, regulations, interpretations, and previous decisions issued by

¹ Full mitigation of 50 percent was not granted because Triad failed to rectify the lack of medical evaluation for workers exposed to blood during response to this event.

DOE. In addition, 10 C.F.R. § 851.42(c)(2) requires that the reply include copies of all relevant documents.

If Triad fails to submit a written reply within 30 calendar days of receipt of this PNOV, then pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 851.42(d), Triad relinquishes any right to appeal any matter in this PNOV, and this PNOV will constitute a final order.

Please send the appropriate reply by overnight carrier to the following address:

Director, Office of Enforcement
Attention: Office of the Docketing Clerk, EA-10
U.S Department of Energy
19901 Germantown Road
Germantown, Maryland 20874-1290

A copy of the reply should also be sent to my office and to the Manager of the Los Alamos Field Office.

III. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Corrective actions that have been or will be taken to avoid further violations should be delineated with target and completion dates in DOE's Noncompliance Tracking System.



William A. Bookless
Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
and Administrator, NNSA

Washington D.C.

This 6th day of November 2020