U.S. DEPARTMENT OF OFFICE OF CYBERSECURITY, ENERGY SECURITY, AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE



Validation and Measuring Automated Response (VMAR)

Idaho National Laboratory (INL)

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Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems Peer Review

November 6-8, 2018


Summary: Validation and Measuring Automated Response

Objective

 Promote Automated Response Capabilities in nontraditional configurations

Schedule


- May 2016 December 2019
- Milestones
 - September 2016 Partners/Models
 - November 2016 Evaluation Environment
 - February & September 2017 Capabilities Analysis
 - May 2018 Performance Scoring
- Response Capability where none existed prior



Performer:	Idaho National Laboratory
Partners:	San Diego Gas & Electric
Federal Cost:	\$1.4M
Cost Share:	\$150K
Total Value of Award:	\$ 1.6M
Funds Expended to Date:	85%

Advancing the State of the Art (SOA)

- In the Information Technology (IT), all in one Orchestrator command and control functionality
- More commonly in IT space, address blocking (blacklisting), adding new malware detection, and URL blocking can be automated. These features are emerging in some sectors, but not in the control system Operational Technology (OT) space.
- With a well defined OT configuration, tailored responses can be provided for automation
- To match the more state-like nature of control systems, provide reassurances to the latency concerns of operations and measure performance, security and resilience to trend over time
- Move beyond existing patch capability to create a novel response capability where none existed prior



Challenges to Success

Challenge 1 – Moving Left in Kill Chain - done

 Huge shift in timing from respond (identify, create patch, test, and patch) to response (action taken: find, remove, block and log)

Challenge 2 – Latency Issues in Control for OT - done

Provide performance views – Test Utility with performance metrics

Challenge 3 – Time to Test, Validate and Revert

Design test concepts, measures and rollback

Challenge 4 – Standardization for unique configs - done


 STIX, CybOX, OpenC2, Performance scripts, open source tools

Challenge 5 – Dependencies - done

 Equipment availability, timing of partner involvement, leveraged coordination with other related projects

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Peap Name:		* Pre © Case © Post	Generate po Summary
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Run Remote File Monitor?	⇔ Yes ⊯ No	Remote FIM Nexes	
Run Configuration Monitor?	⊖ Vers ⊯ No	Device To Monitor: [Second 4]	
Run Packet Engine?	⊖ Yes # No	Filter:	Example: top port 23 and heart 192.146.2.129







Progress to Date

Major Accomplishments

- AR and orchestrator capabilities analysis mapped to NIST report – February 2017
- SDG&E Testbed May 2017 and other Vendors (SecurityMatters, Phantom)
- Collaborating with other sensor based projects in OE
- Instrumented 3 substation automation configurations for performance measures to evaluate potential latency issues – September 2017
- Tested 2 unique AR technologies on SDG&E configuration October 2017
- Go/NoGo on Novel AR November 2017
- Connected AR to existing SIEM for integration to IT creating a 3rd limited AR – September 2018

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
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
- Indicate and Remediate Beyond IT Basics
 - COTS Based Automated Response
 - Prototyped Machine to Machine Automated Threat Response
- Heartbleed Detection and Alert
- Full Indicator and Remediation Actions
 - Unknown Telnet Kill session/block port COTS and Threat Monitoring Appliance (TMA)
 - WannaCry and Industroyer- use of common attacker C2 channels
 - BlackEnergy Wiper/Kill Disk
 - Industroyer Breaker Open
 - SIEM Failed Logins

'type": "indicator", "id": "indicator--d81f86b9-975b-bc0b-775e-810c5ad45a4f" "created": "2014-06-29T13:49:37.079Z", 'modified": "2014-06-29T13:49:37.079Z", "labels": ["malicious-activity" "name": "Malicious site hosting downloader", "pattern": "[url:value = 'http://x4z9arb.cn/4712/']", "valid from": "2014-06-29T13:49:37.079000Z'

Crash Override




COTS Automated Response





Structured Threat Intelligence Graph



Collaboration/Technology Transfer

Plans to transfer technology/knowledge to end user

- Multiple pathways for technology transfer
 - o Open source code for multiple asset owners
 - Technology Provider partnership

o Asset Owner partnership

- What are your plans to gain industry acceptance?
 - Heavy focus on measures and validation to prove out concepts for response and ensure no impact to operational system
 - Performance measures bottleneck is traditionally latency of commands, but process, storage and networks will also be measured
 - Change in protection profile adding response capability will change the security protection profile
 - Resilience of system adding response capability increases agility which is a key aspect of resilience



Collaboration/Technology Transfer

Knowledge to end user

- April 2017 Presentation: Performance Measures Design ICSJWG
- September 2017 Preliminary Performance Metrics Test Results to Utility Partners
- May 2018 Paper and Presentation: Efficacy and Effectiveness of Measures for AR at ISA PowID
- June 2018 Presentation to the Electric Sector Coordinating Council
- August 2018 Demo of AR and measures to EnergySec
- September 2018 Presentation/Demo to California Public Utilities Commission
- September 2018 Paper Referenced: Sharable and Implementable Threat Intelligence
- January 2019 DistribuTech as part of California Energy System for the 21st Century

Path Forward

- Creation and Test of Novel Launch AR
- Final Performance Metrics Collection and Analysis
- Open Source Launch AR host on repository
- Provide final publication Metrics