

# Security Enhancements for DERs in Standardized IEEE 1547 Environments

ABB Inc.

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Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery  
Systems (CEDS) Peer Review

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# Project Overview

## Objective

- The project addresses the gap in the IEEE 1547-2018 requirements on secure integration of DER, particularly DER systems consisting of multiple DER units.
- **Schedule**
- 10/1/18 – 9/30/21 (delayed start 01/19)
- Threat modeling (Q1 2020)
- Resilient DER system architecture (Q2 2020)
- IEEE 1547 security extensions (Q3 2020)
- Lab-scale implementation (planned, Q1 21)
- Red team testing (planned, Q2 2021)
- Field demonstration (planned, Q3 2021)

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**Total Value of Award:**      **\$ 3,358,734**

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**Funds Expended to Date:**      **30.4% as of 8/31/20  
(Not all funds have been invoiced to DOE yet.)**

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**Performer:**      **ABB Inc.**



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**Partners:**      **University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;  
Duke Energy;  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory**

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# Advancing the State of the Art (SOA)

- IEEE 1547-2018 revision introduced new requirements for DER performance and interoperability:
  - Points of applicability may be defined at Point of Connection or Point of Common Coupling.
  - No guidance on implementing interoperability and response for microgrids with multiple DER units.
  - Cybersecurity requirements are not addressed.
- Our approach extends the SOA by implementing cyber-physical secure resilient IEEE 1547 use cases for DER systems:
  - Aggregated regulation, ride-through and system-level anti-islanding considering the potential impact of the mode/setpoint change on the overall system performance.
  - DER circuit communication architecture and security enhancements for IEEE 1547 protocols.



# Advancing the State of the Art (SOA)

- Resilient IEEE 1547 DER system architecture and the use cases developed on top of open standards (IEC 61850-7-420) will enable interoperability.
- Similarly, proposed security extensions for IEEE 1547 protocols follow IEC 62351 practices.
- Use cases and semantic information models developed in the project contributed to UCA/OpenFMB Working Group to ensure industry acceptance.
- Field demonstration at Duke Energy to confirm the feasibility of the proposed approach.

# Progress to Date

## Major Accomplishments

- Defined threat models for major IEEE 1547 use case categories.
- Derived communication architecture and information models for hierarchical DER system based on open standards.
- Prototype implementation of IEEE 1547-constrained energy managements and resilient dynamic voltage support during ride-through with enhanced security mechanisms for Layer 2 and Layer 3 publisher-subscriber communications.
- Patent Application “Distribution Power System Fault Control Apparatus and Method” submitted.

# Challenges to Success

## **Implementation delayed due to restricted physical access to laboratory facilities.**

- Enhancing remote access capabilities to all hardware and software components that are needed for creating controller-hardware-in-the-loop setup.

## **Plans for field demonstration and red team testing affected by limited access to facilities.**

- Work with the partners on arranging remote access to the facilities; consider HIL-only demonstration as a back up.

## **Limited technology transfer and outreach possibilities.**

- Consider virtual event participation, possibly with pre-recorded video demonstrations.

# Collaboration/Sector Adoption

## Plans to transfer technology/knowledge to end user

- What category is the targeted end user for the technology or knowledge?
  - Asset owners (Utilities) and Vendors
- What are your plans to gain industry acceptance?
  - Controller and Power Hardware-in-the-loop testing, demonstrations at conferences/events in 2021
  - Field demonstration at Duke Energy facility in NC
  - Providing inputs to UCA OpenFMB/IEEE/ IEC working groups
- What is the timeline for demonstration and sector adoption?
  - Field demonstration and technology transfer with additional demos and working group presentations planned for 2021



# Next Steps for this Project



## **Approach for the next year or to the end of project:**

- Implementation and testing of the major use cases in CHIL and PHIL laboratory environment
- Red Team testing at ORNL
- Transition to field demonstration with algorithm tuning as needed
- Technology transfer – use cases and semantic models contributed to the community




# DER System Hierarchical Architecture


Concept of a recursive model for DER  
IEC 61850-7-420 Ed. 2



Conceptual hierarchical Information model for IEEE 1547  
operational and power management functions




Result: UML Model with derived semantic information models, actors, interactions, sequence diagrams and message profiles



DER Two Circuit Segment Feeder Model


# Use Case: Resilient Distributed Dynamic Voltage Support During Fault Ride-Through

- Grid faults -> Sensitive DER tripping
  - Fault ride-through and dynamic voltage support to keep DERs remain online and faster voltage recovery
- Uncontrolled local voltage support may become risky
- Aggregated cooperative response can shift ride-through operating point to safer region
  - Communication based methods require defining the appropriate message profiles and need enhanced security





## Solution Method:

- Distributed cooperative dynamic voltage support (DCDVS) resilient to single point of failure
- Implements a multiagent based leader target tracking algorithm
- Avoids uncoordinated current injections via cooperative behavior
- Secure publisher-subscriber mechanisms according to IEC 61850-90-5, 62351-6, and IEC 62351-9 principles for wired or wireless communications



# Use Case: Resilient Coordinated Anti-Islanding

- For an unintentional island in which the DER energizes a portion of the Area EPS through the PCC, the DER shall detect the island, cease to energize the Area EPS, and trip within 2 s of the formation of an island.
- Leveraging measurements and local islanding detection methods at multiple locations to confirm an unintentional island condition has occurred.
- Consensus-based resilient mechanism to reduce non-detection zone and reduce attack surface.
- New information models, communication profiles and the associated security.





# UIUC: Use Cases, Attacks, and Mitigation

## Use Cases demonstrating how misuse of IEEE 1547-2018 standard could result in grid instability.

- Malicious change of reactive power modes.
- Malicious change of state-of-charge information.
- Misuse of Volt-Var setpoints and conservative trip settings (See figures below).

## Mitigations: Network detection methods being explored:



- Firewalls with intelligent packet inspection rules.
- Simulations to decide if a new command will make the system unstable.
- Machine learning approach to decide if new settings pose a threat to stability.



# Example: Impacts of Malicious Mode Changes

## Demo – Malicious change of reactive power modes

- Assume the system is operating in constant power factor mode, active and reactive power are injected.
- Voltage-active power mode is on (or turned on by attacker), causing maximum active power injection.
- Attacker sends a command to change to Watt-VAR mode, causing maximum reactive power absorption.
- Sudden change from Q injection to Q absorption causes voltage depression.
- Monte Carlo simulations show that with DER penetration as low as 14% of AEPS capacity, voltage and frequency collapse occurs.





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**ENERGY**

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Cybersecurity, Energy Security,  
and Emergency Response

Thank you!

Questions?

